TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS
EU ANCHOR, ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS, ARAB WORLD

DAVID PHINNEMORE, ERHAN İÇENER, JOERG BAUDNER, NURULLAH ARDIÇ, ANDREY MAKARYCHEV, SARDAR AZIZ

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Insight Turkey is a peer-reviewed journal indexed by the following databases and indexes: Bibliography of Asian Studies, Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), EBSCO, Elsevier Bibliographic Databases, European Sources Online (ESO), GALE-Cengage, Gender Studies Database, Index Islamicus, International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR), International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ), International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), Lancaster Index to Defence and International Security Literature, Left Index, Middle East & Central Asian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences Bibliographies, Scopus, Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, World Affairs Online (WAO).

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SUMMER 2014 • VOLUME 16 NO. 3

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The international community faces a series of serious challenges, which need to be urgently addressed otherwise the ongoing conflicts will become entrenched and will have increasingly dire spillover effects on the region and globally. The crises in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine are at the top of the agenda of world leaders. However, there seems to be a lack of consensus and commitment to engage in these conflict marred countries to achieve a sustainable solution that will stabilize the region and satisfy all actors involved.

It seems that the leading powers are in a dilemma, reflecting the paradoxes of the global security architecture and the current international balance of power. As the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, such actions may lead to human tragedy and political disintegration, resulting in a long lasting catastrophe. However, avoiding intervention, even in the mild form of supporting legitimate claims of the opposition in Syria, has lead to not only serious damage to the social fabric of the country but to a protracted civil war. In turn, this has produced a fertile ground for the emergence of extremist groups and organizations, such as ISIS. Unless the root causes are addressed head on, any action to defeat these groups will be met with limited and short-term success. Political stability by the establishment of legitimate governments and administrations are the key to resolving these political and military conflicts. The international community, which appears to be trying to establish a core alliance to fight ISIS and similar groups under the leadership of the US, should take this reality very seriously.

Turkey’s position and its relations in the context of regional developments became even more critical after the presidential elections of August 10, 2014. This is the first direct election of a president in Turkey. So, while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the new President of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the architect of Turkey’s more pro-active foreign policy was elected as the Chairman of the ruling Justice and Development Party and has been appointed as the new Prime Minister of Turkey. He is now not only in charge of foreign policy but he is also responsible for preparing his party for the 2015 general elections. Davutoğlu’s term in office will be a period of “tests” in many respects.

Whether Turkey’s foreign policy direction will remain the same or whether new options will be considered greatly depends on what happens regionally.
Turkish foreign policy is heavily oriented towards humanitarian aid, economic and political integration, negotiation and conflict resolution as well as mobilizing the international community to respond to the people of the region’s legitimate demands for democratization. As the new President and new Prime Minister have both already underlined, Turkey will mainly pursue a policy aiming at regional stability in cooperation with local and international actors. As such, Turkey established closer contact with the KRG and stated its readiness to assist the new Iraqi government under Haidar al-Abadi.

The new issue of *Insight Turkey* focuses on Turkish foreign policy perspectives and options as well as other regional developments such as the Russian policy towards Ukraine, the Iranian nuclear issue, and the recent elections in Iraq. In the Commentary section, Ertan Aydın analyzes the results of the presidential elections and argues that Turkey has matured politically though there are still challenges ahead. Malik Mufti touches on a contested topic both in Turkey and beyond, which revolves around the perception of Turkish foreign policy options in the Arab world. He concludes that there is no monolith and fixed reaction towards Turkey’s regional reengagement. Murat Yeşiltas looks at the critiques of Turkish foreign policy centered upon the Islamist ideology, geopolitical codes, and the lack of capacity in foreign policy. Erhan İçener and David Phinnemore analyze the reasons for the frustration and pessimism regarding Turkey – EU relations. Ian Morrison’s critical contribution focuses on crisis and governance of religious pluralism in Europe.

Articles in this issue are products of long-term research and critical thinking. Joerg Baudner and Zuhal Mert Uzuner, in their contributions, evaluate Turkey’s foreign policy on practical and discursive levels; Baudner reflects on the main changes in Turkey’s positions with special reference to regional policies; Uzuner demonstrates that Turkey promotes a global consensus based on cosmopolitanism and multilateralism; and Nurullah Ardıç skillfully provides a discourse analysis on the concept of civilization arguing that this concept has increasingly been employed in Turkish foreign policy.

We hope that you will enjoy reading the current issue. ■
COMMENTS

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Turkey’s Last Electoral Rite of Passage for a Post-Stress Democracy

ERTAN AYDIN*

ABSTRACT Turkey’s presidential election in August 2014 introduced the direct election of the president, ushering in a new era of Turkish democracy. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s election to the Turkish presidency signals the legitimization of the AK Party’s democratic reforms over the previous twelve years. Turkish citizens’ widespread participation in the election indicates a non-partisan acceptance of Turkey’s democratic system, and its departure from the bureaucratic and military influence under the Kemalist system. Even the opposition parties have recognized this shift, adapting their political agendas and election strategies to appeal to the center. These developments have implications for the political future of Turkey, the Middle East, and the international community.

On August 10, 2014, for the first time, Turkish citizens went to ballot box to elect the President of Turkey. In this historic election, there were three candidates—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, and Selahattin Demirtaş. Although all three candidates exhibited distinct political views, each presented an unprecedented centrist and consensus-seeking stance. This presidential election of 2014 contrasted with the 2007 election of President Abdullah Gül, who was elected by a majority vote in Parliament, as is the practice under the Turkish constitution. In that election, positions toward the Turkish presidency were highly polarized. The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, and the Turkish military opposed Gül’s election owing to his conservative ideology and his wife’s public display of religion by wearing a Muslim headscarf. Consequently, the idea of electing Turkey’s President by popular vote emerged in the spring of 2007, in response to the military general’s threats of intervention and secularist parliamentarians’ protest of the first lady’s conservative clothing. The supporters of Turkey’s old Jacobin political order argued for continued militant secularism and elitism, but they lost five consecutive elections from 2007 to 2014. As a result of their repeated electoral defeats, this style of elitism and militarist Ke-
eralism has lost its legitimacy and credibility in Turkish politics, forcing them now to adjust to Turkey’s new pluralist democracy. Thus, the presidential election of August 2014 has legitimized a new Turkish political system characterized by a stable, pluralist democracy.

Turkish politics has undergone a gradual and peaceful evolution in the twelve years of the AK Party government, since November 2002. During this period, national, constitutional, and local elections have produced significant progress in eliminating the Jacobin legacy of Kemalism. In 2007, this elitist ideology was still strong, mobilizing supporters against a woman’s right to wear a headscarf, and camouflaging its agenda with slogans of freedom and democracy. The resounding victory by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in that election empowered Turkey’s true democrats to undertake a movement for civil rights. Under this democratic movement, the Turkish government passed constitutional amendments granting individual rights and equality to Kurdish citizens, religious minorities, and women. This wave of democratization initiated a robust, assertive form of democratic modernity, consistent with Muslim religious values, and it played a large role in the economic development of Anatolian towns and cities. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the nationalist Movement Party (MHP) revised their political agendas and mobilized reactionary resistance to this movement, but they again faced defeat in the following elections. Although the CHP still longed for the Jacobin democracy of Turkey’s past, it recognized the need to adjust its program to remain relevant in Turkish politics. Thus, the CHP raised no serious objections to the launch of the Kurdish peace initiative and the constitution’s recognition of women’s freedom to wear religious attire in public.

In comparison to the outdated, polarized political atmosphere of the presidential election in 2007, the direct election method seems to have initiated a degree of harmony. In the 2014 presidential election, all three candidates appealed to the center of Turkish political values, with the hope of attracting the majority’s votes. No candidate spoke against the freedom of religious clothing or the political...
rights of Kurdish citizens. The direct election method exposed extremist politicians to the will of the majority, and thus forced reactionary views out of mainstream politics. Under this new political environment, neither of the main opposition parties, the CHP nor the MHP, nominated a candidate from their own party leadership, and instead selected a conservative intellectual as their common candidate. The CHP and MHP leaders seemed to recognize that their political visions would not win the approval of the Turkish majority, and they agreed on the nomination of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, former OIC Secretary General and a History of Science professor. İhsanoğlu’s father emigrated from Turkey to Egypt in the early Republican period, in protest against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s radical secularist policies. Thus, İhsanoğlu grew up in Egypt, studied at Al-Ayn Shams University and al-Azhar University, and arrived in Turkey in the mid-1970s. In the presidential election of 2007, the CHP would have labeled İhsanoğlu a reactionary Islamist candidate if he were nominated. Yet, seven years later, in a marked change of political strategy, Turkey’s two main opposition parties agreed on this very candidate, who represents a certain religious critique of Kemalism and holds Turkey’s Islamic affiliations. As such, İhsanoğlu ran on a platform emulating the AK Party’s centrist stance. In support of the Kurdish political movement, the third candidate, Selahattin Demirtaş, similarly promoted centrist political ideas, embracing the Turkish identity and mainstream liberal ideals. Under this strategy, Demirtaş attracted votes from outside the Kurdish ethnic base, and he doubled the number of votes his party received in the local elections. Thus, all three presidential candidates symbolize consensus over dissension, as they demonstrated similar political values in support of basic rights and liberties.

In view of their platforms’ similarity, it is worth examining the reasons for Tayyip Erdoğan’s victory against a coalition of more than 10 opposition parties of various sizes, which openly supported CHP-MHP candidate. At a basic level, the majority of the Turkish electorate looked beyond these shared political values and sought evidence of leadership ability. Opinion polls have indicated the voters’ desire for a strong leader, who will lead Turkey away from crisis and towards a more mature democracy. Erdoğan has proven himself to be such a leader to his supporters, as he guided Turkish democracy through the many trials of the last twelve years. Many citizens believe that he is capable of achiev-
Narrow-minded, provincial nationalism contradicts the humanitarian concerns of Erdoğan supporters, who emphasize the moral responsibility of providing aid to war refugees.
and that Turkey’s prosperity is unsustainable in the long term. They accuse the AK Party of granting social welfare to poor people as a method of deception. Even this criticism acknowledges the extensive social welfare benefits available to the poor, including free health care and financial subsidies for the handicapped, the elderly, and single women. In addition, critics describe Erdoğan’s Middle Eastern foreign policy as too active and involved, citing his acceptance of millions of Syrian refugees into Turkey and his allocation of Turkish funds for them. This critique reflects the ideas of the CHP and MHP leaders, and reveals an isolationist, and at times xenophobic attitude towards the Arab Middle East. This narrow-minded, provincial nationalism contradicts the humanitarian concerns of Erdoğan supporters, who emphasize the moral responsibility of providing aid to war refugees. Even this criticism of Erdoğan’s diplomatic activism and humanitarian concern of the problems in the Middle East illustrates a new recognition of the Turkish state’s power and agency.

Until recently, all the developments in the region had been attributed to American and European meddling, and not to the Turkish government. The main shortcoming of the İhsanoğlu and Demirtaş campaigns, however, resided in their failure to convince the electorate of their ability to do a better job than Erdoğan in solving the constitutional challenges facing Turkey. Both candidates evaded the big questions. Most noteworthy, they did not address the illegal activities of the bureaucrats, who claimed to be affiliated to the Gülen Movement in the Turkish judiciary and police force and portrayed “as a parallel state” by the media. In fact, CHP leaders even collaborated with the Gülenist groups, publicizing their illegal wiretapping of AK Party politicians and average citizens. In the public eye, İhsanoğlu’s dismissal of this major social and political issue as “unimportant” weakened public confidence in his ability to be effective in the highest political office of the Turkish Republic. The many opposition parties that collectively nominated İhsanoğlu for office shared this central problem: they expressed no clear, distinct ideas about the problems facing Turkey, instead they concentrated on tautological and self-referential criticisms of Erdoğan.

With its democratic improvements, the direct presidential election boosted the legitimacy of the Turkish political system, despite a polarized public opinion. The participation rate of just over 70 percent was very high by European standards, although lower than the local elections. Election participation was higher in regions where opposition parties have been stronger, exhibiting opposition voters’ eagerness to change national leadership at the ballot box. The unprecedented success of the Kurdish political party candidate, Selahattin Demirtaş, who received almost 10 percent of the vote, confirmed the Kurdish party’s trust in the Turkish system of democracy in order to achieve their political goals. This success has helped to transform the Kurdish political movement among Turkish public opinion, which
is now more likely to see the Kurds as legitimate political actors rather than as representatives of a separatist terror organization. This election was conducted with professional efficiency and transparency, and with the public’s full confidence in its fairness and results. Overall, the presidential election of 2014 symbolized a return to normalcy in Turkish democratic politics, following the previous political turmoil of the Gezi Protests and Gülenist Coup attempts of the previous year. The democratic strength of the Turkish electoral system helped restore legitimacy to the political system in the aftermath of these crises.

The overwhelming support for Erdoğan in the first round of the presidential election illustrated the public’s confidence that he can lead the Turkish Republic to overcome the final unconstitutional challenges to its civil political system, while fostering an economically prosperous Muslim democracy with ties to the European Union. In this context, Erdoğan’s presidency will ensure the growth of an uninhibited civilian democracy in Turkey. Erdoğan has institutionalized a party culture of diversity and inclusion, without the domination of a single clique or ideology, and this legacy will continue under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu, as the new AK Party chairman and prime minister. Moreover, the AK Party rule for senior parliamentarians’ retirement after three terms allows a new generation of young, dynamic politicians to revitalize and reform the party in keeping with the evolution of Turkish society.

The presidential and local elections in 2014, on March 30 and August 10, have reaffirmed the Turkish model of democracy. These elections hold a significant role in world politics, beyond the protection of Turkish citizens’ safety and prosperity. Many writers
have discussed Turkey as a model for the Middle East and broader Muslim communities involved in the Arab Spring. However, as the Arab Spring quickly transformed into an Arab Winter, following the Egyptian military coup, discussions of the Turkish model faded away, exacerbated by the political chaos of Iraq, Syria, and even its own Gezi protests. Yet, the Turkish government never sought to export its political model to other countries. Turkey’s leaders are aware that each political system, including their own, faces its own idiosyncrasies and challenges. Still, the attention to the Turkish model emphasizes the strengths of fair elections and a sound democratic system. The Turkish political community is composed of many ethnic, social, and political groups, promoting competing national visions and political ideologies. Despite these divisions, Turkey has remained a peaceful and stable country, as a result of the public consensus for a democratic electoral system and constitutionally ensured rights and liberties. This political system grants citizens the freedom to articulate their opinions and allows democratic politics to mediate differences in political ideologies and interests. Under this system, the two main opposition parties recognized their electoral weakness, but merged together to nominate a single presidential candidate, instead of relinquishing their presidential bids. Turkish voters have always made their choices from a wide spectrum of political ideas, and even if their preferred candidate loses an election, they recognize that they will be able to express their political will in upcoming elections. Citizens trust Turkey’s pluralist democracy and the constitutional reforms strengthening their personal liberties. Moreover, this model offers an example of a healthy political system for countries throughout the Middle East. This reality should inspire the Erdoğan Presidency to play a greater international role and to contribute to regional peace and prosperity over the next five years.

Turkish politics will continue to deal with its main challenges. The new AK Party government needs to navigate the Kurdish peace process with diligence and balance. There is now a growing and articulate set of demands from various Alevi citizens and civil society organizations, which need to be addressed through a political process.

Turkish foreign policy needs to be more comprehensive and provide the attention to the Middle East it requires, without losing sight of Turkey’s grand strategy in becoming a full member of the European Union. The new government must continue and institutionalize its zero-tolerance policy to-
Towards examples of bureaucratic corruption. Meanwhile, Turkey needs to maintain its political stability and domestic peace in order to sustain its economic growth, which is tied to Turkey's deep integration to the fluctuations and vagaries of the global markets. Yet, the completion of a pluralist democratic consolidation and a post-stress normal electoral democracy will enable the new government to handle these challenges.

In summary, the presidential election of 2014 signifies a consolidation of democracy in Turkish politics. Turkish citizens demonstrated their opposition to anti-democratic manipulations of the political system, signaling an end to the era of military and bureaucratic interventions in state affairs. The future of Turkish democracy requires a reconsideration of the previous model of Turkish politics, made up of a Kemalist center and a conservative periphery. The developments in Turkish politics from 2002 to 2014 have resulted in a confident Turkish democratic system—a system that should inspire new approaches to bridging the gap between Muslim cultures and the political demands of global modernity.

Endnotes

2. For a concise evaluation of these democratizing reforms see William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP, (London: Routlege: 2010).


5. A joint study of remarkable polling companies of Turkey, ANAR, Denge, Genar and Pollmark showed the leadership effect in the presidential elections. This research was done between 5-11 June 2014, face to face with 29 154 respondents in 12 regions at the national scale. See http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/AbdulkadirSelvi/basbakanin-masasindaki-anket/54842


The current map of the Middle East, and the political attitudes congruent with it, for the most part came into place with the Ottoman Empire’s collapse in World War I and the rise on its ruins of new nation-states modeled on – and in many cases, by – the triumphant Western powers. Unity thus gave way to division. As that map comes under growing pressure today, the story of Turkish-Arab relations comes into view as a story of alienation and mutual rediscovery with profound implications for the future of the entire region.

For several decades after the fracturing of the Ottoman Empire, authoritarian regimes sought to inculcate in the hearts and minds of their populations the secular nationalist identity they believed provided the key to modernization and development. Individual circumstances varied, and there were noteworthy differences between Kemalism, Ba’thism, Nasserism and the other variants of this secular nationalist ideology, but they all shared the imperative of erasing the old common multicultural identity which had once bound them together, in order to make way for new nationalist identities that suppress external affiliations and internal heterogeneities with equal determination. An important part of this process of erasure was the dissemination, in government propaganda and national historiography, of...
After the fracturing of the Ottoman Empire, authoritarian regimes sought to inculcate in the hearts and minds of their populations the secular nationalist identity they believed provided the key to modernization and development.

a series of alienating tropes – on the Turkish side, of Arab ingratitude and treachery, the “dagger” struck into the back of the Ottoman Empire by the Arab Revolt during World War I, the Arab “swamp” in which countless young Turkish soldiers perished in those years; on the Arab side, of Turkish conquest and tyranny, the “yoke” that had kept the region enslaved for centuries, the oppression that had claimed the lives of so many Arab nationalists. Geopolitical and economic factors also helped this process of alienation along. The economic autarchy of the interwar years and the era of import-substituting policies that lasted until the 1980s minimized the rationale for economic interaction, while Soviet threats after 1945 pushed Turkey into a NATO security alliance that further reduced its interest in the Middle East.

By the time the AK Party won its first national elections in December 2002, however, several key variables had changed. The Soviet Union’s collapse diminished Turkey’s reliance on the West. Various aspects of the contemporary “globalization” wave – the transition to export-promoting economic growth, increased international mobility, almost instantaneous access to information worldwide – led among other things to renewed economic and cultural ties to neighboring countries, especially in the Middle East. As barriers came down and the power of the inward-looking nationalist paradigm weakened, there was a resurgence in competing identities at both the subnational (for example, Kurdish) and transnational (Islamic) levels – a phenomenon that intensified the Turkish polity’s sensitivity to its external environment, and so further increased its need to engage with that environment.

The AK Party leaders came into office with a worldview they argued was very much in accord with these momentous transformations, presenting it as more representative politically, more liberal economically, and more inclusive culturally than the authoritarian secular-nationalist paradigm they depicted as having now become bankrupt. Because their opponents remained entrenched in key positions, particularly in the judiciary and the military, however, the implementation of their worldview would be carried out gradually, in a series of stages. The first stage, lasting roughly from the 2002 elections through 2007, was one in which the AK Party concentrated on consolidating its position and warding off a series of internal challenges, including attempts by state prosecutors to...
shut down the party as well as alleged coup plots by high-ranking military officers. Key aspects of foreign policy, most notably relations with Iraq and with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, remained largely under the purview of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Although the AK Party leadership officially supported a parliamentary resolution to cooperate with the United States in opening a northern front against Iraq on 1 March 2003, for example, opposition parliamentarians backed by like-minded circles in the TAF command ensured its defeat. Ironically, the AK Party would reap the public relations benefits of Turkey’s refusal to participate in a war that proved extremely unpopular throughout the Arab world. On most other fronts, the AK Party government’s approach during this initial period was to pursue what Prime Minister Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoğlu, described as a “zero-problems” approach designed “to minimize external threats as much as possible so that sound reforms can be implemented at home.”

Following a second and even more decisive victory in the national elections of July 2007, the internal situation began to stabilize. Leaked documents allegedly detailing TAF plans to overthrow the AK Party government prompted a series of arrests and prosecutions of top officers beginning in January 2008 that ultimately seemed to purge the military leadership of its most interventionist hard-liners. Freer now to pursue their agenda more vigorously, AK Party leaders focused in this second stage (which would last until 2011) on the two most promising fronts: reconciliation with the Kurds, and distancing from Israel. The government unveiled a major initiative known as the “Kurdish Opening” in July 2009 that entailed further political and cultural reforms as well as intensified contacts with elected Kurdish leaders within Turkey. Externally, decades of Turkish policy were reversed by a rapprochement with the KRG that led to unprecedented security and economic cooperation with the northern Iraqi Kurds. If successful, these initiatives promised not only to end the PKK-led insurrection that had plagued Turkey for decades, but to transform entirely the role played by Kurds in Turkish strategic thinking: from an existential threat that could be used by enemies to infiltrate Turkey’s body politic in order to weaken and divide it, to a strategic ally that could promote the projection of power and influence beyond Turkey’s borders.

Relations with Israel, by contrast, underwent a dramatic decline following the Israeli assault on Gaza in late December 2008, and Erdoğan’s outburst against Shimon Peres at Davos in January 2009. After Israeli troops killed nine Turkish activists on a flotilla seeking to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza on 31 May 2010, bilateral cooperation and diplomatic contacts were reduced to a bare minimum. The AK Party government’s increasingly outspoken stance against the perceived aggressiveness and arrogance of the Israeli leadership proved extremely popular both at home and through-
out the rest of the Middle East. A Turkish poll carried out in seven Arab countries in 2009 already showed that a weighted average of 77% of all respondents felt Turkey should play a “larger role” in the Arab world. With-in Turkey, a subsequent poll showed 86% of Turkish respondents holding unfavorable views of Israel, compared to just 2% with favorable views. On this score as well, then, the shift in Turkish policy promised to yield significant benefits, at relatively little cost, for the AK Party’s domestic and regional aspirations alike.

On all other fronts during this second, transitional, phase, however, the AK Party government continued to adhere to its “zero-problems” foreign policy as closely as possible, pursuing collaborative ventures such as free trade and visa-free agreements with most of Turkey’s neighbors, and maintaining a neutral stance when conflicts such as the 2008 Georgian-Russian war broke out. It was only after their third consecutive national election victory on 12 June 2011 – when they raised their share of the total vote from 34% in 2002, and 47% in 2007, to an impressive 50% – that the AK Party leaders finally moved into the latest and most assertive stage of their foreign policy agenda. In his victory speech that night, Erdoğan declared the outcome “Sarajevo’s victory as much as Istanbul’s; Beirut’s victory as much as Izmir’s; Damascus’ victory as much as Ankara’s; Ramallah’s, the West Bank’s, Jerusalem’s, Gaza’s victory as much as Diyarbakir’s. ... Turkey has now attained a democratic freedom that is an example for its region and the world.”
These words came in the context of the greatest upheaval in Arab politics in decades: the popular uprisings that broke out in early 2011 and led to the ousters of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, Saleh in Yemen, and Qaddafi in Libya before the end of the year, as well as the outbreak of a more protracted civil war in Syria. The authoritarian secular-nationalist political order appeared to be collapsing throughout the Arab world. Speaking at a gathering of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo three months later, Erdoğan hailed the revolutions, called for “more freedom, democracy and human rights,” and added: “The time has come for us, who with all our different languages share the same conceptual geography and destiny, to take charge of our shared future.”

Erdoğan’s declarations reflected an accelerating convergence between the AK Party leadership’s domestic and foreign agendas: overseeing a decisive transition from authoritarian secular nationalism to a regime more representative of its people’s cultural and moral values, and a shift from preoccupation with the sovereignty of nation-states to an affirmation of regional unity in lands that shared a common imperial legacy. Nothing confirms this interpretation more clearly than the rhetoric surrounding the centerpiece of the AK Party’s multiculturalist drive in this phase: the effort to reconcile with the Kurds.

With his domestic position more secure than ever, Erdoğan launched a new round of Turkish-Kurdish dialogue – including direct contacts between top intelligence officials and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan – that led to a ceasefire and mutual confidence-building measures in preparation for a final settlement drive. In his declaration of the ceasefire on 21 March 2013, Öcalan denounced “Western imperialism” for dividing the “Arab, Turkish, Persian and Kurdish communities” into “nation-states and artificial borders,” recalled their “common life under the banner of Islam for almost a 1000 years,” and asserted that “it is time to restore to the concept of ‘us’ its old spirit and practice.” That very same day, AK Party Deputy General-Secretary Süleyman Soylu made the link between the Kurdish initiative, the Arab uprisings, and his government’s broader regional goals explicit: “The third wave of democracy is very important for Turkey. ... We have been in a phase of retreat since 1699 [when the Treaty of Karlowitz marked the onset of Ottoman territorial decline]. ... [A]fter 300 years we are rising once again. There is now a Turkey that can lay claim to the lands which we
dominated in the past.”

The same link was drawn by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. In an April 2012 speech he had declared Turkey to be “a country possessing the power to determine the future; to be the vanguard of a new idea, a new regional order,” and announced his government’s intention “to direct the great transformation wave in the Middle East.” Speaking in Diyarbakır one week before Öcalan’s announcement, he elaborated further on this “new regional order,” rejecting the “nationalist ideologies” with which the colonial powers had tried “to dismember us” and calling for the restoration of an “older conception” of community (millet) – one that didn’t differentiate between “Turk and Kurd, Albanian and Bosnian.” Working together, “Turks, Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians, [and] Arabs” would erase “artificially drawn maps” and “break the mold that Sykes-Picot drew for us.”

There is no doubt that Turkey, like the rest of the world, was taken by surprise at the sudden outbreak of the Arab upheaval.

The Turkish leadership’s actions matched its words. As growing cooperation with the KRG increasingly bypassed the Iraqi central government – with the Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish economies becoming increasingly integrated, with plans moving ahead for direct oil exports from the KRG region to Turkey, and with Turkish officials taking to visiting northern Iraq without stopping in Baghdad first – Iraq’s leaders reacted with alarm. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused Turkey of meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs in December 2011, and of acting like a “hostile” state the following April. Hints of similar concerns surfaced elsewhere, even amid generally positive political and economic relations with Turkey. Already a year before the 2011 upheaval, anonymous Syrian officials were quoted as worrying that the northern part of their country – from Aleppo in the west (slated to be connected to Gaziantep by a planned fast train line) to Qamishli in the east (in the heart of Syrian Kurdistan) – could fall under a “Turkish sphere of influence.” One said: “We hear they have Ottoman ambitions, or that they want to take this region under their umbrella. Who will let this happen? Nobody.” A Saudi official added: “They have the power, the history. They sometimes act as if they are running the countries. They forget themselves. If this influence is going to spread again, this is very dangerous to me as an Arab.” Once the Arab uprisings got underway and Turkey’s leadership, again backing up its rhetoric with action, unambiguously aligned itself with the anti-regime forces, the concerns became more explicit. President Assad of Syria, for example, explained Turkey’s backing for the Syrian opposition in November 2012 by saying that Erdoğan “thinks he is the new sultan of the Ottoman [sic] and he can control the region as it was during the Ottoman Empire under a new umbrella.”
In his heart he thinks he is a caliph.”

The Egyptian government installed by the military coup that ousted President Muhammad Morsi, and strongly backed by Saudi Arabia, for its part reacted to Turkish criticisms of its takeover and subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood by expelling the Turkish ambassador in November 2013. Bilateral relations have remained cool since the ascension of General Sisi to the presidency.

Many commentators have depicted these post-2011 developments as the collapse of Erdoğan's and Davutoğlu's Arab foreign policy, a turning point at which “zero problems” gave way to problems with almost all neighboring Arab states. But this interpretation obscures the fundamental consistency of a vision which from the beginning posed itself as a radical alternative to the authoritarian secular nationalism that had been the defining feature of the post-World War I political order both within Turkey and throughout the region. There is no doubt that Turkey, like the rest of the world, was taken by surprise at the sudden outbreak of the Arab upheaval, and it seems likely that the AK Party leadership had been planning to maintain its “zero problems” approach toward most Arab regimes for some time longer yet, until circumstances became more propitious, but it could not have failed to anticipate an inevitable ultimate showdown between its political agenda and the Ba'thist or Ba'thisant regimes of the Arab world. Once the issue was pressed, therefore, it is not surprising that the AK Party leadership would align itself with those Arab movements – such as the Muslim Brotherhood or al-Nahda in Tunisia – most likely to share its overall vision.

The central question all along was, and remains, the viability of that vision. Anecdotal indications of its resonance among the Arab masses – such as press reports of Turkish flags and Erdoğan's photographs being raised by demonstrators in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere during the early days of the uprisings – are reinforced by more recent polling data. While the percentage of respondents in the Middle East who favor a larger regional role for Turkey fell from 77% in 2009 to 66% in 2012 and 60% in 2013, these are still considerable majorities, especially keeping in mind that a substantial portion of the overall decline was due in large part to just two countries: Syria (33% in 2013), where polling was carried out under the distorting circumstances of a bitter civil war, and Egypt (47% in 2013, compared to 74% the year before). The same is true for the question of whether Turkey offers a political model for the Arab world. While only 21% of Syrians and 42% of Egyptians replied affirmatively in 2013, most of the other Arab populations polled did so in overwhelming majorities: Tunisia (74%), Iraq (62%), Jordan (66%), Yemen (70%), and even Saudi Arabia (65%).

These results suggest a number of conclusions. First, that most Arabs remain open not only to the Islam-based alternative exemplified by the AK Party, but even to Turkey
The story of Turkey’s reengagement with the Arab world is still in its early chapters, and the formidable opposition it is already generating will require a great deal of ingenuity, prudence and discipline to counter playing a leading role in the dissemination of that alternative. The AK Party’s current pro-revolutionary stance therefore still seems to be bolstering its popularity with mainstream Arab public opinion. Second, however, these results also show that secular nationalism continues to enjoy a significant constituency, fluctuating between some 30% to 50% of the populations of Arab states depending on circumstances. This electoral split parallels the situation within Turkey itself to a remarkable degree, as does the fact that sectarian and to some extent ethnic minorities tend to shy away from Sunni majoritarianism. What this means is that whereas Islam-based movements will likely continue to be dominant players in regional politics, their positions are far from guaranteed, so that missteps on their part can well lead to serious reversals – as illustrated most recently by the 2013 military coup in Egypt. Third and more generally, therefore, this picture confirms the non-viability of “zero problems” in any effective Turkish engagement with the Middle East, because its agenda is bound to encounter resistance from secularists and nationalists in every country; from conservative actors such as Saudi Arabia which view (correctly) the AK Party model as a far more realistic threat to their regimes than either Islamist radicalism of the al-Qa’ida type or secular nationalism of the Ba’thist type; and from external forces (e.g., Russia, Iran, Israel) which have their own geopolitical reasons to oppose such a consolidation of regional power.

Conclusion

Writing over 600 years ago, the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun rejoiced at the conversion to Islam of the Turkish tribes whose vigorous and uncorrupted ways he hoped would rejuvenate an empire that was decaying from within and under threat from without. Whether Turkey can play an analogous role today, whether it will be able to spearhead the transition from authoritarian nationalism to a more integrated and representative new regional order, remains to be seen. The future holds too many imponderables, too many inevitable twists and turns, to allow for confident predictions. However, two imperatives are already evident. First, any leadership that seeks to pursue such a role must adhere convincingly to the “older conception of community” Davutoğlu spoke of; otherwise its involvement in the Arab world will be viewed – and rejected – as Turkish nationalist expansionism instead of Islamic integration. Hence the critical importance of the Kurd-
ish initiative as a bellwether of this conception's viability. Second, any such leadership must recognize that a certain balance of power between the democratic Islamist and the less numerous but still potent secular-nationalist forces in the Arab world is likely to remain (as in Turkey) a reality for the foreseeable future. Neither side will be able to simply suppress or eliminate the other. The successful management of this balance will therefore require (again, as in Turkey itself) a scrupulous commitment to the institutions, norms, and practices of democratic governance.

The story of Turkey’s reengagement with the Arab world is still in its early chapters, and the formidable opposition it is already generating will require a great deal of ingenuity, prudence and discipline to counter, but one thing seems clear: after all the socio-economic, cultural and political transformations of the past few decades, there is no going back to the period of mutual disengagement and alienation.

Endnotes


2. Mensur Akgün, Gökçe Percinoğlu and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Ortadoğu’da Türkiye Algısı (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2009), p. 11. The responses for individual countries included 73% agreeing in Iraq, 78% in Egypt, 82% in Syria, and 84% in Palestine.


11. Ibid., p. 21.


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The New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy: Critiques and Challenges

MURAT YEŞILTAŞ*

ABSTRACT This article examines the critiques directed at Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party administration. There are three basic critiques leveled at the foreign policy that has been followed by the AK Party: Islamist ideology, geopolitical codes, and lack of capacity in foreign policy. These criticisms will be examined through a multi-layered approach, whereby they will be contextualized in terms of global fragmentation (macro level), regional disorder and fragmentation (meso level), and restoration in domestic politics and the opponents within Turkey towards these policies (micro level). A look at the challenges that Turkish foreign policy faces today and the search for a new foreign policy model will follow.

Introduction

The Arab Spring has significantly destabilized the “geopolitical zone” surrounding Turkey. Although Turkey, at first, viewed these events as opportunities for “democratic restoration,” the Arab Spring has unleashed new dynamics that have turned Turkey’s region into a zone of chronic crisis. Indeed, a new “age of insecurity” has begun in the Middle East, as identity-based animosities and radical tendencies threaten nation-state borders and the principle of sovereignty. These conditions confront Turkish foreign policy with multidimensional challenges and pressures not witnessed during the past decade. In light of President-elect Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s desire to more fully utilize the powers of the presidency to take a more active role in foreign policy, an evaluation of this new period has become necessary for tackling these challenges and generating practical responses to these pressures.

In this new period, Erdoğan’s first task entails forging a new model of foreign policy implementation without abandoning the foreign policy vision that characterized his tenure as prime minister, while employing the institutional suppleness of the presidency. Davutoğlu’s promotion from foreign minister to prime minister...
can be read as a signal that Erdoğan will sustain even more resolutely the foreign policy discourse that has been consolidated over the past several years. However, the pair must answer several critiques that have recently been aimed at them and reestablish their “discursive superiority” on foreign policy issues. Surmounting these challenges is just as important as the new foreign policy model the pair must implement.

The Critique of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Over the past decade, the AK Party under Erdoğan has successfully produced solutions to many foreign policy challenges, and facilitated a continuity in the fundamental transformation that Turkish foreign policy has undergone. Both institutionally and ideationally, Erdoğan and his foreign policy team have instituted the most important foreign policy “revision” in the history of the Turkish Republic. Not only did this administration produce structural solutions to several of Turkey’s chronic political problems, it has also “radically” recast how Turkey is perceived internationally. With its implementation of pro-growth economic policies, Turkey took its place as a “significant” actor on international platforms. Erdoğan devoted his energy to consolidating Turkey’s democracy and reconstructing the domestic political order: from civil-military relations to the Kurdish problem to the relations between religion and state, he has confronted numerous challenges which are remnants from Turkey’s early republican era. Through these policies, Erdoğan has played an important role in the last decade of an attempted “restoration” that stretches back over a century.

With these domestic political accomplishments and a new foreign policy vision, Erdoğan introduced to the global stage a Turkey situated in a very different position from previous eras, crafting a new image of Turkey in the foreign policy arena. However, the past two years have witnessed a new debate over the viability of the AK Party’s foreign policy paradigm and choices it must make in the face of sudden and dramatic ruptures in the region. This difficult context has been exacerbated by the “political enmity” directed towards Erdoğan and his party during a period of extraordinary domestic conditions. Even more specifically newly elected Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu – the intellectual and practical architect of this foreign policy – has become the target of these criticisms.

Though diverse, these critiques have been formed on three major dimensions, and seem likely to persist along these lines during the upcoming period. The first dimension is that of ideology, stemming from dissatisfactions with the political paradigm of the AK Party era. This criticism, commonplace among opposition currents, holds that Sunni Islam has been the ideological source of Turkey’s foreign policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. Consequently, this ideological preference has been the root cause of the “failures” of the AK Party’s foreign
policy. These opponents frame their critique in sectarian terms, and from this perspective, they regard the AK Party’s policy as tied to Erdoğan and Davutoğlu’s “essential” identity which is constructed around Islam. From this viewpoint, it is impossible to expect any foreign policy change in the upcoming period; the essentialism of these figures makes any change impossible. This issue of Islamism has, in fact, become more of a type of “labeling” than actually being an explicit argument.

The second critique relates to the geopolitical tendencies of the AK Party’s foreign policy. While at their core these critiques, too, hew to the “ideological essence” issue, their main critique is that Turkey’s new engagements have become the source of its troubles. As with the Islamism argument, this critique posits a basic driver of Turkish foreign policy, holding that this force is Turkey’s “expansionary” impetus, which has developed into a hegemonic regional project, and thus an abandonment of Turkey’s traditional alliance-based politics.

Such a hegemonic project, according to opponents, is not only unsustainable, it is nearly impossible to achieve. This sets the stage for the third critique, which holds that Turkey’s leaders have “exaggerated” their foreign policy capacity, leading to “excessive self-confidence” in their ability to solve regional problems, as well as a “rigid political discourse.” In other words, Turkey’s lack of means to realize its ambition of “leading the transformation” of the Arab Spring, especially in Syria, has led to the failure of its foreign policy. Moreover, opponents argue that Turkey’s foreign policy perspective has eschewed international support and approval, with the consequence of narrowing Turkey’s room for maneuver in the Middle East and eroding its diplomatic prestige.

Taken together, the purveyors of these three critiques assert that the AK Party, embroiled in domestic political conflict, has “drifted from democratic discourse” at home, a trend which has weakened Turkey’s potential as a model for the Middle East and undermined its “soft power.” Also, by driving Turkey into “isolation,” its current Middle East policy has rendered Turkey “unable to take initiative” in international affairs. Critics hold that the transition of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu to the presidency and prime ministry, respectively, will not lead to a fresh start and cite three basic arguments for this: a) ideological rationales, b) divergence from the West, and c) capacity limitations. For these reasons, while pessimism reigns among the opposition over Turkey’s foreign policy, an “improvement” under the leadership of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu seems equally unlikely.
The above critiques are far from being comprehensive and suffer from reductionism. Even if a narrowing is occurring in Turkish foreign policy, these trends must be analyzed on three levels: the international system (global fragmentation on the macro-scale); regional change (regional instability on the meso-scale); and domestic political conflict (micro-scale). An analysis on all three levels will allow us to better comprehend the problematic aspects of the above critiques, and to foresee the general contours of Turkish foreign policy in the coming period.

**Global Fragmentation**

As in the past, Turkey is directly impacted by dynamics in the international system and in its region. The international system is still in a state of transition following the end of the Cold War. A basic historical property of transitions is that the distribution of power in the system tends to be insufficiently consolidated, which does not permit the emergence of real powers, preventing the formation of a long term and stable balance-of-power. This tends to heighten revisionist tendencies. In other words, actors discontent with their current position in the system, or seeking greater inclusion, take their short-term strategic interests into account and seek to expand their influence. Shortly after the Cold War, revisionist tendencies increased among small powers in regional subsystems, while today, these tendencies are prevalent among various middle and large powers. Russia's Ukraine policy, Iran's push to become a nuclear power, China's policies in the Asia-Pacific, the BRICS or MIKTA vision of an alternative world order – all of these developments both influence the international power distribution and raise the possibility over the medium term of engendering concrete repercussions at the systemic level.

This conflictive and competitive fragmentation is occurring both at the systemic level and in rapidly diverging sub-systems, a trend that has supplanted “stable threats” with an “amorphous threat environment” and the proliferation of “new security” challenges. Because of the increasingly complex and unpredictable nature of the geopolitical order, revisionism at the regional sub-system level triggers unexpectedly acute crises. This narrows Turkey’s foreign policy prerogatives, while in the short term, it could potentially encourage a consolidation of geopolitical flexibility. For this reason, developments at the macro level are a crucial variable, both as a “drag” on Turkish foreign policy, and as an influence on Turkey’s geopolitical flexibility.

This geopolitical instability at the systemic level has two important im-
lications. First, as geopolitical competition diversifies, the likelihood increases of a return to status quo great power politics. Compared with the decade following the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity has waned and demands from rising powers for multipolarity have intensified. However, rather than herald a new era, this has led to a return to alliance behaviors typical of the Cold War period. For instance, the alignments over Syria represent a continuation of the Cold War power distribution. Secondly, the system’s increasing competitiveness has turned the “collective action” of crisis solving into a problem of “global governance,” thus taxing the functions of international institutions. This has diversified the strategic priorities of actors, and introduced considerable ambiguity as to precisely which issues qualify as security matters for the actors in particular and the system in general. Accordingly, major powers have become more selective in the ordering of their strategic priorities, with the consequence of intensifying geopolitical competition in crisis zones and making conflict resolution more difficult and causing the conflicts to deepen.

For these reasons, a number of crises in the Middle East and North Africa – most notably Syria – have had longer durations as a consequence of global competition and, alternatively, their low status on the agenda of major actors. For example, because the US and EU privilege their strategic interests in Ukraine, they have left actors in the Middle East to face the acute crises in the region alone, thus allowing for more confrontation between regional actors. The dramatic developments in Iraq, for example, have put considerable pressure on its neighbors, and Iraq has become an arena for confrontation among them. Similarly, regional and global actors with differing strategic prerogatives have deepened the crisis in Syria, and foreign actors have removed Libya from

A member of Kurdish Peshmerga forces talks to a leader of a local Shiite community who praises the Kurdish Special Forces for protecting them from Sunni militants led by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on June 21, 2014. AFP / Rick Findler
their agendas following the NATO intervention. Though these actors were initially swift, Libya is now being permitted to collapse into a “failed state” – an outcome best explained by the shifting priorities of major actors. This trend makes it more difficult to approach global and regional security governance in tandem, and has enabled emerging crises to rapidly transcend the regional level. The Syrian, Libyan, and Iraqi crises of security governance are striking illustrations of this new trend. It applies as well to the US and international community’s stance on ISIS. As long as ISIS did not threaten Northern Iraq – a region ostensibly more stable than the remainder of the country – or Iraq’s religious minorities, Washington and the international community took no steps to contain the militant group. What steps have been taken represent a preference for short-term measures rather than developing a direct strategy against ISIS.

In a period of such rapid global fragmentation, it is reductionist to claim that Turkey’s regional policies are dictated solely by its ideological precepts. To approach Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy in its totality, attention must be paid to the stark conflict and fragmentation at the global system level. The ups-and-downs of Turkish foreign policy – results of the deepening Syrian crisis, the coup in Egypt, and the security crisis in Iraq - are a function of the global fragmentation discussed above. To wit, these three developments are all interrelated, and all are products of the international system’s fragmentation. If the Syrian crisis had been resolved, the coup in Egypt may have been forestalled, and Iraq’s embroilment with ISIS could have been avoided. This fragmentation puts immediate constraints on Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, this fragmentation has prevented regional problems from reaching timely solutions, allowing them to metastasize to such an extent that they can no longer be solved through the efforts of a single actor. This has, in turn, brought Turkey into confrontation with other actors over these issues. It should be no surprise that Turkey has faced such foreign policy constraints, given the stark conflicts between global actors and actors seeking to exert a greater influence in world affairs, as well as the “indifference” of important actors to conflict resolution. These constraints are not directly related to either ideological preferences or to the constraints on Turkey’s foreign policy organization.

Regional Disorder and Fragmentation

Another factor influencing Turkish foreign policy is regional disorder and fragmentation. Turkey’s foreign policy successes during the AK Party period stemmed from the consonance that its foreign policy principles and tools were in tandem with the regional order, which was previously apparently stable. In other words, as Turkey entered a period of revisionism with regard to its traditional politics, it found that the principles and mechanisms underpinning this revisionism resonated on
What was originally foreseen as a gradual transition took a sharp turn with the outbreak of civil war in Syria, the coup in Egypt, instability in Libya, and the security crisis in Iraq. First, non-state actors have begun to undermine the institutions, ideologies, and economic structures of sovereign states. As the Arab Spring transformed into a security crisis, non-state actors began to directly challenge the secular notion of the nation state by placing increasing pressure on the regional system with actions that have weakened the region's modern formal borders. As a result of these pressures, the borders established during the first quarter of the 20th century are now being called into question. Secondly, the historic political competitiveness in the region has radicalized to become “enmity.” Conflicts that previously were waged between states have now steeped into societies, and modes of conflict over border security have penetrated deeper within borders, stoking new antagonisms. ISIS, as a non-state armed actor, serves as a striking illustration at the center of these repercussions.

The state’s transformation from a security provider to a source of insecurity has pushed sub-national ethnic and religious groups to pursue their own security mechanisms. The resulting struggle of non-state groups to control territory has confronted the state with an acute crisis of security, turning many states into “failed states.” In Iraq, for example, the Kurds, Turkmen, and Sunnis have turned to securing their own interests, as a consequence of the weakness of the Iraqi state and the government’s transformation into a source of insecurity. Syria and Libya could also be included in the same category. The state’s transformation from a security provider to a source of insecurity has pushed sub-national ethnic and religious groups to pursue their own security mechanisms. The resulting struggle of non-state groups to control territory has confronted the state with an acute crisis of security, turning many states into “failed states.” In Iraq, for example, the Kurds, Turkmen, and Sunnis have turned to securing their own interests, as a consequence of the weakness of the Iraqi state and the government’s transformation into a source of insecurity. Syria and Libya could also be included in the same category.
Lastly, regional security governance has weakened. Tasked with exerting influence in conflict resolution efforts and sometimes functioning as constraints on states, regional security organizations (The Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, etc) have become ineffective in the face of states that are differentially impacted by conflicts, and hence, support incompatible responses to these conflicts. As a result of regional disorder and fragmentation, regional organizations have become dysfunctional and unable to address regional security challenges in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, and Gaza. These conditions are dismantling the mechanisms required for constructing regional order, forcing actors to turn to unilateral preferences or short-term alliances.

Against this background, pressures have mounted against the foreign policy methods and choices that Turkey established prior to the Arab Spring. Meanwhile, a tension has arisen between Turkey’s means and its objectives due to the crisis in Syria and Iraq’s fragmentation. The adoption of a foreign policy model that simultaneously engages with both non-state and state interlocutors has become a necessity, as the functional structures of certain states dissolve. For Turkish foreign policy, forging relations with the Kurdish Regional Government has become part of a general strategy aimed at preserving the integrity of the Iraqi state; the decision to include Sunnis and Kurds in Iraqi politics has been an outcome of this policy. Contrary to certain claims, this policy is not guided by ideology. Given Turkey’s ultimate goal of preserving Iraq’s integrity, preventing the exclusion of its Sunnis is quintessentially a rational approach. Indeed, Turkey’s
position was a response to the Maliki government’s pro-Shia policy, a form of politics that has cost Maliki his seat and increased Iraq’s political and security fragility. In fact, ISIS’s inroads in Iraq stands as a dramatic consequence of Maliki’s sectarian politics. In this context, it is clear that charging Turkey with losing influence in Iraq loses sight of the developments that led to today’s conditions, and underestimates Ankara’s role in the negotiations over Iraq’s new parliamentary chair and president.

The same parameters apply to Turkey’s Syria policy. It is fallacious to take Turkish “support” for the opposition in Syria simply as a given, or as a result of ideological preferences, without first analyzing the timing of Turkey’s grant of support to the regime opponents, as well as what Turkey offered this support against. The basic methodological weakness of this criticism is its rush to generalize without first conducting an analysis of process. In fact, Turkey, which has always favored international coordination, was not the cause of the deepening of the Syrian crisis. Rather, the cause was the lack of a credible deterrent from an international coalition. The basic limitation on Turkey’s deterrent ability is the divergent visions of regional and external actors. Similar conditions prevailed in Egypt. Support for Morsi was a continuation of the political preferences that informed Turkish calls for Mubarak to democratize. In this way, Turkey’s stiff response to the military coup is in accordance with the pro-democracy normative position to which Turkey has subscribed throughout the Arab Spring. Thus, Turkey’s differences on this issue were not the product of an Islamist policy of intrinsic support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, the fissures grew from taking positions incompatible with regional and external actors bent on pursuing anti-Brotherhood policies. Important in this regard is the moral frame of reference Turkey used in legitimating its positions on Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. From the opposition’s perspective, its Islamist overtones are unsettling, but this frame is actually congruent with that of the liberal international community.

In a similar fashion, Turkey’s position on Hamas fits into these two dimensions. Turkey’s Hamas policy is resonant with Hamas’ growing role as a political actor, and reflects the reality in Palestine that a “solution without Hamas is impossible.” This position places Turkey in contention with other regional actors. Approached this way, claiming that Turkey’s Middle East policy is built on sectarian or religious foundations is a bold overstatement that displays a selective bias on the part of critics. Indeed, these assessments represent the use of foreign policy as a springboard for domestic power struggles. Stated more explicitly, these are less critiques than coded political language.

Restoration in Domestic Politics and Its Opponents

Domestic politics and its power struggles constitute the micro level of
analysis that enables foreign policy, and serves as a basis for criticism. The ideal and practice of “restoration,” outlined by Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, has both led to the consolidation of political blocs, and in other ways, to certain cross-cutting alignments. As for its reflection in foreign policy, this restoration process dissolved former paradigms, decentralizing the historically highly centralized techno-bureaucratic foreign policy elite, and enacting a “shift” in geopolitical discursive codes. This shift has relaxed Turkey’s historical placement in the West, leading to conflicts of “representation” in the power struggle over foreign affairs. Kemalism, especially, has suffered a crisis of representation with the waning of the domestic security-centric culture that informed the previous foreign policy paradigm’s emphasis.

Into the vacuum left by Kemalism’s “crisis of representation” entered a “renewal” in foreign policy, necessarily engendering a new struggle both in foreign policy discourse and in the field. In this sense, opposition to the current foreign policy has become both a tool for mobilizing opposition blocs, as well as part of an effort to delegitimize current foreign policy. For this reason, criticism of foreign policy on various dimensions should be understood as part of the opposition’s efforts at mobilization. For instance, the discursive coding of criticism toward Turkey’s Iran policy shares a basic similarity with the critiques mobilized on the axis of Islamism and sectarianism.

Against this background, although the nation-state has preserved its existence as a unit in foreign policy, its reference codes have undergone an important transformation, leading to the construction in Turkey of a new “territorial state identity.” This new identity has kept as much distance as possible from Islam, while also altering the previous foreign policy that steeped its roots in nationalism. It is no coincidence that Erdoğan’s presidency has witnessed the dissemination of the “Türkiyeliilik (being from Turkey; broader and inclusive understanding of Turkish identity)” discursive coding. Such an image of identity renders the static nation-state ideal unfeasible for foreign policy. In terms of material interests, the modern nation-state construction may have retained its validity (material power and security), but on the normative level, it is impossible to reconsolidate the unfolding regional transformation and fragmentation with the idea of the nation-state. For this reason, opponents are often guilty of a contradiction: they wage criticisms at the AK Party’s supple nation-state based foreign policy, but they do so through a rigid conception of the nation-state. Clearing up this contradiction in the short-term appears unlikely. More broadly, with a foreign policy renewal that has shifted the point of reference from the state to the civilization, Turkey seeks to address its ethno-religious chronic issues using a “melting pot” approach. Only in this context is it possible to understand religion’s role in Turkish foreign policy. Ahmet Davutoğlu has
revived this understanding under the “restoration” heading – increasing the likelihood that foreign policy debates become bound up with domestic political contests.

Turkey’s shift from markers of identity built around the state to those built on civilization have also impacted its regional and global position. On the regional level, Turkey has been wise to cast itself as the historical source of order, and attempts at integrating this role into the international system are a natural product of this move. Otherwise, Turkey would have carried a “hybrid” identity, which would have clashed with the visions of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu. Worse, opposition calls for such a hybrid are out of step with regional dynamics. Consequently, points of antagonism in Turkey’s domestic power struggle are directly related to competition over “identity representation,” a pattern that will continue in the coming period.

Challenges and the Search for a New Foreign Policy Model

Opposition criticisms are a far cry from depicting a “critical horizon” for evaluating current foreign policy and are problematic on three counts.

First, the criticisms fail to present a comprehensive analysis. By drawing artificial distinctions between the levels of analysis, they neglect the integrated dynamics wrought by fragmentation at the global level, negative developments at the regional level, and domestic power struggles.

Second, they engage in “selective bias” by waging critiques that legitimate their own arguments. Generally, such critiques intentionally ignore the context, opting instead to focus on an isolated event for the purposes of launching an attack on the entire enterprise of Turkish foreign policy. In other words, these critiques are reductionist. For instance, a paper on Davutoğlu’s “intellectual world” will rely on generalizations culled from columns he wrote during the 1990s, and it will select these materials in such a way as to confirm the argument to which the author has already committed. This sort of critique misuses the theories pulled up to support the author, and they slant the “data” to support their claim.

Third, these criticisms are also “agent-centric,” thereby reducing the effects of regional geopolitical ruptures and instability to either the ideologies of decision makers or their policies. Such interpretations abstract the behavioral and ideological positions from the dynamic of foreign policy. And by placing these individual properties at the center of the analysis, they present these ideol-
gies as the essence of foreign policy outcomes.

Overall, Turkey’s geopolitical flexibility will continue in the coming period, despite its challenges, in concert with: a) institutional integration on the global level, b) taking the lead as a “satisfactory” actor on the regional level with regard to stability and state prerogatives, and c) the continuation of reformist stability in domestic politics. For these reasons, expecting a radical divergence in foreign policy during the Erdoğan presidency would be a wild exaggeration. Still, Davutoğlu’s position as prime minister could foster greater confidence in the future. For this reason, while it would be incorrect to expect a radical shift in Turkish foreign policy, it is possible to contend that Turkey may seek to intensify its geopolitical flexibility.

In light of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “restoration” perspective, the interrelations between domestic and foreign policy may increasingly need to be approached together. This interrelatedness has the potential to shape the political processes that lay ahead for Turkey. The restoration concept has four basic dimensions. First, there is domestic political restoration, a process that entails a series of important advances in domestic reform. Domestic restoration is framed around democratic deepening, and consolidation through institutionalization. Second is identity restoration, which entails taking steps to resolve identity-based problems, especially the Kurdish issue. Drafting a new constitution will tie together the processes of domestic and identity restoration. Third is economic restoration. This effort will focus on preserving the structural conditions for sustained growth and expanding into more dynamic regions. Finally, sustaining the dynamism of Turkey’s foreign policy represents the fourth dimension of restoration, which will require using various ad hoc alignments to resolve regional crises. Reviewing critiques related to foreign policy capacity is among the topics Davutoğlu will evaluate most in the during his premiership.

Additionally, the issues at the top of Turkey’s upcoming foreign policy agenda will turn on how to relate the security and political crisis in the Middle East to the AK Party’s domestic reformist understanding, and how to transcend current constraints in order to construct a sustainable regional order. The second important topic will be how to construct a model of foreign policy implementation. It stands to reason that the coming period will witness a kind of “presidential foreign policy” in style and structure, though instituting this model in the short term may be difficult. Nevertheless, instituting this model will be simplified by the fact that Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have been working together in this area for over twelve years.

Endnote

Turkey and the EU: Looking Beyond the Pessimisms

ERHAN İÇENER* and DAVID PHINNEMORE**

ABSTRACT This paper analyses the reasons for frustration and pessimism about Turkey-EU relations. It focuses on the impact of the crisis in Europe, the 2014 EP elections and selection of Jean-Claude Juncker for the Commission President post on Turkey’s EU accession process. Finally, the paper tries to answer how the current pessimism over Turkey-EU relations can be overcome.

Frustration and pessimism dominate the mood in Turkey about the current status of relations with the European Union (EU) and the future of accession negotiations. The negotiations, which started in October 2005, continue at a snail’s pace due to political blockages and the Cyprus issue. So far, 14 (out of 35) chapters have been opened and only one chapter provisionally closed. As a result, not least of the lessons learnt from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, conditionality continues to evolve and accession becomes more difficult. Moreover, the EU remains consumed by debates about enlargement fatigue and integration capacity, particularly where Turkey is concerned. Lingering hopes of progress have been further undermined by the ongoing economic crisis. Further negativity has gained ground owing to the increased support that anti-EU and Eurosceptic parties received in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, combined with the decreasing levels of popular support generally for European integration and further enlargement. Most recently, eyebrows have been raised by the call from Jean-Claude Juncker, the incoming Commission President, for a five-year break from enlargement.

Many informed observers of European integration and enlargement understand the reasons for frustra-
tion but rarely share the feelings of outright pessimism for the future of Europe. The history of European integration is a messy history of ups and downs but with the EU muddling through crises and integrating further as a result. Despite the talk of – and in some instances wishful thinking about – disintegration, the EU has responded to the Eurozone crisis with further integration and moves towards substantive banking, fiscal, and economic union. And Croatia’s accession to the EU, in July 2013, proved that debates on the death of enlargement are misplaced. So too does the progress towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which became possible thanks to the lure of EU membership. Moreover, Montenegro and Serbia have started accession negotiations, in June 2012 and January 2014 respectively; Albania has recently been granted candidate status; and Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have signed association agreements with the EU, an important step towards the possibility of membership.

**The 2014 EP Election: No Good News for Turkey?**

One should not be overly pessimistic about the results of the EP elections. The vote for the mainstream parties in the EP did decline and Eurosceptic parties, especially the Front National in France and the United Kingdom Independence Party, scored remarkably well. However, despite the relative successes of Eurosceptic and far-right parties, the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats are still the dominant groupings in the EP. Between them, they secured 54.86 percent of the seats. When the seats of the Greens/European Free Alliance and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe are added, the percentage of seats for pro-EU parties in the EP rises to 70.44 percent. Moreover, the remaining Eurosceptic and anti-EU parties do not form a coherent bloc in the EP. They cannot be ignored, but their potential to impact significantly on the future of Europe debate can be – and has been – exaggerated, not least by those fearful of – and in some cases hoping for – disintegration.

The EP elections results tell us little that we do not already know: turnout remains low (42.54 percent); popular support for the EU and mainstream parties has declined; the EU suffers from a democratic deficit; and it has a persistent legitimacy problem. Following changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and with the aim of improving the democratic legitimacy of the European Commission, EU leaders nominated the EPP’s *Spitzenkandidat*, Juncker, as the next Commission President, a nomination subsequently confirmed by the EP. What have made the headlines for Juncker in Turkey are his views on enlargement. While pledging to continue accession negotiations with Turkey and others, Juncker has closed the door on further enlargement for the duration of the 2014-2019 Commission.1 Concerning Turkey, and refer-
ring specifically to the Turkish government’s recent Twitter ban, Juncker stated, “the country is clearly far away from EU membership.” Pointedly, he did not mention Turkey in his agenda for the next Commission, but did refer to the Western Balkans and countries of the eastern neighborhood, such as Moldova and Ukraine, in his comments on enlargement.

Many scenarios for the future of Europe are too pessimistic. The same cannot be said, however, for prognoses about Turkey – EU relations. Given the state of European integration, the future remains far from bright. Moreover, irrespective of the crises the EU has been experiencing, Turkey has its own particular problems that need to be addressed if it is to progress further towards EU membership. Indeed, the Eurozone crisis, the outcome of the EP elections, and Juncker’s appointment have not actually changed much in Turkey’s slow-paced negotiations. The EPP’s dominance in the EP is not new. And its reserved position on further enlargement, especially to include Turkey, is well known. Dominated by Christian Democratic parties, the EPP has been leading debates on offering Turkey a “privileged partnership.” However, the EPP recently – and to the surprise of few – stepped up its opposition to Turkish accession and stated, “full membership is no longer our goal.”

Turkey has supporters in the EU, but for many in the EPP, it has long been considered as a permanent guest sitting in the waiting room. Opposition to Turkish accession is particularly high in Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Greece, and Cyprus. Moreover, popular support in the EU for further enlargement is very low. In 2013, only 37 percent of respondents across the EU expressed support for more states being admitted. Only a few member states publically express support for Turkish accession. Considering the potential for enlargement referendums in Austria and France and the possibility of non-ratification of Turkish accession by a national parliament or the EP, the future for Turkey’s membership ambitions is far from promising.

**Frustration and pessimism dominate the mood in Turkey about the current status of relations with the European Union and the future of accession negotiations**

Unlike with eastern enlargement countries, Turkey’s supporters lack a strong narrative that can support their case for its accession. The narrative that accompanied the opening of accession negotiations – one presenting the EU as a norm-based community open to all European states, as long as the candidates align themselves with European norms and values – no longer enjoys the same prominence. On the contrary, many
of those opposing Turkish accession are strong promoters of an “existential” narrative that presents the EU as an essentially Christianity-based entity. And the accession of a formally secular but overwhelmingly Muslim Turkey is considered a threat to Europe in their imagination. For them, Christianity is an essential condition for being a member of the EU.

Before opening accession negotiations in 2005, the debates on Turkey were focused on “whether Turkey should join the EU,” “why Turkey should join” and “when to begin accession negotiations.” A less prominent then, but ever-present question is “should Turkey be admitted to the EU?” Those opposing Turkey’s accession have kept this more fundamental question alive. It was these opponents who insisted on the inclusion of a reference to the “open-ended” nature of negotiations in the EU’s negotiating framework. In fact, all negotiations are open-ended and so the reference to the “open-ended” nature of the accession negotiations was very much a statement of fact. And it has been included in all negotiating frameworks since 2005. Yet, the fact that the insertion of the reference to “open-ended” negotiations was specifically included with Turkey in mind is an open secret in EU circles.

Amid the EU and wider criticism of the way in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government handled the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and the corruption allegations of 2013-14, given also the slowdown in – or, for some, a retreat from – Europeanization, especially regarding democratic norms, and problems regarding media freedom in Turkey, proposals for a relationship short of member-
ship and the “whether” question have re-gained prominence. In proposals relating to the future of the EU that foresee more differentiated and different forms and patterns of integration based around a Eurozone core, Turkey is counted at best among the potential members of the outer rings and tiers.

Turkey has also been adding fuel to the “whether” debate. Against a backdrop of the Eurozone crisis in the EU, the notable success of the Turkish economy, and Turkish foreign policy achievements (especially in the Middle East up until the current crisis in Syria) triggered debates in Turkey on whether it could in fact dispense with the goal of EU membership. Turkish policy makers have engaged in what can be called a “who needs whom more” debate with some advocating joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and opting for a relationship with the EU akin to Norway’s at the end of accession negotiations. Even among some strong supporters of EU membership and opinion-makers, serious consideration has been given to how Turkey might fare on the periphery of an EU characterized by greater flexibility and more differentiated integration. Such developments can be seen as signals of a decreasing commitment to “full” membership and of frustration in the face of the ongoing difficulties in furthering Turkey’s accession process. When combined with the effective stalemate in the accession negotiations and the prevailing pessimism over the prospects for accession, all this helps explain why popular support for EU membership in Turkey had dropped to 38 percent in 2013.

Maintaining Some Momentum

The single biggest opportunity to overcome the mood of pessimism in Turkey – EU relations is resolution of the Cyprus problem. Such a development would be a game changer for Turkey’s accession negotiations. Incurable pessimists may beg to differ, but if the Republic of Cyprus were to lift its vetoes on key negotiating chapters, Turkey’s accession prospects would be considerably improved not least because the accession negotiations would gain momentum. The use of the conditional is intentional; the prospects of Nicosia lifting its vetoes are not encouraging. Cooperation between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece is likely to bring increased dynamism to economic and political integration in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. Here, one of the strong motivations to resolve the Cyprus issue for all parties, including the EU and the international community, is offshore gas and the discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s
potential role as an energy hub in the region keeps hopes alive for Turkey–EU relations. However, optimism for progress in the Cyprus negotiations remains in short supply.8

Under the shadow of the grey clouds hovering over Turkey–EU relations and in the absence of a clear perspective of accession, and as observed by the former Turkish ambassador to the EU, Selim Kuneralp, the EU has “lost its leverage” on Turkey.9 To keep the EU relevant for Turkey and to resuscitate the accession negotiations while 16 out of 35 chapters are blocked, the EU’s member states in 2012 endorsed a Commission proposal for a new “Positive Agenda” for Turkey. This involves eight working groups assisting Turkey in aligning its domestic policies and legislation with key areas of the *acquis communautaire*. The areas covered include: visas, mobility and migration, energy, trade and the customs union, political reforms, fight against terrorism, foreign policy dialogue and participation in EU programs.

A key dimension of the “Positive Agenda” is a focus on issues scheduled to be covered in the unopened Chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (justice, freedom, and security) of the accession negotiations. As evident from the frameworks for negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia, the cross-cutting issues of judicial and administrative capacity and in particular anti-corruption initiatives and the maintenance of the rule of law covered by these chapters have assumed a pre-eminent status in accession negotiations. While the EU aims to address these issues from the start of negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia so as to observe a track record of implementation as well as the alignment of legislation before the negotiations are closed, both chapters are blocked in Turkey’s case. Turkey and the Commission would prefer to begin “real” negotiations in these chapters. For the moment, therefore, the “Positive Agenda” allows dialogue channels to be opened with Turkey, even if the opening benchmarks for Chapter 23 and Chapter 24 cannot – frustratingly for Turkish officials – be formally communicated to Turkey.

Regarding the “Positive Agenda,” one should not underestimate the efforts that the Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, has made to keep the EU’s enlargement process alive during the recent crises. Coming from a “new” EU member state, Füle has been fully aware of the transformative role that enlargement can have on would-be members. He might not be as enthusiastic for enlargement as his predecessor-but-one, Günter Verheugen, who oversaw much of the eastern enlargement process, but despite all the feelings of negativi-
ty towards Turkey – EU relations in recent years, he has repeatedly stated that the Commission has “no intention to ‘give up on Turkey’s EU accession’” and that Turkey and the EU are “bound to succeed together.” As for the future of Turkey – EU relations, the Commission’s agenda-setting role on enlargement policy should not be ignored. Its regular reports and strategy documents have become a firm part of the annual cycle of its activities. Moreover, it oversees an increasingly detailed accession process.

However, enlargement is far from being high on the agenda of the incoming Commission. Its priorities of the economy, trade, and energy are nevertheless understandable given challenges the EU is currently facing. During the next five years, enlargement will not, however, be completely off the agenda. Indeed, the pause in enlargement that Juncker has called for was likely anyway. With Iceland having effectively suspended its membership bid, no candidate is going to be in a position to accede to the EU in the next five years: all are at best in the early stages of substantive negotiations, negotiations which, following the Croatian example, are likely to take at least five or six years, and after that two years are likely to be required to secure ratification of the accession treaty.

Such a scenario is clearly relevant in Turkey’s case. The pause relates to the admission of states not the progress towards enlargement. So, contrary to the media coverage in Turkey, Juncker’s opposition to enlargement is not Turkey specific. Moreover, his criticism of the Twitter ban is widely shared among EU institutions and in the member states. Treating Juncker as if he were a new Sarkozy is to exaggerate what he has said and misunderstand the dynamics of enlargement. What is important for Turkey is who will emerge as Juncker’s Commissioner for Enlargement.

**Overcoming Pessimism**

Also important, not least from a Turkish perspective, is how to overcome the pessimism that pervades discussions about Turkey’s accession process and prospects. First, there is the issue of communication. Turkey, with the support of EU member states and the Commission, needs to increase its efforts to inform public opinion in the EU about Turkey and the potential contribution of its membership to the EU. However, decreasing public support for EU membership in Turkey and ill-informed assertions about the disintegration of the EU show that communication is not only about Turkey promoting itself within the EU. The EU has an image problem in candidate countries. Turkey’s Ministry of European Integration has been informing Turkish public about the current and anticipated benefits of EU integration and membership. But this is not enough. The EU Delegation in Turkey and EU member state embassies also have to increase their efforts to inform Turkish public opinion about the dynamics of European integration and the procedural and technical realities of
enlargement. Special efforts are needed to deal with criticisms over the alleged unfairness of the accession process and the perceived lack of equal treatment of Turkey. On the EU side, however, Turkey should be included in debates and discussions over the future shape and design of European integration, just as it was during the European Convention in 2002-2003 that inspired many of the reforms ultimately contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. Assuming the commitment to EU norms and values can be demonstrated, the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey alongside the leaders of other candidates and potential candidate countries should be invited to at least gatherings in the margins of key EU meetings and included in EU family photos, as was generally the case with candidates in the lead-up to eastern enlargement.

A second issue is commitment: Turkey should renew its commitment to EU membership. In the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey was criticized for human rights issues. Considering the current issues in Turkey and evolving demands and priorities of EU conditionality, it is for sure that promotion of the rule of law and the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives and judicial reform will become prominent themes in the accession negotiations. Therefore, greater impetus should be given to the adoption and implementation of reforms in these areas. This could also trigger a “grand débat” about the EU in Turkey. Among the key questions for a renewed commitment that need to be answered are: “Why does Turkey want to be a member of the EU?” And “What does Europe mean to Turkish citizens?”

Identity issues have traditionally dominated debates, but for many Turks and Europeans, Turkey’s EU membership needs to be presented as a high politics issue as well. Geopolitics and security considerations do matter. Equally, when it comes to accession negotiations, commitment and the adoption and implementation of reforms in all the acquis chapters is of paramount importance. Just focusing on the security dimension of the relationship is likely to end in something short of membership.

One important way to show Turkey’s renewed commitment for EU mem-
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bership is shifting ownership of the discourse; meaning away from a “state policy” to “the people’s choice.” Romania’s Snagov Declaration in 1995 could be an inspiration here. It proclaimed a domestic consensus on the goal of EU accession and was signed by the President, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Parliament’s two chambers and the leaders of 13 political parties, and supported by civil society in Romania.11 To revive Turkey – EU relations, a similar document committing Turkish political parties and civil society to work for a civilian constitution and to continue the reform process in Turkey with the aim of securing EU membership could be drawn up and signed following the parliamentary elections in 2015. If such a commitment were followed by focused reforms and their implementation, the arguments of domestic and international supporters of Turkey’s EU membership would be significantly strengthened when making their case.

Thirdly, it is often suggested that the EU should offer Turkey a clear accession date to make accession a realizable goal. The 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey – 2023 – is rich in symbolic importance and arguably a realistic target.12 Indeed, Erdoğan, when Prime Minister, proposed 2023 as a date by which Turkey should become a member of the EU. Setting the year 2023 as a target to transform Turkey to an EU-ready country could act as a catalyst for reform. However, against a backdrop of “enlargement fatigue” and an agreement to avoid any early commitments on dates, EU member states, aware of Turkey’s protracted accession negotiations and the thorny political problems that accompany them, are highly unlikely to offer Turkey a date for accession in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the European Council in 2006 in its “renewed consensus” on enlargement stated quite emphatically that the EU “will refrain from setting any target dates for accession until the negotiations are close to completion.”13

The calls for setting a date for accession create unrealistic expectations in Turkish public opinion, which tends to forget that the EU has never mentioned the possibility of declaring such a date. And the EU’s potential inability to meet these expectations is likely to contribute to pessimism and frustration in Turkey. Here quick comparisons can be made with eastern enlargement, especially with Romania and Bulgaria. At the Göteborg European Council in June 2001, the EU announced the objective of admitting new member states in time for them to participate in the 2004 EP

The single biggest opportunity to overcome the mood of pessimism in Turkey – EU relations is resolution of the Cyprus problem.
elections. This commitment was conditional on the candidate countries’ progress with a road map of reforms and concluding accession negotiations by the end of 2002. Only when negotiations had been concluded in December 2002 did the EU declare 1 May 2004 as the accession date for its first eastern enlargement. At the same time, the European Council declared its objective to welcome Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Again the date was conditional on the accession criteria being met. Subsequent references to January 2007 entry remained conditional, and it was only in December 2004, once negotiations had been closed, that the date was fixed. Evidently, if and when the EU signals a date, it remains conditional. It is not a promise and dates are only set once accession negotiations are concluded. It is possible for the EU to note and welcome a 2023 target for Turkey’s accession, but it would be naïve to expect the EU to share the same commitment. Precedent dictates this. It should also be noted that its historical importance for the post-Cold War unification of Europe meant that eastern enlargement was essentially an irreversible process. This is far less the case for Turkey and the others in the queue for membership.

Endnotes
4. Eurobarometer 80 (Autumn 2013), QA.17.3.
6. Eurobarometer 80, op.cit. QA7a
11. Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, Romania and the European Union: From marginalisation to membership, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp.73-75.
WHY DID IRAN DIPLOMACY WORK THIS TIME AROUND?

TRITA PARSİ

ABSTRACT In May 2010, Turkey and Brazil surprised the world when they succeeded in getting Iran’s acceptance for a nuclear swap deal. To Turkey and Brazil’s surprise, their diplomatic victory was rejected by the Barack Obama administration. Washington miscalculated the diplomatic skills of Brazil and Turkey and their ability to take on diplomatic challenges usually reserved for the great powers. Fastforward three years, and suddenly diplomacy with Iran was embraced by Washington. Why did the same American administration that rejected the Turkish brokered deal in 2010, shift in favor of diplomacy in 2013? This essay sheds light on some of the factors that rendered the nuclear standoff with Iran ripe for a diplomatic solution.

In 2010, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and his Brazilian counterpart, Lula da Silva, scored a major diplomatic victory. After 18 hours of marathon negotiations, Turkey and Brazil succeeded in getting Iran’s acceptance for a nuclear swap deal. Only 8 months earlier, the same government in Tehran had rejected a similar deal in negotiations with the U.S., Russia and France. But to Turkey and Brazil’s surprise, their diplomatic victory was rejected by the Barack Obama administration. Three years later, the U.S. and Iran were back at the negotiating table and this time, a historic interim deal was reached.

But why did diplomacy succeed in 2013? Why did the same American administration, that rejected the Turkish brokered deal in 2010, shift in favor of diplomacy in 2013? This essay will shed light on some of the factors that rendered the nuclear standoff with Iran ripe for a diplomatic solution.

Erdoğan and Lula’s Brief Moment of Triumph

In May 2010, the Obama administration was finally on the verge of passing a UN Security Council resolution sanctioning Iran’s nuclear activities. But at the last moment, Washington miscalculated the diplomatic skills...
of two up-and-coming states – Brazil and Turkey – and their desire to demonstrate their ability to take on diplomatic challenges usually reserved for the great powers. Erdoğan and Lula proved that it was wrong to assume that diplomacy with Iran was pointless.

On May 15, 2010, Lula da Silva traveled to Iran with an entourage of some three hundred Brazilian businessmen. Soon thereafter, Erdoğan and his energetic Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, joined Lula in an effort to convince Iran to ship out its low-enriched uranium (LEU). Two days later, Lula and Erdoğan stunned the U.S. and the world – they had a deal.

Contrary to expectations, and arguably to the hopes of some, they succeeded in convincing the Iranian government to agree to a deal based on the American benchmarks, where 1,200 kilograms of Iranian LEU would be sent out in one shipment and Iran would receive fuel pads for its Tehran Research Reactor roughly twelve months later. For a moment, it looked as if diplomacy had succeeded after all. But what could have been viewed as a diplomatic breakthrough – with Iran blinking first and succumbing to American demands – was instead treated as an effort to sabotage the new and higher objective of imposing sanctions.

Publicly, the Obama administration emphasized that sanctions were not inevitable; Iran could choose to accept Washington’s offer. “Iran continues to have a choice,” said Susan Rice, America’s top diplomat at the UN. If Turkey and Brazil’s efforts failed and Iran continued to refuse the offer, however, sanctions should follow. “Assuming it continues to make the wrong choices, that pressure will intensify,” she declared.

Lula and Erdoğan’s frustration with the public statements emanating from Washington stemmed from the contradiction between those statements and their private conversations with American decision makers. In addition, Lula and Erdoğan had a letter from Obama that spelled out the benchmarks of a deal that the U.S. believed would be helpful. The letter was dated April 20, 2010, exactly a week after Lula and Erdoğan’s conversation with Obama at the nuclear summit in Washington.

Obama clarified that the purpose of the swap was “for both sides to gain trust and confidence.” He spelled out the important markers that any agreement would have to meet to be acceptable to the United States. “For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200kg of Iran’s LEU out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile. I want to underscore that this element is of fundamental importance for the United States,” the letter said. Obama also presented a compromise mechanism that the U.S. had floated back in November 2009 – the idea that Iranian LEU could be held in Turkey in “escrow” until the fuel was delivered to Iran.
The letter spelled out three substantive points related to the question of quantity (1,200 kilograms), timing (shipped out immediately, with the fuel rods delivered a year later), and place (an escrow in Turkey). The letter also included a formal point that Iran should send its reply to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in writing within seven days rather than to any individual state.24

**Tehran Yields**

The discussions in Tehran were exasperating. However, Iran made a concession toward the end of the first day of talks: it expressed a willingness to escrow its LEU in Turkey. Once this point had been confirmed, Erdoğan decided to join the talks and flew in from Ankara around midnight on May 15. Furthermore, as the parties were ready to break for the day, another hopeful sign emerged: the Iranians wanted to resume the discussions at 7:00 a.m. the next day. For Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, this was “the first time I felt there was a good prospect” because

“only someone who is serious schedules a meeting for seven o’clock in the morning.”

By the end of the second day of talks, an agreement was within reach. The Turks and Brazilians had succeeded in convincing Iran to hand over 1,200 kilograms of LEU in one shipment in order to receive fuel pads for its research reactor within the next twelve months – the same parameters Tehran had rejected eight months earlier in Vienna. The LEU, however, would not go to Russia or France. Instead, it would be put in Turkey under the IAEA’s seal and if the West violated the terms of the agreement, Iran could take its LEU back. This arrangement, Turkey and Brazil reasoned, would alleviate Iran’s fear of undue exposure while putting the bulk of its trust in its neighbor, Turkey, rather than its adversary, Washington. Against all odds, Turkey and Brazil, in a few months of intensive diplomacy, had achieved what Western powers had failed to do in several years.28

Shortly after the agreement was struck, the three states held a press conference in Tehran announcing the breakthrough. The mood was jubilant and a picture of Lula, Erdoğan, and Ahmadinejad jointly raising their hands in a victorious gesture immediately went viral over the Internet. Davutoğlu called the fuel swap deal a “historic turning point,” and Erdoğan and Lula both declared that the world no longer needed to consider further sanctions against Iran. Amorim proudly announced that the agreement accomplished all

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**In 2010, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and his Brazilian counterpart, Lula da Silva, scored a major diplomatic victory**

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of the main objectives of the P5+1 and urged those countries to study it carefully.

**Obama Chooses Sanctions Over Diplomacy**

Enthusiasm for the deal never spread to Washington. Unbeknownst to Turkey and Brazil, the Obama administration had secured final approval for a sanctions resolution from Russia and China only a day before the talks in Tehran began. Two days after the deal was struck, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sounded the death knell for the deal in prepared remarks to the Senate, where she declared that an agreement on a sanctions resolution at the UN had been reached. The choice of venue was not a coincidence. Between instituting sanctions and getting one bomb’s worth of LEU out of Iran, Washington had chosen the former. “We have reached agreement on a strong draft with the cooperation of both Russia and China,” Clinton told a Senate committee. “We plan to circulate that draft resolution to the entire Security Council today. And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts un-
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That same day, Obama met with thirty-seven Jewish Democratic members of Congress for an hour and a half to assure them of his commitment to sanctions. A week later, Clinton raised the rhetorical volume even further, claiming that Turkey and Brazil’s efforts had made “the world more dangerous.”

There were numerous reasons why Obama rejected Turkey and Brazil’s successful mediation. First, diplomacy with America’s political foes was a critical component of Obama’s foreign policy platform during the presidential campaign. Recognizing the political risk that diplomacy with Iran would entail, the Obama team hedged its bets by arguing that the mere attempt at diplomacy would make it easier to mobilize international backing for sanctions if diplomacy failed. With its diplomatic outreach having done just that, the administration felt that it had to at least deliver on sanctions in order to justify the gamble on diplomacy.

Second, the heavy investment in the sanctions process helped turn the matter into one of prestige. Not imposing sanctions would have been hailed as a victory by Iran and condemned by Israel and its allies in the U.S. as a sign of Obama’s weakness and indecisiveness.

Third, moving forward with sanctions in a swift manner was necessary in order to sustain consensus among the P5+1, and ensure that the various deals and concessions that had been made to secure the sanctions would be upheld. These agreements, primarily between the U.S. and Russia, were not so much subject to the Iranian nuclear file as they were a rubric for U.S.-Russian relations and Washington’s reset with Moscow. They were contingent upon Russian support for a sanctions resolution. If sanctions were sidelined by diplomacy, not only could the deals be jeopardized, but, in case the Tehran Declaration fell apart down the road, the sanctions process would start anew and all the deals and arrangements would have to be renegotiated.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the Obama administration believed it had simply run out of political space domestically to accept the Tehran Declaration. Congress was coming at the Obama administration like a steamroller and the White House did not believe that investing capital in expanding the political space for the deal would be a politically wise move. The political maneuverability that Obama enjoyed on Iran when he first took office had been completely eaten away by pressure from Israel and Congress, the fallout from the June 2009 Iranian presidential election, and Iran’s refusal to accept the Russian-American swap proposal in October 2009.

Obama had essentially made two promises: one to Brazil and Turkey through his letter to their leaders, and one to Congress that they would get their sanctions on Iran. Once Turkey and Brazil unexpectedly reached a deal with Iran, Obama had to either break his promise to Brazil and Turkey or to the U.S. Congress. With only six months until mid-term elections, he was not going to antagonize Congress. Therefore, he decided to reject Brazil and Turkey instead.

“The impression, right or wrong, that was created was that we could not take yes for an answer,” a former senior Obama administration official told me. “That was not what I would call a triumph of public diplomacy.”

**Tide Turns in Favor of Diplomacy**

Four years after the debacle over the Tehran Declaration, Obama has found renewed determination for diplomacy and has even accepted the considerable domestic political cost for pursuing it. How did this stunning turnaround come about?

There are several reasons that made the resolution of this conflict ripe and the key parties’ political commitment to diplomacy sufficient. First, there has been a significant geopolitical shift in the region that simply rendered the continuation of the U.S.-Iran enmity too costly. Regionally, the strategic interest of the U.S. and two of its key allies in the region – Israel and Saudi Arabia – have been diverging on several important fronts: Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Arab uprisings. Washington seeks a nuclear accord with Tehran to avoid both a nuclear Iran and war with Iran. The Saudis and Israelis, on the other hand, fear that any improvement of relations between Tehran and Washington will legitimize Iran’s role in the region and increase its influence at their expense.

On the regional balance of power, Martin Kramer, a fellow at the conservative Israeli Shalem Center,
points out the main issue of contention: The American belief that the regional status quo is unsustainable; the Arab populations are rising and America’s Middle East strategy has to adjust to this reality instead of continuing to back pliant Arab dictators. Kramer disagrees: “In Israel, we are for the status quo. Not only do we believe the status quo is sustainable, we think it’s the job of the U.S. to sustain it.” On this issue, the Saudis and Israelis tend to agree.

An Arab official who was briefed on talks between President Obama and King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud told the New York Times that the Saudi monarch was unwavering in his opposition to the largely Shia pro-democracy protests in Bahrain. “King Abdullah has been clear that Saudi Arabia will never allow Shia rule in Bahrain - never.”

Second, the domestic political landscape in Washington has changed so that the key vested interests opposing a U.S.-Iran deal are no longer decisive. In fact, the powerful and hawkish pro-Israeli lobby’s defeats are rare and seldom public. However, in the last year, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has suffered three major public setbacks. AIPAC’s first defeat was over the nomination of Senator Chuck Hagel for Secretary of Defense. In spite of a major campaign defaming Hagel, even accusing him of anti-Semitism, his nomination won approval in the Senate.

Then AIPAC lost the battle in Congress to approve President Barack Obama’s push for military action against Syria. AIPAC announced that it would send hundreds of citizen lobbyists to the Hill to help secure approval for the authorization of the use of force. Nevertheless, AIPAC and Obama were met with stiff resistance. The American people quickly mobilized and ferociously opposed the idea of yet another war in the Middle East. By some accounts, AIPAC failed to secure the support of a single member of Congress.

The third defeat was over new sanctions against Iran. The interim nuclear agreement from November of last year explicitly stated that no additional sanctions could be imposed. Yet, AIPAC pushed for new sanctions, arguing that it would enhance America’s negotiating position. The White House strongly disagreed, fearing that new sanctions would cause the collapse of diplomacy and make America look like the intransigent party. The international coalition the president had carefully put together against Iran would fall apart, and the U.S. and Iran would once again find themselves on a path towards military confrontation.

However, AIPAC insisted. Its immense lobbying activities secured 59 cosponsors for the bill, including 16 Democrats. But AIPAC couldn’t move beyond 59 cosponsors and never managed to get the bill to the floor. Supporters of diplomacy put up an impressive defense of the negotiations, building both off of years of careful development of a pro-diplomacy constituency and coalition.
machinery as well as the grassroots muscle of more recent additions to the pro-diplomacy camp.

Eventually, AIPAC threw in the towel and announced that it would no longer push for a vote on the bill. The powerful lobby’s defeat was historic, public and humiliating. The very same forces that Obama did not dare challenge in 2010 were now defeated by his administration.

The shifting political landscape in Washington was also seen in the debacle over Syria. As Obama sought support from Congress for an attack on Syria in August 2013, the public ferociously resisted, flooding Congress with phone calls. The most credible threat that was issued throughout this episode was not Obama’s threat to bomb Syria, but the American people’s threat to vote out members of Congress if they supported the war. Their threats proved effective.

This dramatically changed the landscape because it showed that the politically safe position was not to be hawkish and pro-war, but to be skeptical of military action and favorable towards diplomacy.

The third factor that has enabled the current diplomatic breakthrough is the president’s ability to muster enough political strength and will to pursue diplomacy, regardless of the domestic political price that might be inflicted on him.

“Tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it’s not the right thing for our security,” he said a day after the deal had been struck. Once Rouhani was elected and the White House concluded that he was serious and committed to diplomacy, the U.S. president mustered the same dedication. He did so partly because it was the right thing to do for U.S. national security, but also because Iran is now – paradoxically – the lowest hanging fruit in the Middle East. There is no other issue in the Middle East that has as high of a likelihood of being solved. With Iran, unlike Syria, Egypt and elsewhere in the region, the U.S. president had a good chance of making a difference.

If the parties reach a final, comprehensive deal, this will undoubtedly be a game-changer in the region. However, it will also come about to some extent because both the region and the political dynamics in Washington have already changed. Unfortunately for Erdoğan and Lula, they were ahead of their time.

Endnote
1. This article is an adaptation of the following writings by Trita Parsi:
   “Going to Tehran”, Al Jazeera, November 28, 2014.
The Crisis and Governance of Religious Pluralism in Europe

IAN MORRISON*

ABSTRACT In recent years, religious pluralism has become the focus of intense debate in Europe – from controversies regarding religious clothing and symbols in the public sphere, to those related to limits on religious speech and the accommodation of religious practices – owing to the perception that pluralism has failed to contend with the purported incommensurability of Islam and European society. This article examines this purported crisis of religious pluralism in Europe and argues that while it is often depicted as resulting from the particularities of Islamic culture and theology, recent controversies point to a deeper crisis born of a historical failure to resolve the question of the governance of religious subjects.

For at least the past two decades, questions concerning the nature, value and parameters of religious pluralism have been the focus of intense debate within Europe. From controversies regarding the permissibility of religious clothing and symbols in the public sphere, to those related to limits on religious speech and speech that may offend religious sensibilities, and to those concerning the accommodation of religious practices, much of this questioning has concerned issues related to the migration of Muslims to Europe. For many, on both the right and the left, these controversies reveal a failure of religious pluralism in the face of a culture portrayed as inassimilable and incompatible with secular, democratic society. In this way, the crisis of religious pluralism appears to be rooted in an incommensurability of Islam and European society. Consequently, solutions to the crisis must be found in measures responding to the presence, and governing the practices of Muslim subjects. Below, I will discuss the purported crisis of religious pluralism in Europe and argue that while it is often depicted as a result of the particularities of Islamic culture and theology, recent controversies point to a deeper crisis born of an historical failure to resolve the question of the governance of religious subjects.

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Vol. 16 / No. 3 / 2014, pp. 55-65
Islam and the Crisis of Religious Pluralism

Since the early 1990s, the notion that Europe is in the midst of a crisis has been a growing refrain. This has been articulated as a crisis of a secular-democratic European society and the values that it is said to both promote and reflect. As I have written about extensively elsewhere, this crisis has arisen from and relates to Europe’s encounter with two immanent others – the Muslim migrant and the Turkish state – both portrayed as representatives of the (actual or potential) destabilizing and corrosive religious otherness of Islam. It is only within a context of immanence – the presence of Muslim migrants in the “diaspora zone” of Europe – or potential immanence (future Muslim migration to Europe or Turkish accession to the European Union) that particular features of Islamic culture, society and subjectivity, long-identified as troubling within Orientalist scholarship, came to be seen as an issue for the governance of European states.

Within this discourse of a crisis of religious pluralism, the foremost concern is an ostensible incommensurability of Islam and secular, democratic society. This concern is articulated in two related ways. The first identifies elements of Islamic theology that are said to be directly incompatible with secular society. Primary among these is an understanding of Islam as an all-embracing religious system for which, as Charles Taylor asserts, “there is no question of separating politics and religion the way we have come to expect in Western liberal society.” Islam, therefore, appears as a system lacking the separation of civil and religious spheres fundamental to a secular society. The second points to a variety of social and political problems found in regions with majority Muslim populations and attributes these to Islam. Of these problems, the most routinely mentioned are those related to: a) patriarchal gender relations, such as gender segregation, sexual violence, honor killings and female genital mutilation; b) the mistreatment of religious and sexual minorities – pointing to discrimination, violence and the lack of legal rights and protections for these groups; c) a lack of respect for freedom of expression – as epitomized by the protests and violent reactions to the publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in 2005, and the release of films critical of Islam, such as The Innocence of Muslims in 2012 and the 2004 film Submission, whose director, Theo Van Gogh, was later murdered; and d) a lack of democracy in the Muslim world, both historically and in the contemporary times. These events, practices and interpretations of theology are said to be demonstrative of the essential incommensurability of Islam and secular democracy and, consequently, of the incompatibility of Muslims with European society.

In this discourse of incommensurability, the above-mentioned problematic practices and attitudes are depicted as being rooted in the teachings,
values and ‘culture’ of Islam. As such, they are not seen as spatially limited to Muslim societies. Instead, they are attributed to all Muslim subjects. Said to be rooted in Islamic values, these practices and attitudes are assumed to be held by all who adhere to Islam. Given this deterministic and essentialist understanding of Islam and the Muslim subject, the phenomenon of migration becomes particularly troubling. The Muslim migrant, as a carrier of Islamic values, allows for the troubling features of Islamic societies to, in the words of Samuel Huntington, escape their “bloody boundaries.”

For adherents of the notion of the Islamization of Europe, Muslim immigration amounts to a “jihad by other means.” Policies permitting immigration and pluralism are portrayed as contributing to Islam’s cultural and demographic conquest of Europe. These measures are seen as allowing for the transformation of secular Europe into a society “subservient” to Islam. In fact, it is argued that European practices of immigration, religious pluralism and minority rights, and ideals of tolerance and openness – often derided as exemplary of the rise of relativism – serve to undermine European culture and society by providing a Trojan horse for Islamization. This discourse has been incorporated into the program of far-right political actors in Europe, who have called for the introduction of a variety of measures aimed at buttressing Europe against this threat, including banning the Koran, the institution of a ‘headscarf tax,’ the elimination of institutional accommodation for religious practices, a cessation of Muslim immigration and even the deportation of Muslims already residing in Europe.

Such sentiments are not only present on the fringes of European politics. As José Pedro Zúquete has demonstrated, they have increasingly infiltrated mainstream European politics. The parties of the far-right that espouse notions of the incompatibility of Islam and European society have attained increased support and electoral success in some recent elections. Moreover, similar ideas are often advocated by traditionally mainstream political actors. Within mainstream political discourse, the threat of Muslim immigration is generally presented as an issue of social cohesion. Articulated in this way, the main challenge posed by migration is one of integration, seen as an exceptionally arduous undertaking given the aforementioned understanding of the nature of Islamic theology and society, and the deterministic and essentialist understanding of Muslim subjectivity. Muslims, defined by an essential and unalterable religiosity, are understood to pose a particular
challenge for social cohesion due to their inability or unwillingness to integrate into secular European society.

The primary concern with regard to governance relates to the previously mentioned view that Islam does not recognize a division of religious and secular authority or identity. The apparent absence of social differentiation is deemed problematic because it is said to permit the dominance of religious authority and identity in the public sphere. This often-repeated interpretation of Islamic theology has led to a questioning of whether religious authority will always override secular authority for Muslims. In other words, mainstream European political discourse reveals reservations regarding the willingness of Muslims to abide by laws that conflict with religious teachings and commandments. In debates concerning recent controversies related to religious pluralism, Muslims have been depicted as unwilling to abide by state regulations concerning appearance, freedom of expression, gender relations and violence against women. Moreover, the loyalty of Muslims to a particular nation or state is often seen as compromised by a primary allegiance to the supra-national Ummah. This question of loyalty has been given particular attention and has even been considered an issue of security for European states engaged in military operations within majority Muslim countries.

Such apprehension regarding the ability of Muslim migrants to integrate into European society is apparent in various measures concerning migration that have recently been
instituted in a number of European states. In the past decade, several European states have altered requirements for attaining residency and citizenship. For instance, as part of the “Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act” of 2005, the government of the United Kingdom instituted the Life in the United Kingdom test, which includes 24 questions related to employment, government and society. The stated purpose of this test is not only to assess English language proficiency and candidates’ knowledge of British culture and society, but also, in the words of former Home Secretary David Blunkett, to “protect the rights and duties of all citizens and confront practices and beliefs that hold them back.”

The United Kingdom is not, however, the only European state to institute such policies. In 1997, the French government established the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, tasked with ‘controlling migration,’ ‘favoring integration’ and ‘promoting our [French] identity.’ In addition, in January 2012, the French Interior Ministry introduced a citizenship test that requires candidates to demonstrate proficiency in the French language equal to that of a 15-year-old native speaker, as well as sufficient knowledge of French history, culture and Republican values. Furthermore, France has attempted to ensure the loyalty and integration of migrants by the institution of a ‘social integration charter.’ In explaining the purpose of the charter, the then-Interior Minister, Claude Guéant, placed special emphasis on the needs of migrants to recognize the secular nature of the French state and society, and equality between sexes. This statement was widely seen as specifically aimed at Muslims, who constitute a majority of new French citizens each year. As such, the charter states, “becoming French is not a mere administrative step. It is a decision that requires a lot of thought.” Moreover, it declares, “applicants will no longer be able to claim allegiance to another country while on French soil.” Thus, candidates are informed that they must decide whether, in order to attain French citizenship, they are willing to accept French values and loyalty to the French nation-state.

Perhaps the most renowned of the recently instituted measures concerning the integration of migrants in Europe is the Dutch civic integration exam, which has been obligatory for all potential migrants since 2006. Similar to the measures instituted in France and the United Kingdom, the aim of the Dutch examination is not only to assess an applicant’s knowledge of the country’s language, his-
history, politics and geography; it also tests their compatibility with what is considered secular, liberal Dutch society. The aspect of this examination that has attracted the most attention is a two-hour long film that potential migrants are required to purchase and view, entitled *Coming to the Netherlands*. This film, which critics have argued is designed to offend and exclude devout Muslims, contains images of public nudity and two men kissing in a park. The inclusion of these scenes, depicting practices ostensibly common and universally accepted in the Netherlands, is meant to demonstrate to potential migrants the importance of tolerance, as well as to gauge their willingness and ability to integrate into what is considered liberal Dutch society. These changes to immigration practices, like those in France and the United Kingdom, reveal an anxiety concerning integration and a resultant need to demonstrate to migrants that they must put aside, or at least temper, their religious beliefs, practices and loyalties in order to be welcomed into secular, democratic European societies.

Such measures are responses to the belief, prevalent since at least the early 1990s, that Europe is experiencing a crisis of religious pluralism. For both proponents of the Islamization thesis and more mainstream figures, it is the phenomenon of Muslim immigration and a belief in the incommensurability of Islam and European secular-democratic society that have necessitated a questioning of the value, nature and limits of pluralism and toleration. In this sense, the crisis is portrayed as resulting from the particularities of Islamic culture and theology, namely, that within Islam “everything pertains to religion.” This understanding not only suggests that Islam does not recognize a distinction between religious and secular spheres, but also that religious authority and identity dominate all areas of a Muslim’s life. Such an understanding of Islam and Muslim subjectivity has led to a questioning of Muslim immigrants’ allegiance to European nation-states and obedience to secular authority, which – particularly since the events of September 11, 2001 – has increasingly been portrayed as an issue not only of social cohesion but of personal and national security. Of principal concern are two related issues: a) whether the primary loyalty of Muslim immigrants lies with the nation-state or the globally-dispersed Muslim community; and b) whether Muslims will, in the case of conflict, follow the dictates of religious or secular authority.

Loyalty, Obedience and the Perennial Threat of Religious Difference

While the discourse outlined above attributes the crisis of religious pluralism to the particularities of Islam, the perceived threat to governance posed by the presence of religious differences within a political community has been a topic of recurrent consideration throughout European history. Moreover, the concerns about loyalty and obedience that ani-
mate the contemporary sense of crisis are also the focus of perennial apprehension regarding the threat of religious forces to secular rule. As such, the current crisis of religious pluralism should be seen as the contemporary materialization of a deeper crisis of governance resulting from a failure to resolve the question of the governance of religious subjects.

Since antiquity, there have been ongoing attempts to manage the threat of the presence of religious differences within the political community. Within the empires of ancient Greece and Rome, comprised of followers of various religions, the divine mandate of the state required the worship of the official gods of the state. Failure to engage in such worship was viewed as a sign of disloyalty. However, the syncretism of ancient Greek and Roman polytheism served as a form of religious pluralism, permitting the followers of diverse religions to worship their traditional gods, while simultaneously paying tribute to the gods of the official pantheon. This was made possible by the equation of the gods of other religions with those of the official pantheon or, at times, the incorporation of a new god. The limits to this form of proto-pluralism appeared in the form of atheism, which rejected the worship of deities, and, in the case of the Roman Empire, monotheistic religions (particularly Christianity and Judaism), which prohibited their followers from participating in the polytheistic state religion. Within the Roman Empire, both Christians and Jews faced severe persecution, including restrictions or at times outright prohibition of worship and proselytization.

As in the case of Islam in Europe today, the measures enacted against Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire were reflective of anxieties related to their loyalty and obedience. The primary loyalty of these groups was seen as residing with their religious community, rather than the Empire. Moreover, owing to their rejection of the divinity of Imperial power and the eschatological aspects of their theologies, the obedience of Christians and Jews to Imperial rather than religious authority was always in doubt. The legalization of Christianity in the 313 Edict of Milan and its eventual establishment as the official religion of the Roman Empire by Theodosius I in 380 did not, however, introduce an era of religious pluralism. Rather, the persecution of Jews and Christian sects deemed heretical increased and in 392, all pagan cult worship was prohibited.

With the Protestant Reformation, religious difference once again emerged

Muslims, defined by an essential and unalterable religiosity, are understood to pose a particular challenge for social cohesion due to their inability or unwillingness to integrate into secular European society.
The loyalty of Muslims to a particular nation or state is often seen as compromised by a primary allegiance to the supra-national Ummah as an issue of governance in Europe. Despite being banned in 1521, Lutheranism was rapidly gaining adherents by the middle of the 16th century, including a number of Princes within the Holy Roman Empire. In order to contend with this problem, the doctrine of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose realm, whose religion) was developed. With the inclusion of the *ius reformadi* (right to reform) in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, rulers were permitted to enforce religious uniformity within their principality. Individuals living in a territory whose leader belonged to a denomination other than their own were also guaranteed the right to emigrate. Thus, the Peace of Augsburg attempted to provide a solution to the presence of religious differences and the attendant problems of loyalty and obedience by introducing a system of interstate religious pluralism and intra-state religious uniformity. However, the extent of interstate pluralism permitted by this solution was limited, as only Catholicism and Lutheranism were recognized as state religions.

The signing of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 marked the official end of this system and the emergence of new challenges related to religious pluralism. By abrogating the *ius reformadi* and guaranteeing certain rights to Christians living in territories where their denomination was not the established church, the Peace of Westphalia introduced the religious minority as a legal subject. With the recognition of religious minorities in law, a new problem arose for the state: namely, how to govern these subjects. Rulers could no longer legally resort to traditional policies of annihilation, forced conversion or expulsion. The legal acceptance of religious minorities led to a renewal of anxieties concerning loyalty and obedience to the ruler, leading, at times, to open conflict or the violent suppression of minorities. Thus, the Peace of Westphalia failed to offer a model of governance capable of resolving such issues without periodically resorting to policies aiming to restrict or eliminate religious differences.

Since the emergence of liberal constitutionalism, questions regarding the governance of religious minorities have been complicated, as the right to religious difference is viewed as inalienable. Consequently, the governance of religious difference cannot take the form of an explicit exclusion of followers of particular religions. Nor, however, can this issue be ignored, given the threat it could pose to social and political cohesion. The task of democratic political philosophy, consequently, has been to formulate systems of governance through which the risks that religious differences pose to the nation-state can be managed without illegitimately constraining freedom of religion.
Two models of governance have emerged to contend with this dilemma. Influenced by John Locke’s theories of tolerance, the first of these models – the secular state – is characterized by the strict division of a privatized religious sphere and a neutral, secular public sphere. According to Locke, the problem of the loyalty and obedience of religious subjects is not simply the result of the presence of followers of different sects within the same political territory; rather, it is due to a lack of clearly demarcated and differentiated civil and religious jurisdictions. He suggests that as long as religion and the state recognize that the sources of their authority are distinct and belong to separate realms, the religious subject can “be a citizen of both sacred and secular realms — he could enjoy dual citizenship — with no conflict of obligations.”16

Foreshadowing the recent questioning of the limitations of religious pluralism in Europe, Locke’s toleration only extends to those he judged willing and able to respect the separation of state and religious jurisdictions. Moreover, if particular religious practices had secular consequences, he declared that intervention would be justified and appropriate. Thus, while freedom of religion is protected by the secular state, the expression of beliefs must remain confined to the private sphere. Within the public sphere, secular reason and identities prevail. Only through the adoption of a secular reason and identity is the individual deemed able to legitimately engage in public discourse. As these limitations make evident, within the model of the secular state, dual citizenship can only be exercised by subjects capable of bracketing their religious identities and beliefs while
in the secular public sphere. Consequently, the model of secular governance continues to operate with a logic of exclusion – an exclusion legitimized through the declared neutrality of the public sphere.

The second model of the governance of religious difference – the religiously pluralistic state – attempts to escape the logic of exclusion at play in the secular model. Yet it too fails to resolve the question of loyalty and obedience. Rather than requiring the religious subject to transform their persona in order to conform to the supposedly neutral norms of the public sphere, the pluralistic model advocates the constitution of a public sphere that can accommodate religious subjects. Within this model, religious subjects may engage in public discourse and advocate positions that derive from religious teachings. Consequently, it is argued that they are free to maintain their religious identity in the public sphere. Unlike in the case of the secular model, agreement is not found in the common adoption of a universal citizen identity or a neutral public reason, but through the emergence of an overlapping consensus of various traditions and worldviews. However, despite this opening of the public sphere, religious subjects’ participation is still bounded by their capacity to engage in ‘reasonable’ and reciprocal discussion. Of question is the ability of the religious subject to: a) participate in public discourse, and b) abide by the judgements resulting from the political process. Given the perceived inerrancy of revealed truths and the potential for eternal rather than merely temporal reward and punishment, the religious subject is said to have difficulty engaging with positions that are contrary to religious dogma and accepting the burden of public judgement. As such, they are considered to have great difficulty adopting the persona of the citizen, engaging in the process of ruling and being ruled.

Conclusion

The crisis of religious pluralism in Europe is reduced to a crisis of Europe’s engagement with Islam, a problem related solely to the particularities of Islam. The focus of contemporary European debates about the nature, value and limits of religious pluralism is related to issues regarding Muslim immigration and concerns about the incommensurability of Islam and European secular-democratic society. As such, the crisis of religious pluralism in Europe is reduced to a crisis of Europe’s engagement with Islam, a problem related solely to the particularities of Islam and the phenomenon of Muslim migration to Europe. Depicted as such, it masks the ways in which it is reflective of the historical anxieties about the governance of religious subjects. As discussed above, since antiquity, it is the very characteristics said to define religious subjects...
their allegiance to an authority beyond the state and the force of their convictions – and related questions of loyalty and obedience that are deemed a barrier to their inclusion in the public sphere and, consequently, a threat to social cohesion and the state. Consequently, rather than stigmatizing Muslims as particularly threatening figures – which will only legitimize the rhetoric and feed into the popularity of Europe’s increasingly influential far-right anti-immigrant groups – it is necessary to work towards developing a model of community that can address the issues of religious pluralism without resorting to a logic of exclusion.

Endnote

10. Both this Ministry and the High Council for Integration, which has been in place since 1989, were disbanded by the Socialist government elected in June 2012.
12. “France Makes it Harder to Become French.”
West Coast Visions

Borusan Contemporary, **San Francisco Modern Sanat Müzesi** Medya Sanatları Koleksiyon seçkisini ağırlıyor.

*Borusan Contemporary presents West Coast Visions, featuring artists and works from the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art’s Media Arts Collection.*

Sanatçılar / Artists: **Jeremy Blake, Bill Fontana, Doug Hall, Steina, Bill Viola**

Küraçör / Curator: Rudolf Frieling SFMOMA Medya Sanatları Küraçörü / Curator of Media Arts, SFMOMA
The Kurdistan Regional Government Elections: A Critical Evaluation

SARDAR AZIZ*

ABSTRACT This analysis offers an evaluation of the last three elections of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. These three elections included the regional parliamentary elections in September 2013, and the local and federal elections held simultaneously in April 2014. The KRG, as a federal region, exists in the north of Iraq where Kurds have managed their own affairs through a regional government since 1992. The KRG elections have very little in common with elections in the rest of Iraq. Compared to the rest of Iraq, the “region” has experienced a very different trajectory during the last two decades. As a postwar region, the KRG strives to solidify a stable democracy in a landlocked region, which suffers from minimal economic capital and weak democratic culture.

Political and Electoral Background

The KRG held its regional parliamentary election in September 2013. It was an election of great significance and candidates battled acrimoniously for their seats. In fact, one can argue that for the people in the Kurdistan region, the regional parliamentary election is likely the most important election for the electorate, due to the nature of Iraqi governing system. The KRG includes three governorates in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok. This regional government is the only real sovereign political body. In view of this sovereign organization, the region has been described as “a de facto state.” Electoral and subsequently parliamentary democracy reached the region in 1992, after the withdrawal of the central government due its flagging military, security, and administrative power. The first election in 1992 had a distinct “aura”—an aura of authentic artwork. It was not only the first manifestation of the region’s political power, but also a demonstration of the Kurdish people’s existence. It was an election to form a new state, a novel government. Democracy requires a defined territory and people as well as a cohesive state. However, in 1992, none of these existed. These absences resulted in roadblocks to democracy, which remain in the region.
today. Thus, it was not surprising that the second election did not occur until after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Elections in the region have two faces, like the Roman god Janus: one looking at the past, and the other at the future. Thus, elections might cultivate the idea of democracy through practice, while simultaneously, in a post civil war society, maintains and revives pre-modern formats of relationships, which in most cases are anti-democratic.

In the first election, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) emerged with success. Both parties proclaimed their right to govern, as they feared they would lose public support for the next election if they ruled with anything less than full power. This dynamic resulted in a fifty-fifty coalition government. This inconclusive competition for dominance damaged the region’s democracy and government formation. The fifty-fifty model divided the government body and the geographical organization of the electorate, and has resulted in entrenched regional unrest. Bad governance, limited information, and personal and factional enmities contributed to the population's disenchantment with the system and the emergence of Islamic political parties. This development resulted in the first distinctions between secular and Islamist ideologies—concepts still not fully understood by the region’s populations.

In post-Saddam Iraq, the KRG region has leapt forward in many areas. The Ba'ath regime had been an existential threat to the Iraqi Kurds, and its demise changed the nature of the country. Not even a century old today, the Iraqi state came to being as a post-Ottoman, Western creation, but there is no commonality among its populations. As former Iraqi minister Ali Allawi put it, “Iraq as a limited geographical expression does not have the civilizational unity.” Despite this traditional discord, the post-Saddam era set the stage for post-partisan politics in the KRG. Under these conditions emerged the Gorran (Change) Movement—the first real opposition movement in the Kurdish political sphere. In its debut election in 2009, the movement won 25 parliamentary seats: a political event that changed and redefined the nature of regional party politics. The movement divided the PUK, halted the Islamists’ progress, and applied pressure to the KDP.

**The Three Elections**

Only against this background can we comprehensively analyze the last
three elections in the region. These elections included the regional parliamentary elections in September 2013, the Iraqi National Parliamentary elections, and the provincial elections in April 2014. One can hardly find any differences between these elections, and this repetition indicates serious deficiencies in conducting the electoral democratic practice. It signifies an inability to address different issues in each election, or to relate the election based on these issues.

The campaigns are all similar, if not the same and have exhibited similar problems. Campaign officials cover every city and town in the region with party flags and candidates’ pictures. Unlike Turkey, in the KRG, the MPs are not the most important political figures. Party leaders never run for seats in parliament. Although the governing system in the KRG is nominally parliamentarian, neither the ministers nor the prime minister are members of parliament. Therefore, the Kurdish political elite is not composed of current MP’s, mostly due to the insignificant role played by parliament within the governing system in the KRG. Until the emergence of the Gorran opposition, the parliament was a place for compensation, and the two main parties would compensate their devoted servants with parliament seats. This trend still continues, albeit in different fashions. Thus, those in parliament were party delegates and not representatives of the people. When the Gorran movement emerged, the nature of the parliament tremendously changed. For the first time, the parliament debated regional budgets and discussed laws. Above all, the people became informed about the nature of governing the region.
Making of Kanded (Candidates)

Before coming to the nitty-gritty of the last three elections, it is important to shed light on the public’s perceptions of the figure of the candidates. The Kurdish people refer to candidates for parliament as kanded—a word (Why they use a foreign word, while there is more than one Kurdish word for it, is another issue). The word is derived from the English word candidate, not from the word candid. Since the main perception of a candidate is not that he/she is “candid.” The connotations of kanded are distinct, and include none of the prestige and respect common to the English term. The public views the candidate as someone running for parliament and not representing his constituency, but to make money instead. People generally view these figures as inefficient, overpaid, and lazy, and they angrily compare their generous salaries to those of teachers and other low-paid civil servants. This negative public image, however, one can argue, is universal but somehow impacts negatively the already weakened institution of parliament. While the MPs salaries merit readjustment, they are by no means the main source of waste of public revenue.

The KRG region suffers from severe, systematic corruption, as visible from Iraq’s low rank on the International Transparency Index. Reflecting public outrage, many writers have criticized this corruption and the MP candidates. The region’s famous anti-establishment author, Bakhtyar Ali, wrote a piece entitled “Kanded.” He describes the candidate as an empty minded, greedy figure who tries to gratify himself through public acceptance. He is obsessed with his worth, his position, and his aura; all are attributed to him from the outside world. Ali’s view originates from Jean Baudrillard’s perception by demonstrating human relations with unreal objects. Ali’s writing is part of a destructive, nihilist movement to devalue activity by government institutions and political parties. This destructive criticism has resulted in little positive change.

The previous three elections, in 2013 and 2014, were held in this tense political environment. Campaigns for the most recent two elections began slowly in early April 2014. Disenchanted intellectuals argued for abstinence, and marginal, political parties of the far left endorsed their message. In addition, many argued against voting itself, based on the futility of reform attempts in the region. They claimed that a small group of elites controls the region and organizes society for its own benefit, at the expense of the masses. The powerful have consolidated political power amongst themselves and have used their power to amass wealth. However, as Election Day approached, this argument against voting lost momentum, and it was replaced by a harsh polemical exchange. This sort of brutal polemics has been the common form of political discourse among different parties. There is no respect or acknowledgment of the rights of their opponents. There is no dialogue. The whole exchange is mere polemical.
In most cases, the content of debates is irrelevant. Candidates’ expression of Eastern-style leadership, through rhetoric, charisma, and strength of voice, matters above all else. It is always Kennedy versus Nixon (referring to the famous Sep. 26, 1960 USA election debate) but all sides are aware of the importance of extensive television presence in order to reach every household, as underlined in Kurdistan by the use of TV as a central media source. The TV has to a certain degree a magical power. It is a tool of reaching and convincing ordinary people. People from all parts of society spend most of their free time in front of the TV, and many watch even during work, as there are TVs in offices, including every regional civil servant office. Like many other places in the world, in keeping with global trends, Kurdistan has left the radio far behind and embraced the televised age.

The majority of the election debate consists of polemics and rhetoric. This emphasis on polemics over the relevant issues is harmful in a society at the early stages of democracy. To the polemicist, “the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning.” While candidates undertake this self-interested, competitive approach to politics, how do the voters behave? Before answering this question, it is necessary to provide an analysis of the typology of the political parties.

Typology of the KRG Political Parties

In general, there are five main political parties vying for the voters’ preference. The parties are distinguished primarily as pro-status quo or pro-change, but can also be divided along secular and religious lines. The KDP and the PUK both support the status quo, while the Gorran movement and the Islamist political parties call for change. The local media has also labeled Gorran and the Islamists, which include the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), as the “opposition block,” in view of their informal coalition in the parliament over the past four years. However, the two Islamic parties have different origins and views. The KIU focuses on charity and civil society, due to the Muslim Brotherhood’s (Ikhwan al Muslimin) world view and
its considerable influence, while the KIG has a paramilitary past and more radical views. The KIG’s flamboyant leader regularly advertises alleged visions of Allah and the Prophet from his dreams, employing an archaic method of obtaining legitimacy in the eye of the followers. While both parties have increased their numbers of votes since their emergence onto the political stage, they both suffered a decrease in votes in the last election. The KIU suffered more than the KIG in this election, and it currently struggles from a lack of raison d’état or a fraying political consensus.

In an interview with the local newspaper *Awene*, Abubakir Haladni, one of the leading KIU politburo members, stated that party leadership had been shocked by the results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections and Kurdistan’s local election results. He pinned the undesirable result on the candidates’ weakness. Although votes for the Islamists might have declined, Denise Natali argues, “Islamic influences are penetrating Iraqi Kurdistan in another more subtle way. According to one Erbil resident, “The secular parties’ own second generation is becoming part of Islamic institutions from within.” Others have described a “whole new generation of Kurds following the Quran.” Some residents argue that this trend is a reaction to the rapid lifestyle changes linked to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s vast oil wealth; nightclubs, massage parlors, bars and immodest attire — even if they benefit materially from the oil wealth.” Natali points out a significant trend, but this tendency towards religion is neither politically inclined, nor highly conservative. In fact, many people are simultaneously practicing religion and immersing themselves in the pleasures of consumption. In addition, Islam is becoming more and more localized and nationalized rather than pan connected to an Umma approach. The discourses of pan-Islamic, Khalifa style are going out of fashion. Currently, the KIU tries to consolidate its followers by arguing that its party stands for “religiosity, patriotism, pacifism, honesty, fidelity, creativity, and care.”

Voters display complex behavior toward these political parties. Some citizens are loyal party cardholders, others make a rational choice each Election Day, and many vote for their economic well-being. Most of the population is affiliated with a particular political party based on their location, ancestry, fears, blood ties, and frustrations. On this subject, drawing “the usual analogy between the voting decision and the more or less carefully calculated decisions of consumers or businessmen or courts … may be quite incorrect. For many voters political preferences may better be considered analogous to cultural tastes—in music, literature,
recreational activities, dress, ethics, speech, social behavior. ... Both have their origin in ethnic, sectional, class, and family traditions. Both exhibit stability and resistance to change for individuals but flexibility and adjustment over generations for the society as a whole. Both seem to be matters of sentiment and disposition rather than ‘reasoned preferences.’ While both are responsive to changed conditions and unusual stimuli, they are relatively invulnerable to direct argumentation and vulnerable to indirect social influences. Both are characterized more by faith than by conviction and by wishful expectation rather than careful prediction of consequences.”

In keeping with this model, KRG election campaigns rely heavily on sentimental attachment, brand recognition, hero-making, and savior figures. Moreover, candidates frequently attempt pork barrel spending, in order to please their local constituencies. Affirming Tip O’Neill’s phrase, “all politics is local,” all KRG elections are contested on the same local stage, whether the election is national, regional, or local. For example, leading up to the April 2014 elections, mainstream political officials had delayed the second local election many times, in order to block the power of local decision-making and the spread of support for the opposition.

Each of the five main political parties of the KRG had different preconceptions leading up to the April elections. The Gorran party was confident, and as some analysts argued, overconfident. The PUK entered the
election amidst factional squabbles and without the guidance of its general secretary Jalal Talabani. The PUK battled with disarray and low morale, and looked forward to little success in the elections. The KDP approached the elections with an expectation of its traditional share of about forty percent of the vote. Sure enough, the party won 38 seats of the hundred available. Both Islamic parties expected to gain support based on their stances as opposition parties against corruption. The two Islamic parties maintained their share of the vote in the parliamentary election, but in the Iraq general parliamentary election, the KIU’s vote declined significantly. As a result, many believe that the two Islamist parties have reached their peak and are headed towards decline, unless they engage a wider population. This sort of transition could be difficult to achieve due to their Muslim Brotherhood background, some argue.

The PUK yielded a most unexpected result in the elections, and the party claims that to have been revived. Hemin Ebdullah asserted, “In less than a year the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has managed to get back on its feet, disproving those who believed the group was drawing its final breath.”\textsuperscript{10} No doubt Ebdullah’s view is optimistic, but the PUK has indeed boosted its morale, at least temporarily. The Gorran and the PUK battled it out in a neck breaking campaign, especially in the Sulaymaniyah area. The PUK managed to increase its popular vote, in the Iraqi parliamentary election relative to its result in the previous regional election, but this boost seems more like a bubble than a definite upwards trend. The PUK has not made any serious changes to its formation or ideology. The party acted as an opposition group, and promised its voters that it would not participate in the coming government. Moreover, during the campaign, the party’s established, older figures did not publicly participate, and the party benefited from an illusion of reform and renewal. But soon after Election Day, this enthusiasm quickly dissipated. The Gorran Movement gained votes in some regions, and lost votes in others: depending on the geographical location, for a mixed result. Despite its appearance of stability, the KDP faces serious challenges. Sixty per-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)</th>
<th>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)</th>
<th>Gorran Movement</th>
<th>Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU)</th>
<th>Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG)</th>
<th>Other minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>340,668</td>
<td>91,072</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>46,300</td>
<td>52,448</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>310,816</td>
<td>52,172</td>
<td>12,772</td>
<td>56,660</td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>33,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>92,500</td>
<td>234,252</td>
<td>333,961</td>
<td>84,081</td>
<td>67,285</td>
<td>6,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
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</table>

percent of the population opposed the party in these elections, and the party has so far failed to secure support beyond its core constituencies. The KDP is not dominant in matters of politics, security, and economics, and its opponents regularly cite these weaknesses. In addition, the close correlation between regional dominance and votes for the KDP raises questions about electoral procedure. The KDP had won one hundred percent of the vote in some regions—a rare, if not an impossible, result in a free democracy.

Conclusions

The 2014 parliamentary election resulted in a broad coalition government, including all of the KRG’s main political parties. The government formation was difficult and time consuming, primarily due to the lack of trust among the three most powerful parties—the KDP, the PUK, and the Gorran. Up until this point, inter-party cooperation has functioned, but the KRG is now entering an especially trying phase. After the recent electoral realignments, the KRG faces challenges in managing economic, political, geopolitical issues, and governing. Tensions with the central Iraqi government have reached a high, after the latter cut the KRG budget in a dispute over oil sales. Iraq currently faces a critical juncture, following the fall of Mosul and the emergence of the Islamic state in the country’s Sunni region.

On the international stage, Iraq has once again risen to prominence as an unstable, fragile country, and a threat to world peace.

The reign of the Islamic caliphate has transformed the region in many ways. In a significant mobilization, Kurdish forces from all parts of Kurdistan came together in order to protect their territory. This shift indicates the Kurds’ identification with KRG as their government, and it also suggests reorganization in the existing system of Middle Eastern states. Both the caliphate and Kurds are challenging the system set forth by the Sykes-Picot state system, albeit in different ways. While the caliphate refuses to recognize established borders, the Kurds have blurred them and created a free liberal zone of movement; contributing to shifting geopolitics to geo-economics, especially with Turkey.

In this commentary I attempted to evaluate the last three elections in the KRG critically. This region is in a transition from a long brutal dictatorship to democracy and over the last two decades, there have been many ups and downs, but in sum, there has been significant progress. Still, the transition paradigm should not encourage a false impression of the region’s situation. In many cas-
es, a transition is not what it seems, as Thomas Carothers explains in his article “The End of the Transition Paradigm.”11 The last three elections have proved that all the KRG political parties, except maybe the KDP, are vulnerable, especially with the possible emergence of swing voters. Even KDP’s stability seems to be in doubt, and many are questioning the legitimacy of the electoral process in general—especially in the districts where the KDP has won one hundred percent of the vote. There have been many positive developments, but the region is far from a true democracy. The intimate relationship between the economy and the political system has blocked the emergence of democracy, as the country has moved towards both a political- and economic dynasty. To borrow from Thomas Piketty there has been an emergence of “patrimonial capitalism” in the region.12

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The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government

JOERG BAUDNER*

ABSTRACT This article aims to explain the evolution of Turkish foreign policy through the search for a foreign policy role concept. It will argue that the AK Party government has already adopted two different foreign policy role concepts. Thus, the changes in Turkish foreign policy can best be characterized as the adoption of a foreign policy role with many traits of civilian power (2002-2005), subsequent limited change (2005-2010) and the adoption of a regional power role (from 2010 on).

Evaluations of Turkish foreign policy have drastically changed over the past few years. The new policy of the incoming AK Party government had been almost unanimously applauded as a “paradigm change” from a “post-cold war warrior” or a “regional coercive power” into a “benign”, if not “soft” power,¹ or as the (albeit incomplete) change from “securitized nationalism” to “desecuritised liberalism.”² However, further analysis of the more recent Turkish foreign policy finds very divergent evaluations. Some authors within Turkey have described it as an unfolding of policy principles,³ whereas other studies have debated whether Turkey has become a “normative power” or could join the BRIC states.⁴ In contrast, European and American observers’ criticisms of Turkey’s “over-confidence”⁵ have turned into verdicts that “Turkey’s plan to be a standalone power in the region is nowhere near fruition.”⁶ Some pundits have gone as far as to claim that Turkey’s “foreign policy is falling apart victim to Mr. Erdoğan’s hubris.”⁷

This paper will argue that Turkish foreign policy has in fact changed in relation to the basic parameters of foreign policy role concepts. Thus, this essay will
The AK Party government began with a foreign policy approach that strongly prioritized cooperation, expressed in the often quoted “no problem-with neighbors” principle,10 and aimed at rechanneling national aspirations from security concerns to economic prosperity and international trade. In addition, it strongly supported international organizations and prioritized Turkey’s integration into the supranational structures of the EU.

The shift towards a “regional project” – first by using visa exemptions and free trade arrangements and later also by taking sides in the domestic conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Egypt – and towards the emphasis on multiple (including military) resources of power and the ambition to act as a representative of a group of (Muslim) states in international organizations display the characteristics of a regional power.11 As a foreign policy analyst put it, “the AK Party envisioned Turkey as the area’s Brazil, a rising economic power with a burning desire to shape regional events.”12 The most visible and explicit change in Turkey’s foreign policy role has been from its prior aim to be “a bridge between EU and the Islamic world”13 to the more recent aim to “be the owner, pioneer and servant of the new Middle East.”14

In order to grasp the range of foreign policy options and changes in the last decade, this essay will first discuss civilian power and regional power as two ideal types of foreign policy roles. According to Max Weber’s definition, “concrete individual phenomena are arranged into a unified analytical construct”, the ideal type, in a methodological “utopia [that] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.”15 Using this analytical angle, the essay will link an influential strand of the recent literature on regional powers to the earlier debate on civilian power. Both ideal types display some astonishing similarities, but still represent different concepts in the core dimensions of foreign policy: the position towards conflict and cooperation, military and non-military means of foreign policy, and the state’s role in international and transnational organizations.

The essay will then demonstrate that the foreign policy of the incoming AK Party government introduced a new foreign policy concept with many traits of
a civilian power (2002-2005). Subsequently, Turkish foreign policy was more willing to enter into conflicts with the European Union and the United States, and shifted its attention towards the Middle East (2005-2010). However, the basic parameters of foreign policy shifted to a regional power concept only after the Mavi Marmara incident (2010). Although Turkish policymakers have described Turkey as a “central country” and therefore multi-regional power, Turkish policies have since then displayed the characteristics of the regional power ideal type. Moreover, Turkey’s conception of a regional power has clearly departed from its early civilian power role, given the use of confrontation (towards Israel) as a means to promote a regional project and the taking of sides in domestic conflicts of other states in the region (Syria, Iraq and Egypt). Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully analyze the interaction between domestic and international developments, the paper will also highlight that different foreign policy roles have different domestic “uses” - corresponding with the analyses of the respective ideal types, particularly in the case of civilian power.

“Civilian Power” as a Foreign Policy Role Concept

The very notion of a foreign policy role concept has been developed in the analysis of “civilian power” as a new form of foreign policy that largely departs from the use of military power and the isolated pursuit of national interests. Thus, the foreign policy of a state reflects its perception of international relations alongside the values and norms its leaders feel committed to and intend to promote. According to Hanns Maull, three elements constitute civilian power: 1) “the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives”; 2) “the concentration on non-military, primarily economic means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument”; and 3) the “willingness to develop supranational structures” and a “determined insistence on integrating itself into multilateral structures,” which consequently implies relinquishing national sovereignty. Maull then interpreted civilian power from the perspective of the international system and defined it as a “foreign policy role concept” that Japan and Germany “developed for themselves” in reaction to the devastating military defeat and subsequent loss of national sovereignty after the Second World War. However, its success “depended crucially on the USA as a cooperative, understanding hegemon in a heavily multilateralized and institutionalized international order.”

Subsequently, Germany and Japan became prototypes of the modern trading state and shifted “the emphasis of international relations to enhancing prosperity.” In the domestic context, this process brought about a redefinition of the national identity of former “military nations”, wherein “national aspirations were re-channeled towards economic achievements.” First restricted
by Allied Forces’ obligations, Germany and Japan subsequently deliberately chose not to fully utilize the military potential stemming from their population size and rapid economic growth. Both states renounced nuclear weapons and strongly limited military expenditure in relation to a swiftly growing GDP. Until today Germany’s military expenditure has reached only half the percentage of the national GDP of other European states (see Table 1). Moreover, Germany and Japan gave up national sovereignty, preferring close integration into and reliance on the protective shield of NATO (and ultimately the US). In addition – and reflecting their geographic position at the margin of the “Western community” – they also became very active within the UN, contributing to large parts of the UN budget, promoting disarmament and peaceful conflict resolutions, and turning into salient donors in development cooperation.

Recently, civilian power has been used as a synonym for normative power.20 However, the diffusion of norms – such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights – which is the core element of normative power (and for some scholars, the major aspect of EU foreign policy) is in the foreign policy role concept of civilian power secondary to peaceful conflict prevention and resolution.21 Accordingly, the foreign policy of both Germany and Japan was, until the 1990s, characterized by a “profound reluctance to assume larger military roles,”22 even in international military interventions. Leaving aside the question of whether Germany, given its increasing involvement in peace-keeping missions, can today still be considered a civilian power, coalition-building for
The foreign policy of a state reflects its perception of international relations alongside the values and norms its leaders feel committed to and intend to promote.

peaceful conflict resolution is much more characteristic of the civilian power role than participation in military action, even if supported by transnational or international organizations and norms.23

The very concept of civilian power relates foreign policy to domestic politics. The double meaning of the word “civilian” reflects both the aim of “civilizing” international relations, as well as the aim to strengthen the civilian prerogative over the military by demilitarizing (or even “desecuritizing”) the very concept of foreign policy. Thomas Berger pointed out that the “new” Japanese and German foreign and security policies implied the intention of a recalibration of militarist societies which had developed after German nation-state building and the Meiji restoration in Japan. Both post-war Christian democrats in Germany and liberals in Japan were determined to prevent the military from playing the kind of political role it had played before 1945, as they “were deeply suspicious of the armed forces and blamed them for the failure of party democracy in the 1930s.”24 The new foreign policy approach in Germany and Japan kept the military under strict civilian control and, during the rearmament in the 1950s, civil-military relations were clearly designed to ban the formerly dominant military ethos and the existence of the army as a “state-in-a-state.”

Regional Power as a Foreign Policy Role Concept

Like the concept of civilian power, the concept of regional power has in the last decade been developed in relation to a specific international context - an increasingly multi-polar world in which the United States is the only remaining superpower, but is losing influence to a number of other states. The increasingly broad literature on regional powers can be divided into two major strands: one that focuses on the range of characteristics of regional powers and their positions within a “regional security system”25, and the other that elaborates on communalities between current regional powers in order to develop an ideal type of regional power 26. This second strand of literature states that the influence today’s emerging powers is mostly geographically limited and based on economic power. Detlef Nolte claims that in the current state of international relations, regional powers can only exert “leadership in cooperation” and that “regional hegemony is in the current state of world politics only possible as cooperative hegemony, through incentives and leadership (as opposed to co-
ercion). Therefore and to limit the leverage of great powers, regional powers hold a preference for multilateralism and institution-building.

In this debate, the initial definition of regional power by economic and military resources (capability) was supplemented by the focus on a state’s ability to use these resources to “convince a sufficient number of states in the region to rally around its regional project” (influence) and the recognition by other states in the region (perception). Robert Kappel has listed as criteria for economic regional powers that they influence the monetary and credit policies of their neighboring countries, contribute significantly to world trade and regional economic growth and aim at playing a core role in regional economic development and cooperation. Other empirical studies have focused on the states’ political capability to establish regional cooperation and institutions and to act as representatives of other states in international organizations.

If we take a dynamic perspective on the making of regional powers, the foreign policy of a state wishing to become a regional power consists of 1) the articulation of a common regional identity or project and its influence on the establishment of regional governance structures, 2) the accumulation of military, economic and ideational resources, with priority given to a central position in economic relations, and 3) the claim to represent other states in the region in international organizations. Both Brazil and South Africa, arguably the most common examples of regional powers, have claimed leadership in their region and have risen to leading roles in MERCOSUR and SDAC, respectively. South Africa, for instance, has achieved an overarching status in regional economics whilst renouncing some military options, including the development or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it claimed to be a model for the development of African states as well as a representative of the interests of African and other underdeveloped and debt-ridden states in international organizations. Many other states have been included in different classifications of regional powers, ranging from India, China, Saudi-Arabia, Indonesia, Mexico and Egypt to, most recently, Turkey.

As the concept of regional power has only recently gained prominence in foreign policy analysis, there is little systematic work on its domestic dimension. However, there is some evidence that internal coherence is rather one of the domestic aims of the regional power role concept than its precondition. In the case of South Africa, the ambition to represent the “disadvantaged” African states on a global scale, has cemented the domestic alliance of the governing party, in particular by pacifying the more (left-wing) radical part.

The foreign policy concepts of civilian power and regional power both emphasize contribution to public goods, particularly economic cooperation and peaceful conflict regulation. But in the case of regional powers, both are linked
to the claim of a leadership or custodianship position in a particular region, i.e. the aim of shaping a “regional project” according to own policy preferences. Moreover, civilian powers reject confrontation and the use of military strength for principled reasons, deliberately renouncing military power and resorting to confrontation only in the most extreme cases. In contrast, regional powers tend to renounce military power for instrumental reasons; they tend to keep it as one resource of regional leadership and regard confrontation as a viable option. In fact, military strength is given as a prerequisite for a regional power status, whereas it is negatively correlated to the role concept of civilian power. Considering the variety within the conception of regional power, it is conceivable that the roles of civilian and regional powers might converge, however, only in the very specific circumstances of a multi-polar and pacified regional security complex with many transnational institutions. One may think of contemporary Germany as an example of a regional power which still exhibits to some extent the characteristics of the civilian power role: the downplaying of military strength, non-interference in the domestic policies of neighboring states and the insisting on peaceful conflict resolution (even to the point of reluctance for participating in international missions).

The Foreign Policy of the Incoming AK Party Government: From “Defensive Nationalism” towards “Civilian Power”?

For decades, Turkey’s foreign policy role concept was determined by its nation-state building history. Turkey was a late-comer in entering the stage of European nation-states after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. The military and strategic skills of nation-state builder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk prevented a coalition of western European powers from dividing the largest part of the Turkish territory as determined in the Treaty of Sevres (1920). Although never ratified, the Treaty of Sevres became a national “founding myth” and perpetuated the notion of being surrounded by a world of enemies. As a consequence, Turkey’s foreign policy became characterized by a “defensive nationalism” as Ziya Öniş has succinctly put it, by focusing on (perceived) threats to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey. The prioritization of “national security and military readiness” by “the traditional republican foreign-policy making establishment” was based on the low level of transnational economic cooperation with Asian states and the geographical position of Turkey that facilitated the flow of national minorities across borders. As late as the 1990s, a leading figure in Turkish diplomacy claimed that Turkey should be prepared to lead “two and a half wars” against Greece, Syria and the Kurdish PKK.
In the international context of the Cold War, Turkey allied with the West; NATO membership and close military cooperation with the US and Israel in the procurement of arms served to satisfy Turkey’s security concerns. However, membership in an international organization was instrumental and did not stop hostile relations with Greece, which was a member of NATO as well. On the contrary, Turkey aimed at accession to the European Union in order to gain an advantage, or at least prevent being at a disadvantage, in the power balance with Greece. Thus, as a foreign policy role concept, “defensive nationalism” kept cooperation mainly for security concerns, strongly focusing on military capacity and perceiving international organizations as a “security shield.”

Due to the stark contrast with this defensive nationalism, the incoming AK Party government's foreign policy attracted huge attention. Most of the analyses attribute three core characteristics to the AK Party governments’ initial foreign policy after its ascent to power in 2002 (as will be analyzed in the following paragraphs): the prioritization of cooperation; the shift from military or security considerations to economic aims (up to the point of a transition into a “trading state”); and strong support for transnational and international organizations. These three elements correspond rather neatly with the characteristics of a “civilian power.”

**From Confrontation to the Prioritization of Cooperation**

Once the AK Party was in government, it carried out a number of diplomatic activities to pacify old conflicts with neighbor states. Relations with Greece improved considerably after the AK Party government changed Turkey’s approach to the Cyprus question. It withdrew support for the intransigent Turkish Cypriots and strongly pushed for the approval of a plan for a unified federal state put forward by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. It significantly improved the difficult relations with Armenia, strained by the memories of the deportation of Armenians in 1915, which is considered genocide by Armenians. The AK Party also improved relations with Iraq and, in particular, Syria. Building on the Adana accords with Syria in October 1998, mutual visits followed in 2003. Syrian-Turkish trade increased drastically and was further supported by the establishment of a common free trade area.

The arrangement with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, which was perceived as a major threat to Turkey's territorial integrity after the military defeat of Saddam Hussein, made the changes in foreign policy particularly visible. In stark contrast to the 1995 intervention and against pres-
sure from the Turkish military, the AK Party government sought an agreement with the United States and the Iraqi government before engaging in cross-border operations between December 2007 and February 2008 against PKK fighters, which entered Turkish territory from Iraq. Moreover, Turkish President Abdullah Gül broke a precedent when he had direct talks with Massoud Barzani, head of the KRG, on March 23, 2009.

It has become a commonplace to attribute much of the change in Turkish foreign policy to the influence of Ahmet Davutoğlu, long-time architect of the AK Party’s foreign policy and Turkey’s foreign minister since May 2009. Based on the insight that “a comprehensive civilizational dialogue is needed for a globally legitimate order,” Davutoğlu had in his academic work called for Turkey to move from its traditional “threat assessment approach” towards an “active engagement in regional political systems in the Middle East, Asia, the Balkans and Transcaucasia.” Davutoğlu stated that Turkey possesses a “strategic depth” that it had failed to exploit; it should act as a “central country” and break away from a static and single-parameter policy. Turkish foreign policy analysts have recently argued that the “no-problems-with-neighbors” principle is only one aspect of Davutoğlu’s multifaceted approach. However, in the AK Party’s first few years in government, the emphasis was clearly on becoming a “problem solver” and contributing to “global and regional peace.” In line with this generalized support for cooperation, Turkey aimed to build a reputation as a “facilitator of cooperation” and repeatedly mediated in conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Syria and Israel, and Hamas and Israel.

**The Shift from Military to Economic Aims in Foreign Policy**

The foreign policy of the AK Party government displayed a significant shift from an emphasis on military strength to prioritizing economic cooperation. Building on reforms after the 1999-2001 crises, the AK Party’s economic policies led to a period of continuous growth and stability with an average growth rate of 6 per cent. The changing importance of foreign economic relations on the one hand and of military strength on the other is reflected in the sharp rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) from $1.1 billion in 2001 to an average of $20 billion between 2006 to 2008 whilst Turkey’s military expenditure strongly decreased in terms of percentage of GDP from 3.9 per cent in 2002 to 2.1 per cent in 2007, falling back in relative terms behind Greece, France and Britain (see table 1).

Given Turkey’s geostrategic position, diplomacy and economic cooperation were mutually reinforcing to increase hitherto rather limited trade relations. For instance, in the aftermath of the conflict between Georgia and Russia, Ankara streamlined a diplomatic initiative championing the idea of a “Caucasus Solidarity and Cooperation Platform,” including Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The emphasis on the mutual gains of economic
cooperation was further strengthened by Turkey’s ambition to become a key player in regional energy politics as an “energy hub” and pivotal country for the transition of energy supplies. Therefore, Kemal Kirici has even argued that Turkey would develop into a “trading state.”

Table 1: Defence spending as percentage of GDP in selected countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Support for Trans- and International Organizations

Another major innovation of the AK Party government’s policies in comparison to previous Turkish foreign policy was the policy activism in international organizations. Turkey assumed a front-running role in a number of international organizations after the AK Party’s ascent to government. Turkey’s most salient success was the non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2009-2010, which was acquired with the support of many African countries. It also took over the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers within the Council of Europe and became an observer in the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and the Organization of the American States (OAS). In addition, Turkey emerged as a donor country in the United Nations with development assistance exceeding US$700 million in 2008. Turkey also started to play a prominent role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); the election of Turkish professor Ihsanoglu to the position of Secretary-General by democratic vote was the first in the history of the OIC. This went hand in hand with a new discourse “highlighting the moral/normative aspect beyond the confines of narrow self-interest” and Turkey’s role as an “internationalist humanitarian actor.”

During the AK Party’s first years in government, Turkey’s role in other regional organizations was clearly connected to Turkey’s rapprochement with the EU. Davutoğlu argued that “if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would
have very limited chances with the EU.” President Gül stated that Turkey’s EU membership would promote “the harmony of a Muslim society with predominantly Christian societies” and Erdoğan emphasized that the European Union would “gain a bridge between the EU and the 1.5 billion-strong Islamic world.” Therefore, much public attention was given to Turkey’s co-sponsorship of the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative (AoC) with Spain, originally proposed by Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero in September 2004 and taken up by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

There is an interesting parallel between the foreign policy of the early AK Party government and the civilian powers of Japan and Germany in the use of a foreign policy role to curb the influence of the military and, reminiscent of the German relationship to the European Community, the use of regional integration as a means to lock-in economic and political liberalization. It has become “conventional wisdom” that the priority assigned to Turkey’s bid for EU membership in Turkish foreign policy was part of the AK Party’s quest for a new form of legitimacy after the ousting of its predecessor party, the Welfare Party. Moreover, it was instrumental in reducing the influence of the military whose intervention was repeatedly condemned by EU progress reports. In fact, reform packages in preparation of the EU’s decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey reduced the influence of the military in the National Security Council. Moreover, the significant reduction in military spending (see table 1) and emphasis on economic prosperity and cooperation combined with the downplaying of security concerns reduced the role of the military.

A major innovation of the AK Party government’s policies in comparison to previous Turkish foreign policy was the policy activism in international organizations.

More Assertiveness, Limited Change (2005-2010)

The Turkish foreign policy role concept of being a “mediator between Europe and the Muslim world” suffered a setback when the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, which started in 2005, were impeded by the predicament of the Cyprus question. In an ill-advised move, the EU accepted the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus as a member, disregarding the negotiations for a reunification of the island conducted by the United Nations. Whereas the AK Party government strongly pushed for the acceptance of the so-called Annan plan, Greek Cypriots rejected the plan in a public referendum in 2004. As the EU also did not take action to stop the isolation of the Turkish part of Cyprus, Turkey did not open its ports and airports to Greek Cyprus, which was an of-
There is an interesting parallel between the foreign policy of the early AK Party government and the civilian powers of Japan and Germany in the use of a foreign policy role to curb the influence of the military official breach of the Ankara protocol Turkey had signed as a precondition for the accession negotiations. Subsequently, the EU Council of Ministers blocked the opening of several chapters, a move which was regarded by virtually the entire Turkish public as thoroughly unfair.

The perspective of EU accession further faded after German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy, in a reversal of the predecessors’ positions, objected to the Turkish bid in principle and French President Sarkozy blocked chapters that allegedly would determine Turkish accession. These actions gave Turkey the impression that there was a principled and insurmountable blockade to membership, causing public support for EU membership to drop from around 75 percent to 50 percent in 2005. However, despite the public disappointment about the EU’s policies, EU accession and EU norms still played an important role in the conflicts in 2007 and 2008 regarding the election of Abdullah Gül as President and the indictment of the AK Party by the Constitutional Court. Statements of EU officials and institutions legitimized the AK Party’s position vis-à-vis the military and Kemalist state elite. Even the Turkish constitutional reforms enacted in 2010 were justified as complying with EU requirements.

In addition, whilst within the EU many felt that “Turkey has been moving away from aligning its foreign policy with the EU,” Turkish foreign policy remained within the role concept as a mediator in conflicts; a role the EU was neither eager nor capable of adopting. A case in point was the reception of the Hamas leadership in Ankara in 2006, which caused immediate concern in the US and the EU. However, the incoming Obama administration welcomed the Turkish mediation in cautiously establishing contact with Hamas, which was previously refused by the Bush administration. Moreover, the AK Party maintained close cooperation with Israel and Turkey’s role as a potential peacemaker was explicitly supported by Israel’s President Peres. Indirect talks between Syrian and Israeli officials started in Istanbul with Turkish diplomats acting as mediators.

The insistence on peaceful conflict resolution among sovereign states also continued to characterize Turkey’s stance in international relations, particularly in the conflicts in Iraq and Sudan, although it put Turkey in opposition to the US and the EU. During its turn as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2009-2010, Turkey voted together with Brazil against the UN resolution imposing sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program. The
Turkish government also refused to condemn Sudan’s ruler, Omar al-Bashir, who was accused of mass murder in the Darfur region of Sudan, and tried to postpone the International Court of Justice’s warrant by a Security Council decision. However, in the Iranian case, the Turkish government not only pointed out that Turkey was much more strongly affected by additional sanctions than Western European states; it also proposed a Turkish-Brazilian initiative to control the Iranian nuclear program through the exchange of enriched Uranium material. In a similar vein, Turkey engaged in a peace initiative for Sudan.

Towards a New Role Concept as “Regional Power” (Since 2010)

It was the confrontation between Turkey and Israel after the Israeli raid on an aid ship infringing the Gaza blockade in May 2010 that marked a clear break in the Turkish foreign policy role concept. Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador and other senior diplomats, suspended military agreements with Israel, and threatened to send naval vessels to escort future aid convoys trying to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. The Turkish government adopted an anti-Israeli rhetoric and accused Israel of committing “an act of state terrorism and savagery.” Moreover, when Greek Cypriot and Israeli authorities (next to other states) in 2011 signed an exclusive economic zone agreement establishing their maritime borders, Ankara rejected any such delimitation and announced the freezing of all contacts with the EU Council of Ministers during the 6 months of (Greek) Cyprus’ presidency in 2012.
The Mavi Marmara incident did by no means mark a return to the earlier “defensive nationalism.” However, it did indicate that the Turkish government renounced the position of a mediator in the conflict between Arab states and Israel in order to play to the tribunes of the “Arab masses” - the Turkish government used the confrontation with Israel as a means of increasing its influence in the Arab regions. In domestic policies, the divergent positions on the government’s support for the Mavi Marmara convoy marked the beginning of the escalation of tension with the Fetullah Gülen movement. Since then, Turkish foreign policies demonstrated (as will be analyzed in the following paragraphs) significant change in position towards cooperation and confrontation, the investment in military and economic power resources and the role in international organizations.

Table 2: Different ideal types of foreign policy role concepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal types</th>
<th>“Defensive nationalism”</th>
<th>“Civilian power”</th>
<th>“Regional power”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy role concept</td>
<td>Defending Turkey against internal and external threats</td>
<td>Making Turkey a mediator between cultures and “facilitator of cooperation”</td>
<td>Making Turkey a leader country and own model of “secularism” and economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation vs. cooperation</td>
<td>Defensive confrontation</td>
<td>Skilful diplomacy for problem solving</td>
<td>Mix of confrontation and cooperation in pursuit of regional project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military vs. non-military means</td>
<td>Focus on military strength</td>
<td>Priority of economic development</td>
<td>Economic and military strength, “soft power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to international organisations</td>
<td>Limited support for intern. organisations as protective shield</td>
<td>Principled support for intern. organisations as base of cooperation</td>
<td>Conditional support for intern. organisations as “battleground”; claim of role as “representative” of other states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to domestic policies</td>
<td>Military as guardian of national security</td>
<td>Reduction of influence of the military, inclusion of economic actors</td>
<td>Obtaining hegemonic position by combining elements of nationalist and Islamist heritage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From “Mediator” to the Claim of Leadership

An emerging public discourse described Turkey as a “leader country,” or a “regional player with an influence that exceeds its physical borders”. In the course of his so-called “Arab spring tour” in summer 2011, Erdoğan explicitly encouraged the new political forces in the Arab states to follow the Turkish model of economic development and of a type of secularism that is not identical to the “Anglo-Saxon or Western model”. During its first years in government, the AK Party had downplayed its religious roots and, as Meliha Altunişik noted, had stressed that it did not want to be a model for anyone. In contrast, Saban Kardaş recently concluded that Turkish “leaders made clear their perception of Turkey as destined to play leading roles in the region, even framing it in highly idealistic and cultural terms”. He pointed out that the AK Party government’s concept as a “central country” implied that Turkey is a regional power in the
Balkans, the Black Sea and Caucasus regions and the Middle East at the same time. However, Kardaş conceded that in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions “Turkey is overwhelmed by Russia”.

In contrast, Turkey had already become an advocate of a free-trade, integrationist position and has pursued an “aggressive policy to increase Turkey’s economic engagement in the Middle East” and Turkey’s ambition for regional integration found expression in the establishment of a common free trade area with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The idea was that Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon would come together under a customs and political union. Visa requirements for Moroccan and Tunisian nationals were lifted in 2007 and for Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian nationals in 2009. As Kemal Kirişci stated in 2012, Davutoğlu’s aspiration for “an integrated Middle East where people and goods can move freely ‘from Kars to the Atlantic’” would be “actually reminiscent of the vision of the founding fathers of the EU”.

Moreover, beyond the continuous use of “Israel bashing” in pursuit of its regional project, the Turkish government started to support political forces within Arab states in a reversal of its previous stance as a “sovereign-state defender”. In the case of Libya, Turkey first spoke out against the NATO intervention and delivering weapons to the rebels, thus, against the EU’s position (with the noteworthy dissent of the German government). In the 2010 Iraqi election, Ankara backed the pan-Iraqi bloc headed by Ayad Allawi, but Allawi lost to Nuri al-Maliki, seen by Ankara as an “Iranian pawn”. Subsequently, the Turkish government started to support the Iraqi opposition as well as Islamic parties in places like Egypt and Syria which, according to the AK Party’s logic, could moderate and come to power through democratic elections. For Turkey, such an outcome promised the added benefit of creating natural regional allies. With the Muslim Brotherhood’s initial rise to power in Egypt, Turkey’s vision seemed to be coming to fruition. The Turkish government also started to host and arm members of the Syrian opposition, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, to help it emerge as the leader of the country’s opposition. Moreover, in a drastic reversal of the earlier rapprochement to Syria, Erdoğan publicly called for Assad’s resignation.

From “Trading State” to Multiple-resources Based Power

The Turkish government began to depict Turkey as a regional power with manifold economic, military and soft power resources. After a decade in government it could point to an impressive economic record, making Turkey one
of the fastest growing economies in the world when GDP growth reached 8.9 per cent in 2010. At the same time, inflation rates were kept below 10 per cent and state debt was reduced from 75 to about 45 per cent of GDP. Turkish trade volume strongly increased, especially among the country’s neighbors. Trade with the EU remained the largest and most technologically advanced aspect of this trade volume, however, its share fell from a peak of 56 per cent of overall trade in 1999 to about 41 per cent in 2008. Turkey’s economic position became central for an entire area; her economy produces half the equivalent of the entire output of the Middle East and North Africa. Thus, regional integration became an interest of Turkish economic actors as Turkey’s foreign direct investment increased from $890 million in 2001 to $5,318 million in 2009.

However, military threats also returned to the agenda when the Turkish government asserted its military presence in the Mediterranean Sea in the conflicts with Israel and Cyprus and flexed its muscles in the conflict with Syria. Military expenditure that had been reduced considerably in the first years of the AK Party government started to rise again (see table 1). Lastly, the AK Party government began to point to Turkey’s new “soft power”. The concept, which characterizes “influence other than coercion”, particularly the attraction of values and policies, has often remained vague. In the Turkish case, it certainly reflects the ambitions of the Turkish government to bolster its influence in the region by promoting transnational relations. Besides fostering visa exemption regulations, the Turkish government has strongly promoted an increased role of non-state actors in foreign policy, as demonstrated by its participation in the Turkish African Civil Society Forum, which includes 80 civil society organizations. Furthermore, it has strongly increased the number of university scholarships and the Turkish state office for religious affairs, Diyanet, has increasingly promoted the education of African Imams.

### From Support for International Institutions to “Revisionist Power”

Turkey’s aspiration for a major role in world politics was explicitly highlighted, for instance by Davutoğlu’s claim of “a transformation for Turkey from a central country to a global power” and Erdoğan’s statement that Turkey is “becoming a global player and this is an irreversible process”. As Saban Kardaş put it, “Turkish leaders have criticized the international order on open forums and called for a revision of its international architecture”. Turkey’s global role was demonstrated by its ambition to promote regional integration in the Middle East as well as by Turkey’s stance in many conflicts in international insti-
tutions. The fact that the Turkish government championed Muslim sides in numerous conflicts even raised the question whether Turkey might be laying the ground for the creation of a “Muslim bloc.” In fact, Turkey’s foreign policy of promoting peaceful conflict resolution had already implied a “sub-text” according to which Turkey acts on behalf of other Muslim countries. Erdoğan’s rhetoric often hinted at such a role, for instance, when he defended Sudan’s president al-Baschir with the often-quoted statement that mass murder was something a Muslim would not be capable of.

Another case in point was the protest against the Mohammed caricatures in Danish newspapers and, subsequently, against the appointment of then-Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO secretary general, justified by the alleged requests of Muslim nations for Turkey to use its veto. When AK Party leaders spoke of Prime Minister Erdoğan as being the representative of the “1.5 billion Muslims of the world”, it implied a claim to a global role for Turkey as representative of other Muslim states, equivalent to Brazil and South Africa’s claim to struggle for the “recognition of developing countries as full and equal partners”. In a similar vein, Turkey’s cooperation with Brazil in the UN Security Council to prevent the imposition of sanctions against Iran demonstrated Turkey’s self-conception as a “revisionist power” in regard to a “reconfiguration of the global governance institutions”.

**Domestic Rationales and International Repercussions of the Regional Power Role Concept**

Many observers have interpreted this shift in the Turkish foreign policy role concept as a reaction to international change. For instance, former German Foreign Minister Fischer concluded in September 2011 that “the EU had slammed the door to EU membership in Turkey’s face; and this had led to a new orientation of Turkey”. However, the decisive move towards a different foreign policy concept occurred with the open confrontation towards Israel and the appeal to the “Arab masses” in May 2010, several years after the deterioration of relations with the EU in 2005 and before the Arab revolutions started in Tunisia in December 2010 and Islamist parties won the elections in Tunisia (October 2011), Morocco (November 2011) and Egypt (May 2012) which, to different degrees, have considered the example of the AK Party as a role model for a modern Islamic party.

Thus, it can be concluded that previous domestic change and the perspective of a new domestic hegemonic strategy played a significant role in triggering the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy role concept. First, the increasing self-confidence in Turkey’s growing economic strength as well as an emerging “domestic hegemony” allowed the AK Party government to discard the EU acces-
sion option. The downgrading of the military’s influence made the AK Party reconsider the role of military strength and the use of a nationalist discourse in foreign policy once both did no longer threaten the AK Party. Second, the regional power concept allowed the AK Party to move closer to its core electorate (stressing Turkey’s role for other “Muslim states”) and at the same time appeal to a nationalist electorate which had considered the concessions to the EU as excessive.

Subsequently, the new approach in Turkish foreign policy “paid significant dividends in the realm of domestic politics” in the years 2010 and 2011, such as the approval of constitutional changes by a large majority in the referendum in September 2010 despite its adamant rejection by the opposition (but still welcomed by the EU Commission) and the third consecutive election victory of the AK Party in June 2011. As Ziya Öniş commented, “nationalism of a different kind together with the traditional recourse to conservative-religious discourse constitutes the very tools to build the broad-based, cross-class electoral coalition.”

However, the very claim of a regional power role (demonstrated by entering in permanent conflict with Israel and taking sides in the domestic conflicts of Iraq and Egypt and most explicitly by calling for regime change in Syria) has undermined its preconditions, primarily the consent within the regional environment. Turkey has lost the option to act as a mediator in these conflicts to foster the region’s stability. Hamas’ and in particular Iran’s politics (to ally itself with Assad in Syria) demonstrated that the support Turkey had lent them in the international arena was not reciprocated. Moreover, the support for Islamic parties and movements did not lead to regime change but jeopardized the recently established economic and diplomatic cooperation with Syria, Iraq and Iran and endangered the economic export model of the Anatolian “Islamic bourgeoisie”. It also opened up a “new front” in the Kurdish conflict, when Assad retorted by allowing for the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish area in the conflict-ridden Syria, thus increasing Turkey’s fear of an independent Kurdish state encompassing parts of Turkey, Iraq and Syria.

When regime change in Syria failed, Turkey’s open confrontation with Assad led to tangible tensions and possibly a new political-religious cleavage within the Middle East. The Turkish government started to feel it was facing a Shia-based coalition in Syria, Iran and an Iran-friendly Iraqi government. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki heavily criticized Ankara’s Syria policy and Ankara’s close ties with the Iraqi Kurds. He openly accused the Turkish government of interfering in his country’s internal affairs and blocked Turkey from using his country as a trade route in an attempt to cut it off from the region at large. Following the Brotherhood’s ouster in Egypt, Turkish ties with the country have come almost undone, with the new leadership—taking issue with An-
kara’s strongly pro-MB stance—withdraw ing the Egyptian ambassador from Ankara. Turkish businesses have suffered in Egypt since then, undermining Turkey’s cherished soft-power goals. The TESEV study on the perception of Turkey in the Middle East of 2013 demonstrated that the support for Turkish foreign policy has declined in every single country of the Middle East. Turkey had ranked first in positive perceptions in 2011 and 2012 (with 78 and 69 per cent of respondents), however, it fell to fourth place in 2013 (with 59 per cent), and the number of respondents who agreed that Turkey engages in sectarian foreign policy increased within a year from 28 (2012) to 39 per cent (2013).62

Conclusion

This essay has argued that the foreign policy role concept of the AK Party government shifted from the focus on cooperation and de-militarization and the Turkish bid for EU membership (coming close to a civilian power role concept) towards the ambition to shape the regional environment and to act as a global player and a representative of a group of states (coming close to a regional power role concept). After the AK Party government had started out with a co-operation and EU accession-oriented foreign policy (2002-2005), its attention shifted in reaction to the disappointment about the EU towards the Middle East. Although Turkish foreign policy became more assertive towards the EU and the US, it remained within the parameters of its foreign policy approach (2005-2010). It was from 2010 on that the domestic rationale and, subsequently, the Arab revolutions led the AK Party to shift towards a regional power role concept. Although Turkey’s role was rather interpreted as that of a “central country” by Turkish policy makers, it followed the ideal type of a regional power in the pursuit of a regional project in the Middle East.

This is not to deny the serious challenges Turkey’s foreign policy started to face, for instance in Syria; however, it has been demonstrated that its answers were based on a change in the foreign policy role concept. Similar to regional powers such as Brazil or South Africa, Turkey started to combine a revisionist position in international organizations with the claim to be the representative of a group of (Muslim) states. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy clearly departed from the role of a civilian power as the pursuit of its regional project implied open confrontation towards Israel and taking sides in the domestic conflicts of its neighbor states. The mutual with-

When regime change in Syria failed, Turkey’s open confrontation with Assad led to tangible tensions and possibly a new political-religious cleavage within the Middle East
The essay has further argued that the change of foreign policy roles was also related to different functions in the domestic context. The AK Party government’s emphasis on de-militarization and EU accession was instrumental in the struggle against the Kemalist elite and military. In contrast, the adoption of a regional power role concept strengthened the hegemonic position of the AK Party in Turkish society in the years 2010 and 2011. However, its repercussions have started to undermine Turkey’s “soft power”, as demonstrated by the changing perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East, and may in the long run also undermine Turkey’s economic position. Finally, this essay has argued against a conception of continuity in Turkish foreign policy, constructed “in hindsight” (both by advocates and adversaries of the current AK Party government policies), which prevents a debate of the changes which have occurred and the possibility to re-evaluate the merits of different foreign policy choices.

Endnotes

4. See the contributions in Turkish Studies no. 4, 2013.
16. The aim of the essay is not to criticise the policy development but to underline the dimensions of change implied.


31. Flemes, ibid.


34. Hale and Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey*, p. 120.


36. Saban Kardaş, “From Zero Problems to Leading the Change.”


45. This is not the place to debate whether the changes in the EU foreign and security policy demonstrated its character as a “normative power” or the return to classic interventionism.


47. Today’s Zaman, September 15, 2011.


52. Ibid, p. 322.

53. 2011 displays a significant rise in absolute figures which still has to be converted in per cent of GDP. See http://milexdata.sipri.org/. However, the figures for 2009 and 2010 are also both higher than the all-time low figures for 2007 and 2008.


57. “Turkey and the Middle-East – Ambitions and Constraints.”


Civilizational Discourse, the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ and Turkish Foreign Policy

NURULLAH ARDİÇ*

ABSTRACT The main orientation of Turkish foreign policy has recently been described as Europeanization, Middle Easternization, or Islamization. This article offers an alternative reading of its discourse as a civilizational one, arguing that the concept of civilization has increasingly, albeit vaguely, been employed in Turkish foreign policy discourse in three different layers – national, regional and universal. Turkish foreign policy makers often invoke (and occasionally switch between) these different layers of civilization in a flexible manner, which adds dynamism to Turkish policies. Often integrated with the domestic and foreign policies of the AK Party government, this pragmatic discourse has proved useful for its proactive and assertive diplomacy. Based on the discourse analysis method, this article explores how and why the concept of civilization is utilized within this discourse.

Introduction

The concept of “civilization” was not very popular among most Western social scientists in the 20th century, although it was somewhat influential in 19th-century scientific thought. More recently, civilization has been rediscovered by social scientists in the West after it was inserted into politics through the “clash of civilizations” thesis and the September 11 attacks as well as with the rise of the “Asian tigers” with their different civilizational roots. A final factor has been the increasing migrations to the industrial, Western countries from different parts of the world.¹ In Turkey, too, the concept has increasingly been used in foreign policy discourses as well as in popular political debates. President R. Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, in particular, frequently make references to “civilization.” These references (and the AK Party’s civilizational discourse in general) might be taken as manifestations of Davutoğlu’s “strategic depth doctrine,”² which has, according to many, heavily influenced Turkish foreign policy.³
The Islamic credentials of the AK Party leadership and the recent intensification of relations with neighboring countries have led some to argue that Turkish foreign policy has undergone a “Middle Easternization,” or even a radical shift toward “neo-Ottomanism.” Others believe that the increasing tide of “Islamization” in Turkish society has led the AK Party to shift its emphasis from the West to the East/Muslim World. Still others, however, argue that Ankara’s foreign policy remains principally Western-oriented; they often read Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism as part of a wider trend toward the Europeanization or democratization of foreign policy, noting the close links between Turkey’s foreign policy and domestic politics. There is, however, little attention paid to the discourse of civilization in Turkish foreign policy.

Assuming that Turkish foreign policy maintains a multi-directional orientation, rather than simply a “Middle Easternization,” “Islamization” or “Europeanization,” this paper provides an alternative reading of Turkish foreign policy. The AK Party government’s general foreign policy approach has been based at least partly on a civilizational discourse that is somewhat ambiguous but also very flexible. This article tries to demonstrate that the concept of civilization in Turkish foreign policy discourse has a vague meaning, entailing at least three different layers, the national, regional and universal dimensions. Thus, Turkish political actors often refer to “our civilization,” implying a vague Turkish civilizational tradition; with this they sometimes refer to the Islamic civilization, the Muslim people or cultures of the Middle East and the Balkans. However, they also often invoke universal humanitarian values and a “common legacy of humanity,” including justice and freedom. The exact boundaries of these layers of civilization are not clear; these actors also often switch between them in a pragmatic and skillful manner. Furthermore, this ambiguity adds dynamism to Turkish foreign policy and is useful within the pragmatic discourse of the AK Party leadership.

Secondly, the paper demonstrates that the Alliance of Civilizations is located, both as a concept and an institution, within the third dimension of Turkish foreign policy discourse, particularly in relation to Turkey’s EU membership process. Thus, on the one hand, the Alliance of Civilizations is constructed as a concept that brings Turkey (as the representative of the Muslim World) and Europe (as that of the West) together on the common ground of the “legacy of the humanity.” On the other hand, it is presented as a sociopolitical project
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and institution – the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) – that will end current divisions and clashes among different regions and countries on a global scale. This double utilization of the Alliance of Civilizations (as a concept and institution) proves useful in the self-presentation of Turkish foreign policy and as an element of Turkish diplomacy. The paper explores how civilization is variously utilized within this framework. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion on why the AK Party leadership finds the civilization-discourse useful for Turkey’s assertive foreign policy performance and the party itself.

The article is based on the discourse analysis method inspired by Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, which conceives discourse as both reflecting actual sociopolitical developments and practices formed within a historical context, and constitutive of these social relations (and social reality in general). Studying discourses is important because they function as indicators of social change (in this case, that of Turkish foreign policy under the AK Party) by both affecting and being effected by sociopolitical events – that is, by making sense of these events and thereby informing actors’ decisions. Therefore, discourses not only justify actors’ positions in power struggles, but also influence their dispositions; actors utilize discourses to create and impose a legitimate vision of the world that makes sociopolitical divisions possible. The symbolic power of language, or what Bourdieu calls the “theory effect,” refers to the ability to define, classify and determine things – that is, the capacity to order and shape social relations in the way that powerful actors/institutions envision. Furthermore, as Foucault insists, the notions of truth and power are intrinsically tied to one another, often through discourse. Thus, this view suggests that discourses not only refer to or show sociopolitical configurations, but also signify and constitute them. The AK Party leadership’s discourse of civilization, too, might be examined from this perspective.

“Civilization” and the AK Party

During the first several years of its rule, the AK Party adopted a Western-oriented discursive strategy in its foreign policy because of the impact of the unfavorable domestic and international politico-ideological conditions for a government party with Islamic roots, such as the hostile post-September 11 atmosphere occupied by the clash-of-civilizations debate and the Turkish military’s harsh stance against previous Islamic movements following the February 28, 1997 coup d'état.

Despite these unfavorable conditions, the AK Party gradually adopted a more civilizational foreign policy discourse, particularly with the appointment of Davutoğlu as Foreign Minister in 2009. However, as we shall see below, this
new discourse is not exclusive of the Western orientation that Turkey had previously adopted; the AK Party government improved Turkey’s relations with Western countries and cultivated its EU accession process, particularly during its first two terms. Thus, many scholars agree that the AK Party’s foreign policy choices did not exclude Turkey’s traditional pro-Western orientation; rather, its first term was characterized by “Europeanization.” However, I argue that the existing political, military, economic and cultural relations with Western countries have increasingly been framed as a “civilizational alliance” or “meeting of civilizations” with this new discursive strategy since 2009.

On the other hand, there has also emerged a discursive emphasis on the “Islamic civilization” and the significance of neighboring regions that has increasingly been visible in Turkish foreign policy in parallel to the recent intensification of sectarian conflicts in the Middle East --a discursive strategy that is sometimes used in an attempt to prevent these conflicts. In addition, we also observe an increase in references to Turkish history in both domestic politics and foreign policy. These developments could be read as signs of a significant, albeit partial, transformation at the discursive level in Turkish foreign policy under the AK Party. This discursive change was made clear by the party leadership during the AK Party’s 4th Grand Congress on September 30, 2012. Erdoğan mentioned “civilization” 14 times in his long speech, whereas he used the term “conservative democrat,” which is the Party’s official ideological position, only two times. Moreover, he emphasized the Party’s mission (rather than service and development) as the main discursive strategy through various historical references and themes like the “2023 and 2071 vision.”
Furthermore, by emphasizing the inclusive aspects of this civilizational discourse, the AK Party constructs it on a transnational scale, going beyond the Turkish national identity and borders. It discursively positions the other peoples in the Middle East, particularly the Kurds and the Arabs, within the framework of “brotherhood,” which functions as the new subject position for these peoples within this discourse. The party leadership is also careful to frame this discourse so as not to harm the existing institutional (political and military) cooperation with the West.

Turkish Foreign Policy’s “Civilizational” Discourse

The main feature of the AK Party’s civilizational discourse is that it is multi-layered (or multi-dimensional) and vague, but with a very dynamic character at the same time. For this discourse simultaneously accommodates Turkey’s national identity, history and values on the one hand, and its membership in the Muslim World and the Middle East on the other. At the same time, it often makes references to the common values and heritage of “the humanity.” Let us now discuss each of these three layers in more detail.16

The National Dimension

The first dimension of this flexible discourse contains a number of discursive elements, including (i) frequent references to the glorious episodes of Turkish history, with a particular emphasis on the “opening of the gates of Anatolia” by the (Muslim) Turks with the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, and on the “War of Independence” that resulted in the establishment of the Republic in 1923; (ii) the related signification of two dates, 2023 and 2071, as the turning points in Turkey’s future; (iii) a stress on Turkey’s territorial integrity as a fundamental condition to be protected at any cost and the crucial significance of the “brotherhood” between Turks and Kurds for this integrity; (iv) an emphasis on Turkey’s regional leadership as a “pivotal country” (or “central power”) and on (v) the significance of its mediator role to solve inter-state problems among neighboring countries (e.g., through “rhythmic diplomacy”) and, consequently, its rising profile as a “wise country” in the region; and finally, (vi) the promotion (until 2013) of the so-called “Turkish schools” controlled by the Gülen movement through proprietary and facilitating policies. For instance, in his above-mentioned congressional address, Erdoğan invoked the glorious episodes of Turkish history in quite a comprehensive manner:

“Sultan Alparslan sowed the seeds of a ‘civilization of love’ that would last for centuries. This civilization burgeoned at the hands of Osman Gazi turning into an offshoot and then a sapling, which in turn transformed into a large plane tree that branched out to heavens and covered seas, from the Caucasus Mountains to the Alps, from the Euphrates and the Tigris to the fiery Danube. … There is no blood
in the shadow of this large plant tree – the Seljuk, Ottoman and Republican tree. There is no discrimination in the shadow of this plant tree. There is no oppression, repression, and otherization in the shadow of this tree. ... Now, as the AK Party, we are one of the branches of this large plant tree. The path we follow has been forged by Alparslan, Melikşah and Kılıçarslan [as well as] Osman Gazi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Sultan Süleyman, Yavuz Sultan Selim.”¹⁷

This “national” layer of the Turkish foreign policy’s civilizational discourse is supported and solidified by concrete policies designed and pursued according to the interests of Turkey as a nation-state. Constituting the non-discursive bases of the first dimension of the Turkey’s civilizational discourse, these policies include, among others, the increasingly expanding humanitarian efforts through the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA); the renovation and reconstruction of historic buildings, such as mosques, tombs, madrasas and cemeteries, in the former Ottoman territories;¹⁸ efforts to revitalize and promote traditional Turkish culture through Yunus Emre Centers all over the world; the foundation of Turkish universities abroad, particularly in Central Asia and the Balkans; and attempts at a greater role in international politics, such as the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2011, hosting the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and moving UNDP’s regional bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States to Istanbul.¹⁹

The Regional Dimension

The second dimension of the civilizational discourse entails two elements: the Middle East as a geographical identity/membership, and the wider Muslim World as a cultural identity. In their speeches, the AK Party leadership frequently makes references to these two elements relatively flexibly, sometimes emphasizing the geographical dimension and, at other times, the cultural one. This regional dimension entails a number of discursive practices, including (i) a rather possessive and protectionist approach to the Palestinian cause and the related critical attitude toward Israel, manifested with continuous, coherent and occasionally harsh criticism; (ii) efforts to support the living conditions and defend the humanitarian, economic and political rights of Muslim peoples from Somalia to Myanmar, and from the Balkans to Syria and South Africa;²⁰ (iii) a concern and diplomatic affinity for some Islamic political movements, such as Palestine’s Hamas and Tunisia’s Ennahda; (iv) discussions (and Ankara’s self-promotion) on Turkey as a “model country” for the region during the “Arab Spring;” and, underlining all these elements,
(v) Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy and economic and cultural integration approach, which are among the essential elements of the Strategic Depth doctrine.21

These discursive practices imply a three-dimensional strategy regarding Turkish foreign policy’s regional elements, including (i) a humanitarian dimension that entails a continuous support for those who suffer from either political oppression or natural disasters; (ii) a value-oriented approach that emphasizes the need for democracy, pluralism and human rights as essential principles of governance in the Middle East; and (iii) the strategic position that often favors the notion of integration and “zero-problems” with neighboring countries, especially non-oppressive regimes.22

Davutoğlu openly declares that Turkey desires the formation of a “new order” within the “region” (including the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East) based on four principles: “common security, cultural interaction within a multi-cultural environment, economic interdependence, and a consciousness of common destiny.”23 He often justifies these objectives with reference to a civilizational framework:

“As while the humanity and the international system are going through a general restoration, our region … has been experiencing a great internal restoration, [which] I call the closing of a hundred-year parenthesis… following colonization and the Cold War… This region seeks integration and internal restoration. This region is where our authentic and immemorial (kadim) civilization was born… Look at the Malabadi Bridge [in Diyarbakır] and the Mostar Bridge [in Bosnia], you’ll see that we share common values beyond the borders drawn [by others] for us. And then you’ll understand the necessity of the reintegration of the Middle East and the Balkans, of the Caucasus and North Africa forever… It is impossible to build the future with emergent notions of statehood based on conflicting nationalist ideologies that emerged out of Sykes-Picot maps, colonial administrations, and unnaturally drawn borders. We will break the template imposed on us by Sykes-Picot!”24

Davutoğlu’s more recent comments on the hostage crisis, where two Turkish pilots and nine Lebanese pilgrims were rescued on October 19, 2013, further exemplifies this trans-nationalist discourse:

“… We have also paid close attention to the Lebanese pilgrims. From the very beginning, we have approached to the issue from a humanitarian perspective and put all the efforts we could, even though it wasn’t part of our responsibility… Whoever feels the pain of separation in our region, we feel the same. It doesn’t matter which sect or ethnic group they belong to. We work hard for them all.”25

Erdoğan’s recent speech at a conference held by the International Union of Muslim Scholars in Istanbul also affirms this emphasis on Ankara’s position as the
(only) model that transcends the Sunni/Shia divide in the region: He strongly emphasized that sectarian conflicts such as in Syria and Iraq are against Islamic values, implicitly criticizing Iran and Hezbollah, but also explicitly mentioning the significance of the "Prophet’s grandsons, whose tomb has been a main target for ISIL militants in Iraq, for the Islamic world." Likewise, Erdoğan's public address during a recent visit to Kosovo, where he enthusiastically declared that Kosovars and Turks are part of the same history and civilization, further signifies the second layer of Turkey’s civilizational discourse:

"Turkey is Kosovo, and Kosovo is Turkey. Languages can be different, religions, sects, faces can be different, but we are all children of the same country... My family, I, and ministers of my delegation feel at home here. Today I greet all Albanians, Bosnians, Turks and Gorans... We will build our future together, just like our grandfathers, our ancestors did. We have lived here as brothers for centuries and we will continue to do so."

As with the first dimension, these discursive practices have been supported by a number of concrete policies that are designed to improve relations with neighboring and Islamic countries. Constituting the non-discursive bases of the second dimension of Turkey’s civilizational discourse, these policies include taking over the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) General Secretariat and intense diplomatic efforts for mediation and facilitation, particularly in crisis areas such as Bosnia, Iraq and Syria (e.g., organizing the meeting of Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas in Ankara in 2007, indirect talks between Israel and Syria in 2007, direct talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2007, trilateral consultation mechanisms among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia initiated by Turkey in 2009, the Conference of the Interior Ministers of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq started by Turkey in 2004, the Group of Friends of the Syrian People launched in 2011, hosting several hundred-thousand refugees, efforts on behalf of Arakan Muslims suffering in Burma, and the mediation between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front). Furthermore, agreements with many regional countries for visa exemptions and trade and strategic partnerships, as well as some of the “national” policies mentioned above (such as the TİKA’s activities), are often presented as part of Turkey’s regional policy at the discursive level.

Distinct from traditional Turkish foreign policy, which was mainly Kemalist-oriented and parochial, this new discourse and the practices associated with it have played a positive role in terms of increasing Turkey’s regional influence. For instance, Turkey’s Israel policy, which initially took the form of controlled tension followed by open and harsh criticisms as well as political and military isolation (e.g., canceling a collectively planned military maneuver in October 2009), reached its peak with the Mavi Marmara crisis that eventually resulted
in an official apology by the Israeli government. (The Israelis also seem to have agreed on paying compensation to the families of the Mavi Marmara victims killed by Israeli soldiers.) Turkey has also played a role in the resolution of various regional conflicts, such as the feud between Hamas and al-Fatah, Syria and Israel (which was not successfully concluded due to Israel’s withdrawal), Iran and the P5+1 group, and most recently between Syrian opposition forces and the Iranian and Lebanese governments during the hostage crisis in September-October 2013, which also resulted in the freeing of two Turkish airline pilots. These success stories may contribute to Turkey’s possible leadership in the region. Thus, for example, the leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda movement, Rashid al-Ghannuchi, reportedly said that “the AK Party has moved Turkey to the heart of the [Islamic] ummah after living in the margins of history for more than hundred years.”30 Similarly, Michael Rubin, a member of the American Enterprise Institute and a harsh critic of the AK Party, has criticized Turkish foreign policy for the same reason:

“There has been a profound shift in Turkish foreign policy. The [AKP] has sought to reorient Turkish policy away from the United States, toward both Europe and the Islamic world… The first victim of Turkey’s shifting diplomacy has been Israel.”31

Though these statements are quite partisan and exaggerated, the stress in Turkey’s civilizational discourse on the Muslim World is unmistakable. This orientation often takes the form of either emphasizing the peaceful and cooperative aspects of Islamic culture and history, or drawing attention to the current Muslim suffering and invoking the historical and recent injustices that are the cause of their present problems. However, it does not always involve blaming Westerners for Muslims’ political and economic backwardness. For instance, in his address at a conference organized by the OIC’s IRCICA on the significance of the Qur’an (a discursive act—and Foucaultian “enunciative modality”—which is itself significant), Erdoğan put the blame for the current crisis in the Muslim World squarely on Muslims themselves, still invoking Islamic sources and history and maintaining the perfection of Islam, however:

“…In Islamic countries I have seen … extreme poverty, increasing income gap, intolerance, wars, conflicts and terror… Upon witnessing these scenes, I wondered why today’s Muslims are so far away from building the monuments that people will admire and constructing glorious cities, despite the fact that they [Muslims] established countless virtuous cities, and magnificent states and great empires based on the Qur’anic message throughout history… Our profound civilization, which
has greatly contributed to humanity, and to the mankind’s common cultural and scientific legacy in history, will one day revert to type and reclaim its well-deserved status on the globe.”

Furthermore, the emphasis on “democratization” and “common destiny” with the Muslim World, which has been present since 2003, has been intensified with the process of the “Arab Awakening.” This intensification might, together with the economic and cultural integration policies of the last decade (such as the increase in trade volumes, visa exemptions and cultural exchanges with Muslim countries), strengthen the second dimension of the AK Party’s civilizational discourse.

The Universal Dimension

The third dimension of this discourse entails an emphasis on “universal” values of mankind and its common legacy. Within this framework, the AK Party leadership frequently refers to the “family of mankind” that shares the “common legacy of humanity” as a basis of their argument for the necessity of a global expansion of peace and cooperation. This emphasis becomes visible in their discourses on two particular themes: justice and environmental concerns. Thus, during his address to the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun (and at the preceding Preparatory Meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York), Davutoğlu said that participants should “act as the Interior Minister of the entire humanity, rather than as Foreign Ministers of individual nation-states” for the protection of the environment.

The Turkish government also supports this discourse with a dynamic diplomacy, often taking leading initiatives in international organizations, such as the 5th World Water Forum (Istanbul 2009), the Istanbul European Capital of Culture (2010), the Summit of the Heads of States of South East Europe (Istanbul 2011) and the United Nations Least Developed Countries Conference (Istanbul 2011). Ankara often presents these initiatives as part of its effort to promote global peace and cooperation as well as intercultural and inter-civilizational dialogue. Moreover, these initiatives discursively function as manifestations of Turkey’s increasing role in regional politics and its rising profile in international relations.

A significant feature of the “universalist” dimension of this discourse is its critical tone, which centers particularly on justice. Despite Turkey’s strong Western orientation (e.g., continuing loyalty to NATO membership and the EU accession process, “model partnership” with the U.S., etc.), criticizing advanced Western countries based on the universal notion of justice constitute an important element of this civilizational discourse. This is particularly evident in Turkish leaders’ criticisms of the double standards applied by Western governments, especially members of the UN Security Council, in the face
of humanitarian crises in different countries (e.g., Myanmar, Somalia, Egypt, Iraq and Syria). The AK Party openly criticizes these powerful states’ attitudes, which often take the form of either active support or reluctance (as in the case of Syria), on the basis of such universal concepts as “justice” and “shared humanitarian responsibility.” Davutoğlu recently criticized the UN and Western governments for failing to act properly in Syria, emphasizing the need for acting (again) like the “Interior Ministers of Humanity,” instead of relying on parochial national interests and callous geostrategic calculations.34

Still, Turkish foreign policy’s discourse is not entirely critical toward the West; this third dimension also involves the Turkish government’s desire to improve its relationship with the West in general and the EU in particular. Here the most frequently emphasized discursive elements include the historical relations and cultural exchanges with the West, rooted in the classical Ottoman period in the 15th century, as well mutual economic interdependence, which is often emphasized in the context of trade and natural gas. On the other hand, this non-critical aspect of Turkey’s universalist discourse is crystallized in the case of the “Alliance of Civilizations.”

Alliance of Civilizations

The Alliance of Civilizations also represents the discursive layer where the operationalization of “civilization” is most clearly visible in the third dimension of Turkish foreign policy’s discourse. Parallel with the latter’s general characteristics, the utilization of this concept entails flexibility and plurality. For, on the one hand, the UNAOC, which was launched in 2005 as a UN initiative by Erdoğan and former Spanish PM José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has increasingly been framed within this discursive layer, whatever the initial concerns were for Turkey’s involvement. On the other hand, as a more abstract concept, the “alliance of civilizations” is discursively constructed by the Turkish leadership as the main framework of Turkey’s relationships with the EU. Moreover, in both aspects of the concept, one may observe connections with the three dimensions of Turkey’s civilizational discourse.

First of all, the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, an institution organized under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and supported by 130 UN member countries, aims “to prevent potential tensions and conflicts among cultures and civilizations,” and is particularly concerned with “tensions that
have emerged between Muslim and Western societies” due to post-9/11 Islamophobia. Turkey has been actively involved in this initiative, playing leading roles in various projects and committing resources for them. It also frequently figures as a concrete element of Turkey’s emphasis on global cooperation and universal values. For instance, in his address to the UNAOC’s Second Forum, Erdoğan placed Turkey’s efforts for the institution within the larger discursive field of inter-civilizational cooperation:

“We have wholeheartedly believed that Christian, Islamic and Jewish worlds can understand one another… We have declared against those who push forward the clash of civilizations that alliance of civilizations is possible… We need to foster an understanding that will overcome the ‘us and them’ dichotomy, which is the symbol of polarization. The first step toward this is to enhance tolerance, dialogue and solidarity.”

Yet, the significance of this element is not confined to the discourse’s third dimension; the Turkish government often presents the UNAOC (and Turkey’s co-founder position) as one of the steps to make Turkey a “global actor” and a “pivotal country” that assumes regional leadership in inter-civilizational relations. In other words, the new Turkish foreign policy discourse frames the UNAOC’s function as connected to the increasing power of Turkey as a nation-state within the first dimension, and to its “leadership role” in the Middle East and Muslim world within the second. For instance, in a recent comment about the UN’s “unjust” structure, Erdoğan inserted the Alliance of Civilizations as a significant discourse particle into his criticism:

“As Alliance of Civilizations I’d like to ask: Does the UN Security Council represent the entire world?… Do its members represent all religious groups in the world? No, they don’t!… If the UN exists for world peace, then it urgently needs reform.”

On the other hand, Ankara also presents, in a stark contradistinction to previous periods, the concept of “alliance/dialogue/meeting of civilizations” as the main framework of Turkey’s EU accession perspective. This framework fundamentally assumes that the two parties have a non-hierarchical inter-subjectivity and negotiation-centered relationship on an equal ground. The subjects of this relationship (Europe and Turkey) are thus discursively constructed as partners who must respect each other’s civilizational identity and cultural specificity in order to nourish a non-asymmetrical, cooperative relationship, which would be mutually beneficial. A reflection of the increasing self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy, this concept implies that far from being a Third World country hopelessly waiting at the gates of Europe – a common image in previous periods – Turkey is now a strong candidate that desires a partnership (“meeting”) with the EU as an equal subject with its increasingly stronger economy and its “pivotal country” position. Manifestations of such
a foreign policy perspective are abundant in the AK Party’s discourse on Turkey’s relations with the EU. For instance, Erdoğan thus explained his government’s EU perspective in an interview with Independent in 2004:

“Huntington declares that there might be a conflict of civilizations. Turkey is a catalyst to make sure we have harmony of civilizations. It is a bridge between the Islamic world and the rest of the world … [To have] a country like Turkey, where the cultures of Islam and democracy have merged together… will bring harmony of civilizations. That is why we think it is the project of the century. We are there as a guarantee of an entente between the civilizations.”

Likewise, in 2006 Erdoğan said:

“We have put forward our most significant mission as alliance of civilizations. We have also argued that otherwise the EU will remain as a Christian club. When Turkey joins the EU, the EU will no longer be remembered as a Christian club. Conversely, it will become a locus of the alliance of civilizations.”

What we see here is an intertwining of the two elements of the alliance of civilizations concept (the UNAOC and Turkey’s EU membership): the phrase “the project of the century” is the UNAOC’s official slogan. The fact that Erdoğan inserts both meanings simultaneously into one sentence implies that he constructs a subject position for Turkey (and himself) as a representative of a different civilization of equal status with his European counterparts at the negotiation table.
Therefore, it is safe to argue that an essential element of the AK Party government’s critical approach to the EU is a civilizational discourse, which has historical, geographical and cultural dimensions that are often emphasized by Turkish political elites. In fact, this discursive framework might also help explain the increasingly bold claim by members of the Turkish government that Turkey’s EU membership will be more beneficial for EU countries, many of which are in financial crisis, than Turkey itself, which is accompanied by their discursive emphasis on Turkey’s economic and demographic dynamism.

On the other hand, the concept of an “alliance/dialogue of civilizations” also shows the interlocking of the universal(ist) discursive layer with the others. On the one hand, it assumes a conceptual ground on which universal human values and the “common legacy of the humanity” are of paramount importance; on the other hand, it implies the existence not only of a multi-civilizational world order, both historically and currently, but also of an authentic Turkish-Islamic civilization, which is different (and independent) from that of the West. This concept further implies that Turkey is the most important representative of this authentic civilization, which the Westerners should talk to as a main interlocutor. Therefore, it refers to civilizational pluralism and differences, which are not to be understood as reasons for a civilizational clash, but for a new multi-civilizational world order based on “dialogue,” “cooperation,” and even “alliance.”

Within this framework, a specific element included in the discourse of the Alliance of Civilizations is that these dialogue and alliance are to be established primarily between the Islamic and Western civilizations, and that their philosophical/ideational foundation is to involve the notions of “family of humanity” and “common destiny,” as Davutoğlu often emphasizes. In this sense, “alliance/dialogue of civilizations” contains the apparent traces of Davutoğlu’s own discourse in his academic studies.

On the other hand, the three concentric circles of this flexible civilizational discourse bear similarities, in both content and form, with the three intellectual perspectives that were dominant in the late-Ottoman Turkey in the early 20th century: Ottomanism (the idea of the unification of all Ottoman peoples, regardless of religion and ethnicity, under the Ottoman flag), Islamism (the idea of the unification of Muslims under Turkey’s leadership), and “Westernism” (the idea of full integration with the “European civilization”). Though different and rival, these ideologies existed simultaneously and sometimes intermingled with one another. Their traces are also manifested in the AK Party’s discursive strategies, such as making various historical references, emphasizing national values and/or the “common legacy of the humanity,” thereby producing a hybrid discourse, which is not without its internal contradictions. Thus, we often observe the juxtaposition of an emphasis on identity with authentic Islamic
civilization and a desire to expand originally Western values, such as democracy and human rights, to the wider Muslim World.

Finally, discourse cannot, of course, exist in a vacuum, nor can it live without any ‘actual’ basis formed by political, ideological, economic and military power sources. In the case of Turkey’s civilization-al foreign policy discourse, these power sources are crystallized in the three main non-discursive factors that help this discourse survive: Turkey’s increasingly strong economy and continuing growth, Erdoğan’s strong leadership and charismatic personality, Davutoğlu’s foreign policy activism and ideological guidance, and Turkey’s military muscle. The first factor facilitates Turkey’s supportive attitude toward particular Turkish and Islamic populations, thereby enhancing Turkey’s standing in regional and international platforms. The second helps maintain trust in Ankara’s foreign policy in both Turkey and the Middle East, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of specific policies. Finally, the new “hyper-active” foreign policy paradigm formed around Davutoğlu’s strategic vision and personal dynamism help to constantly expand its horizon to new areas, both geographically and methodologically. When banded together, these three factors either reconcile the potential contradictory elements within the hybrid foreign policy discourse or cover them by emphasizing some elements on certain occasions while ignoring or de-emphasizing others. Consequently, the internal coherence and relative efficacy of Turkey’s civilizational discourse are improved through such an accommodation, or what I call a “meta-discursive strategy.” Clearly, however, the ultimate success of this discourse depends on concrete developments and practical results, as any discourse needs to be supported by relevant action in order to be effective. On the other hand, as Foucault emphasizes, discourse is not merely a reflection of “real life;” at the same time, it is one of the essential elements that constitute and shape social reality. Thus, to the extent that it is effective, the new Turkish foreign policy civilizational discourse also exemplifies a case of such constitutive character.

Conclusion: Why Civilizational Discourse?

I have argued throughout this paper that the AK Party’s general foreign policy approach has been based – at least partly – on a civilizational discourse that is ambiguous but also very flexible. This discourse has been increasingly visible in the speeches of Turkish political elites, particularly Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, for the last decade. I have tried to demonstrate that this discourse consists of
three main layers or concentric circles (national, regional and universal), which respectively invoke Turkish history and culture, Islamic history and Middle Eastern geography, and the common legacy and destiny of the humanity. I have examined them by analytically separating them from each other, although in reality they are closely connected and often mixed with one another, which is what makes this discourse vague, flexible and effective. I have also suggested that the AK Party’s discourse of “alliance/dialogue of civilizations” might be better understood if located within the third (universal) layer. Employed by the AK Party leadership both as a main conceptual framework of Turkey’s EU membership process and as a mechanism of intercultural rapprochement through the UNAOC initiative, this discourse and the policies associated with it simultaneously facilitate Turkey’s claim for regional leadership and enhance its relations with the West. We have also observed that the Turkish leadership often backs this discourse with concrete policies through a very dynamic diplomacy to increase the efficiency of this multi-faceted civilizational discourse.

At this point, it might be useful to briefly discuss the possible factors, in addition to Davutoğlu’s obvious ideological and academic influences, that have led the AK Party leadership to adopt such a civilizational discourse. First of all, processes of globalization and democratization have facilitated the ascendance of the AK Party (and the previous National Outlook tradition), whose members were already familiar with the concept of “civilization.” Debates on civilization have been present in Turkey and the wider Muslim World since the mid-19th century; intellectuals and statesmen from the “Young Ottomans” (e.g., Namik Kemal), Ziya Gökalp and Prince Sabahattin to Necip Fazil Kısakürek and Sezai Karakoç, and from Jamaluddin al-Afghani to Rashid Rida and Mawdudi, have extensively debated the past, present and future of the Islamic civilization vis-à-vis the West. Second, religious middle classes in Turkey have become stronger and more assertive politically and economically with the help of globalization, liberal economic policies and the relatively free political competition, all of which have been growing in Turkey since the early 1980s. In the 1990s, members of this new middle class started seeing themselves as beneficiaries of globalization, rather than victims. Equipped with a newly found but increasing self-confidence during the 2000s, this group began to regard the cultural, economic and political requirements of globalization – including Turkey’s EU membership – with sympathy rather than fear and enmity. As Kösebalaban discusses, Europe turned from a Hobbesian “other” (enemy) into a Lockean “other” (rival) for Turkey’s religious middle class in Alexander Wendt’s classification.
On the other hand, Turkey’s democratization since the 1950s has been advantageous for religious-conservative groups in Turkish politics. Relative relaxation of the public sphere for religious conservatives, particularly in the last three decades, has further enhanced their status and political power, eventually opening the way for their rise to power – first with the Welfare Party (1996), then the AK Party (2002) following the 1997 coup d'état. Kept under constant political, economic and cultural pressure by the Kemalist elites in the name of secularism, these religious-conservative groups have nevertheless made use of “opportunity windows” (in the form of enhanced opportunities for higher education, political participation, trade and business) offered by a relatively democratized milieu.50 For the last decade, moreover, they have been transforming the Turkish political system, which was under the military’s tight control, from within. AK Party leaders initially opted for a Western-oriented foreign policy discourse and practice due to the legitimation problem that they experienced in the eyes of both the Western powers and the local bureaucratic and economic elites. However, with the self-confidence that they developed as a result of their victory over the existing military-bureaucratic tutelage system through various politico-legal battles (particularly the Ergenekon and Balyoz court cases) since 2009, the AK Party leaders have had the opportunity to bring the question of “civilization” to the fore more comfortably. Furthermore, under Davutoğlu’s guidance, this concept has increasingly turned into a “discourse” – a series of systematic, integrated and coherent statements.

However, there is also a third, external, factor that has contributed to the crystallization of this concept: the regional security context of the Middle East, which has been transformed as a result of the September 11 attacks and the following Iraq War. As the region became critical for the US and other global powers, the Middle East has become one of the two most important dossiers (the other being the EU) in Turkish foreign policy as well. Moreover, the “Arab Spring” has solidified the situation, which is further complicated by the Syrian civil war. As a result, the Middle East has probably gained a more prominent status than EU membership in Turkish foreign policy: Erdoğan, Davutoğlu and the foreign ministry bureaucracy (and consequently the Turkish media) have started spending more time and energy on the region than on the EU. For this reason, the above-mentioned change in the international politico-military context forced Turkish foreign policy to be more focused on the Middle East, thereby making it an issue that the AK Party had to deal with for geopolitical reasons – and not seem to be paying special attention to it for cultural-religious reasons. Consequently, it has expanded the AK Party’s maneuvering capacity and enhanced its discursive transformation in relation to the Middle East, thereby contributing – as an unintended consequence – to the strengthening of the “regional dimension” of Turkey’s FP foreign policy discourse. It is thus with the help of this external factor that TFP Turkish foreign policy has, after a long hiatus caused by the Kemalist ideology and institutions, firmly returned to the Middle East.51
Fourth, this civilizational discourse is fairly rational and quite useful for the AK Party government, for it expands its foreign policy options. Simultaneously invoking both “Eastern” and “Western” cultures, this discourse helps Turkey claim its membership in both the Islamic/Middle Eastern and Western world, while also allowing for an emphasis on Turkish national identity. Furthermore, it forges discursive ground for one of Davutoğlu’s (and increasingly the government’s) central assertions – that Turkey is a “pivotal country” within the Afro-Eurasian geopolitical continent, rather than a “bridge” or a “frontier country” (or Huntington’s “torn country” for that matter) between the East and West. It is on this ground that the AK Party leadership bases Turkey’s claim for being a “regional and global actor.”

A fifth factor in this civilizational discourse is an advantage for Turkey in both domestic and international politics. The first two layers of the discourse emphasize the peaceful co-existence and cooperation, both historically and currently, of different ethnic and religious groups within Turkey and the wider Middle East (Arabs, Kurds, Shias, Alevi, Sunnis and Turks) on the one hand, and justify and reclaim Turkey’s territorial integrity and historical depth by invoking the glorious epochs of Turkish history (particularly the Ottoman and Seljuk periods) on the other. On a more practical ground, the discursive synthesis of Turkish, Middle Eastern, Islamic and Western identities and values plays a mitigating function that softens potential criticisms from both domestic and global actors. Therefore, this inclusive discourse carries a positive function for both the legitimacy of the AK Party government and the desired integrity of Turkey and the Middle East.52

Finally, the AK Party leadership also makes an effective use of historical references as part of this multi-faceted discourse. The primary implication of references to such historical turning points as 1071, 1453 and 1923 is that they simultaneously invoke both domestic politics (particularly the issue of territorial and cultural integrity in the context of the Kurdish question) and Turkish foreign policy’s new direction with its more inclusive and cosmopolitan identity.53 Moreover, this discourse makes it possible to establish parallels between the historical co-existence (“brotherhood”) of Turks, Kurds and Arabs in both Turkey and the Middle East on the one hand and Turkish foreign policy’s civilizational orientation on the other. Thus, Erdoğan clearly states that Turkey should play “a leading role” in the construction of “a new civilizational consciousness” in the Muslim World.54 Hence, the AK Party’s somewhat ambiguous, but quite flexible and dynamic civilizational discourse.
Endnotes


8. Balci and Mısı provide a similar reading of Turkey’s position in terms of a civilizational perspective (see Idem, “Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations”) whereas Ramazan Kılıç sees it in terms of norm adoption as a survival strategy focusing on domestic factors (see Kılıç, “Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adoption as a Survival Strategy,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp. 57-75.


11. Though this discourse has been intensified since 2009, Erdoğan and then-FM Abdullah Gül occasionally adopted this discourse previously (see e.g. Gül’s speech at the 30th Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on May 28, 2003, and Erdoğan’s speech at the American Enterprise Institute on January 29, 2004, both cited in Balci and Mısı, “Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations” p. 388).

Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism During the AK Party Era.” For a detailed analysis of the notion of “Europeanization” in TFP and its reflections in Turkey’s Middle East policy, see Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).


15. See AK Parti 2023 Siyasi Vizyonu: Siyaset, Toplum, Dünya (30 Eylül 2012), http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/akparti2023siyavizyonurturkce.pdf, accessed 4 January 2013. Here 2023 refers to the centenary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, and 2071 to the millenary of the arrival of the Turks in Anatolia/Asia Minor. One should note that this new civilizational discourse also represents an alternative vision among the competing domestic and foreign policy orientations in Turkey, such as liberal-Westernism and secular nationalism. However, it is beyond the confines of this article to discuss these orientations.

16. Duran (“Understanding AK Party’s Identity Politics”) is the first to pay attention to these three layers in the AK Party’s civilizational discourse. His examination covers, however, more of domestic politics than Turkish foreign policy discourse. Furthermore, the second layer in Duran’s classification entails the Middle East only, rather than the entire Muslim World. Moreover, his study is based on a brief textual examination of Erdoğan’s statements in connection with the AK Party’s political struggles with domestic and foreign power actors, rather than a thorough discourse analysis. Finally, Duran’s examination does not involve the concept (and institution) of “Alliance of Civilizations” that is an integral part of the AK Party’s civilizational discourse. Despite these limitations, however, his examination is quite useful to understand the AK Party government’s current discourse.


20. Duran (“Understanding AK Party’s Identity Politics,” 94) correctly calls these efforts “Islamic solidarity politics.”

21. See e.g. Kemal Kıriç, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2011), pp. 33-55; Zarko Petrović and Dušan Reljic, “Turkish Interests and Involvement in the Western Balkans: A Score Card,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2011), pp. 159-172; Mehmet Ekinci, “A Golden Age of Relations: Turkey and the Western Balkans During the AK Party Period,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2014), pp. 103-125; Emre Erser, “Geopolitical Codes in Davutoğlu’s Views toward the Middle East,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2014), pp. 85-101. Erdoğan’s recent statement offering Turkey’s condolences to Armenians for the 1915 massacres, which marks a significant change in Turkey’s attitude toward the issue, is also a clear instance of the civilizational discourse.

22. See Davutoğlu, Teoriden Pratige Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar (pp. 16-39) for a discussion on the principles guiding the new Turkish foreign policy. For a useful summary of the main concepts that shape Ankara’s foreign policy based on the Strategic Depth doctrine, see Ali Balci and Murat Yeşiltaş, “AK Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası Sözlüğü: Kavramsal Bir Harita” Bilgi, 23 (Winter 2011): 9-34; see also Şaban Kardaş, “From Zero Problems to Leading the Change: Making Sense of Transformation in Turkey’s Regional policy,” TEPAV-ILPI Turkey Policy Brief Series, 5 (2012) for an overview of Turkey’s oft-discussed “zero problems” policy.


24. ibid.

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27. “PM Erdoğan: Turkey is Kosovo and Kosovo is Turkey” October 24, 2013, http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=121375, accessed October 25, 2013. The Turkish leadership is also careful to stress that Turkey’s interest in the Balkans does not stem from any “neo-Ottomanist ambitions” but Turkey’s “historical and cultural depth” in the region. (See e.g., Davutoğlu’s statements in an interview with a Bosnian journalist: “Davutoğlu: ‘I’m Not a Neo-Ottoman,’” April 26, 2011, http://www.balkansight.com/en/article/davutoglu-i-m-not-a-neo-ottoman, accessed October 25, 2013.) The Balkan case further complicates Turkey’s civilizational discourse because it is quite inclusive and accommodative as it reserves room for non-Muslim, as well as Muslim, peoples of the region, including Serbs, Croatians and Bulgarians, by invoking common history and “cultural depth.” The Balkans as an object of Turkish foreign policy discourse thus represents the boundaries of this discourse – by simultaneously signifying these boundaries and blurring them.


32. “Başbakan: Suçlu biziz Kur’an’ı anlamadık” September 5, 2010, http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/600047-basbakan-suclu-biziz-kuran-i-anlamadik, accessed September 15, 2013. Note also that the term “virtuous city” is a central theme in the political philosophy of the famous 10th-century Islamic philosopher al-Farabi and the title of his well-known book. The glorification of Islamic civilization with reference to the historical achievements of Muslims in science and arts (and urban development) at an academic conference mostly attended by Islamic scholars is quite significant in terms of manifesting Erdoğan’s inspirations. Though probably not directly connected to this, Davutoğlu too makes references to al-Farabi (and other Muslim scholars) quite frequently in his earlier, more philosophical, works (e.g., Davutoğlu, Alternative Paradigms: The impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on political theory (University Press of America, 1994).


40. Whether this “different civilization” refers to an “Eastern” or specifically a “Turkish-Islamic” one is left unclear, of course, in line with the intrinsic vagueness of this discourse.

41. Talha Köse correctly observes that the UNAOC’s “action-oriented agenda and practical environment conducive to flexible, interactive and reflexive interaction” offer an important potential to create “spheres of dialogic interaction” (SODIs) to overcome inter-civilizational conflicts. See Köse, “The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level” Insight Turkey, vol. 11 no. 3 (2009): 91. From a conflict-resolution perspective, Köse also explores the possibility of an alternative conceptual ground to help manage existing inter-civilizational conflicts based on the concepts of “cultural violence” and “dialogue of civilizations” vis-à-vis the Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations,” citing the “Alliance of Civilizations” project as an important venue for the realization of such an approach. See Köse, “From Cultural Violence to Dialogue of Civilizations: A Critical Examination of the Conceptual Toolbox” in Global Orders and Civilizations (ed. by Sadik Ünay, Muzaffer Senel, Nova Science, 2009): 354.


43. For a sophisticated theorization of these four sources of power, see Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol 1 (New York: Cambridge UP, 1986), particularly ch. 1.

44. A full analysis of Turkey’s military muscle is beyond the scope of this article.

45. I use the concept of “meta-discursive strategy” to refer to a general discursive strategy that connects and/or brings together all specific discursive strategies (in the Foucaultian sense) within a general framework. See Nurullah Ardıç, Islam and the Politics of Secularism: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 35-36 for an explication of the concept of “meta-discursive strategy.”

46. Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 64.

47. For a useful discussion on these debates, see Ismail Kara, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi (Istanbul: Dergah, 1986) and Cemil Aydın, “Between Occidentalism and the Global Left: Islamist Critiques of the West in Turkey” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2006), pp. 446-461.

48. See Nurullah Ardıç, “Friend or Foe? Globalization and Turkey at the Turn of the 21st Century,” Journal of Economic and Social Research, 11 (2009) for an account of globalization and its effects on Turkey; see Nurullah Ardıç and Sevinç Alkan Özcan (eds.) Küyerel Dönüşüler: Küreselleşme, Zihniyet, Siyaset, Politics (İstanbul: Kure, 2012) for a collection of articles that examine this issue from different angles.


51. See also Hasan Kösebalaban, “Globalization and the Crisis of Authoritarian Modernization in Turkey,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2009), pp. 77-97.

52. Duran (“Understanding AK Party’s Identity Politics,” pp. 93-95) argues that this discourse primarily allows the AK Party to accommodate the three challenges that it has been facing since 2002: the “Islamic past,” “Kemalism’s legacy” and “regional power balances.”

53. As Duran (“Understanding AK Party’s Identity Politics,” p. 94) argues, these historical references are also functional in terms of forging an identity for the AK Party itself.

54. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, Küresel Barış Vizyonu (İstanbul: Meydan, 2012), p. 23.
The Rise of Radical Liberal Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy

ZUHAL MERT UZUNER*

ABSTRACT Change is a central concept in Turkish and global politics. It forms the basis of liberal ideology, alongside freedom, democracy, and equality. In this spirit of change, radical liberal thinkers question the state of contemporary international relations with a focus on justice and fairness. Ahmet Davutoğlu appreciates the importance of these liberal considerations, and he claims the global order is in a period of transformation, in which Turkey and the rest of the world will come into new political roles. In order to facilitate the formation of a fair, cooperative world order, Davutoğlu promotes a global consensus based on cosmopolitanism and multilateralism. These ideas for international reform are consistent with radical liberalism. However, he also considers the formation of a new global order according to his conservative and Islamic ideas—a position inconsistent with liberalism. This contradiction demands a better understanding of Davutoğlu’s stance in domestic politics and international relations, and a consideration of implications for Turkey’s global identity.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, reform and change have been two key concepts in Turkish foreign policy, as it has claimed a greater role in world politics. The reconstruction of the global political system offers an opportunity to small and middling powers in world politics. In fact, it is difficult to make a comprehensive road map of change in the international order in years following the Cold War. In wake of 9/11, the current world order and the liberal ideology have been criticized, and literature espousing alternative views about world order emerged. Writers from different theoretical schools proposed different ideas for transforming the system into an ideal model. One such view is radical liberalism that seeks a more liberal liberalism and reform in international relations to facilitate better inclusion of the current world order’s victims. This form of liberalism prefers reform to the dismantlement of the current global political system.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, a prominent name in Turkish foreign policy since 2002, currently the Prime Minister of Turkey, offered a comprehensive analysis of Tur-
key’s place in world politics in his masterpiece, *Strategic Depth*, published in 2001. Davutoğlu’s book underlines the need for reform and change not only in Turkey, but also in the current system of world politics. Emerging global and regional actors have started to ask for larger roles in global governance and reforms in international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF. From his position in Turkey, a rising power of the 2000’s, Davutoğlu questions the current UN system and its efforts for justice, equality and peace. He argues that the world system is in a transitional period, which offers a chance to reconstruct an improved world order in terms of not only organization, but also justice. This kind of reform would offer Turkey new opportunities to become a more effective player in world politics.

Davutoğlu fits the description of a liberal scholar in the current system, in view of his focus on the need for change, reform, and improved justice, in a humanitarian context. On the other hand, some people perceive his affinity to Islam and his critics against modernity as threatening. Especially his career in Turkish government and his sympathy to Islamic groups have placed him at odds with the secular liberals. In the traditional sense, conservatism and religious loyalties are in opposition with liberalism. Therefore, Davutoğlu seems an ideological contradiction. This example sparks a discussion of liberalism in the post-modern world. How can we understand Davutoğlu’s stance? Is he a liberal or radical Islamist leader? In the context of liberalism, Turkish opposition groups view Davutoğlu’s theories on international relations as idealistic to a degree of irrationality. As a scholar of international relations, Davutoğlu views foreign policy in a manner different from the traditional conceptions of Turkish politics. In the context of a changing liberal order, his views offer a unique view of the future for the world, and for the Turkey. Still, it is important to answer the question, “Is he a radical liberal or not?” The answer will indicate the likelihood of his theories’ influencing foreign policy, and it will illuminate the degrees of continuity and change in foreign policy of the post-modern era.

Therefore, we should begin our analysis with the evolution of the liberal world order and the rise of radical liberalism. By looking at Davutoğlu’s principle ideas and concepts, we may solidify an understanding of his stance. This will require a close analysis of his books, articles, and speeches, archived on the foreign ministry website. This analysis will run from his advisory position in 2002 to the present, in order to form a comprehensive understanding of his ideology, and to understand his status in terms of liberalism.
The Rise of Radical Liberalism as Liberalism 3.0

Liberalism and Versions of Liberal Institutionalism

Liberalism has evolved as a theory of government, and encompasses social, economic, and international theory. Its central goal is the happiness and well-being of the individual. In order to achieve this goal, liberal philosophy operates on the assumptions of modernity—that history is discontinuous, and there are distinct shifts in the linear progression of history, such as the transformation from the feudalist age to the capitalist, industrial age. This idea of modernity also prioritizes individual and social freedoms before traditional, national boundaries. In classical liberalism, liberty is the focal point, and it is tied directly to the freedom, happiness, and well-being of the individual. Classical liberalism regards the status quo with an inclination for reform, in order to eliminate all threats to individual freedoms, such as monarchies and authoritarian governments. Thus, liberals’ proposal for freedom hinges on republicanism, constitutionalism, and the right to hold property under the rule of law. According to its definition, the core tenants of liberalism are the equality of citizens, the basic human rights of individuals, the belief in a market-driven economy, and the right to private property. Accordingly, liberals regard shortcomings in existing global and national structures as obstacles, which are to be solved with positivist strategy, as used in the material sciences: find the problem, and then find its solution.

In the context of international relations, liberalism promotes cooperation as a method for the prevention of war. Philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that humanity can achieve freedom and justice by reason. He promoted individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a continuous international peace contract between all states as the ingredients for international peace and prosperity. Similarly, another 18th-century thinker, Jeremy Bentham called for an international law system to facilitate peace and prosperity. In the 19th century, Richard Cobden introduced the idea of natural harmony of interest, based on individual freedoms and free trade. By this theory, if all states look out for their own well-being, there will emerge a natural harmony that will benefit all parties, without any need for outside intervention. Cobden saw the natural harmony of interest as an ideal formula for the global economic system and international relations. Each of these liberal theories maintained that the nurture of constitutionalism, individualism, republicanism, human rights, private property, the free market, and a network of growing interdependence would produce global peace.

In practice, however, these liberal principles did not always facilitate the well-being of the people, especially in the case of colonies under imperial power. Free trade and the open-market economy did not result in the natural harmony described by Cobden, and people across the world did not experience the
contentment liberalism promised. As the global liberal order developed, the system favored the rich and the powerful, at the expense of the poor and the weak. In view of the ruling liberal ideology’s effects on international affairs, thinkers began to question the promises of classical liberalism. In the 20th century, liberal institutionalism emerged with the goal of peace and prosperity by promoting national self-determination and international institutions based on democratic principles. This new liberal ideology placed a special emphasis on international cooperation in dealing with belligerents. Thus, with the end of World War I, liberal internationalism 1.0 came into being by 1919.

Liberal institutionalism has commonalities with modern liberalism—a theory based on the freedom of the individual in social relations. Modern liberals, including John Stuard Mill and Leonard Hobhouse, espoused a communitarian type of liberalism. They criticized classical liberals’ understanding of freedom, which centers on freedom of contracts and property rights. Modern liberal J.S. Mill described “man as a progressive being,” and he argued that individuals should be allowed to develop in all their “manifold diversity.” This form of liberalism can be seen as distinct from the rest of liberal thought, as its “aim is to emancipate individuals from the fear of hunger, unemployment, ill health, and a miserable old age, and, positively, to attempt to help members of modern industrial societies...” According to John Rawls, modern liberals are liberal because they share the traditional moral view of freedom, and they accept the right to personal property as a necessary element of individual self-expression.

The modern liberal ideology also argues for a welfare state, and after the First World War, it promoted an interwar idealism in an effort to improve existing global structures. In view of these commonalities and contrasts, it is intellectually useless to discuss a form of liberalism as static. Liberalism’s most distinctive feature is its commitment to progress, and its belief in the human capacity for progress through rationality. In wake of the First World War, peace proved not to be the natural condition, and as Leonard Woolf argued, peace and prosperity are “consciously devised machinery,” in need of rational construction.

Despite this acknowledged need for a consciously devised system for international peace and order, Woodrow Wilson reverted to a belief in natural harmo-
In his economic liberalism. In a familiar way, he argued that if all states acted in their own interests, the whole world would benefit. This form of liberalism promoted a rational approach to socio-economic issues as integral to world order. Wilson and his supporters also argued that global progress was the natural result of liberal economic policies, such as economic non-interventionism.

However, the Great Depression in 1929 and the mercantilist policies that followed proved the need for a mechanism to regulate the global economy. This international mechanism was needed to facilitate cooperation between states and to ensure every state’s observance of liberal economic rules. This glaring need motivated the USA to intervene on the international stage during the interwar years, and to facilitate the formation of a global order respecting liberal values and the well-being of people around the world.

The Second World War added motivation for increased international regulation, and shortly following the war, states came together to form stabilizing mechanisms according to liberal ideology. These states agreed to reform their individual national economic structures, and they created international organizations, including the IMF and the World Bank, to promote liberal economic conduct in international economy. The British international hegemony gave way to American supremacy, but the liberal post-war world order remained a system based on Western domination. Yet, in keeping with Westphalian ideology, this world order maintained the importance of national sovereignty and equality. The new UN system designated the world’s 198 states as equal, but it fell short in translating equality and democracy to the international level. This system constitutes liberal internationalism 2.0.

Version 2.0 was a pragmatic liberalism, as World War II had proven that states must carefully evaluate obstacles to the formation of a stable international liberal order. The war had illuminated economic and political inequalities barring the way to a purely liberal international order. Powerful countries had been benefitting from the existing global political dynamic, whose inequities had masked by the word “liberal.” In post-war years, the growing technological capacity of the Western world intensified these global inequalities in prosperity. Improving telecommunication and transportation capabilities granted the West even greater influence across the world. Soon, thinkers began to question
this Western supremacy. Antonio Gramsci’s description of this hegemony was especially critical. He attributed American hegemony to both coercion capacity of the US and consent of the victims of American dominance by accepting dominance of the US. Channeling this sentiment, powers outside of the Western world began to question their subjugation to the system of Western values. This unrest bred backlash movements against the liberal world order, including the post-colonial subaltern studies, the new left, and the religious nationalist reactions. The new perspectives of post-structuralism and post-colonialism mounted a normative criticism of globalization. G. John Ikenberry defined this liberal internationalism 3.0 as “a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain.”

**The Rise of Radical Liberalism in World Politics**

Once liberalism was solidified as the guiding economic ideology, critics of the existing order discussed alternatives within the liberal ideology, and intellectuals began to seek a more liberal form of liberalism. Intellectuals from the left had become active in criticizing the liberal global order for states’ unequal participation in international affairs and for the marginalization of certain people and countries. Critics viewed the liberal international system as a malfunctioning mechanism that widened gaps between developed and underdeveloped countries. They perceived the current system as a mean to perpetuate inequality and injustice. Thus, since the 1960’s, the New Left and “radical liberals” have launched harsh critiques and protests against mainstream liberalism. The Frankfurt School of the 1920’s and 1930’s first introduced “radical democracy,” an influential, new vision for procuring justice, equality, and support for the marginalized. Instead of staging a full-blown revolution, they sought to reform the existing international liberal ideology.

Radical liberalism owes its intellectual roots to 19th-century European political philosophy. Peter Lichtenstein offers commentary on the heritage of radical liberalism:

> [It] shares not only the heritage of classical (laissez-faire) and modern (etatist) liberalism but also the heritage of left wing revolutionary thought. Both of these orientations originate, after all, in a common ideological base supplied by Enlightenment Liberalism. Radical liberalism is therefore an association of two divergent philosophical perspectives, one a “liberal” perspective which seeks to liberate individuals from political and/or economic power, the other a “radical” perspective which seeks to overturn a social order based on privilege and property.

However, radical liberalism emerged as a modern concept during the American civil rights movement in the 1960’s and 1970’s. New Left thinkers supported the African Americans in their struggle for equal rights, and they promoted a
more inclusive liberalism. One of the most influential names in radical liberalism is Arnold Kaufman. He argues that New Left radicalism and modern liberalism were not necessarily in conflict with one another. The New Left had to divide its efforts between the promotion of participatory democracy and the formation of a wide coalition, in order to be more effective in its campaign for political equality. Kaufman asserted, “Democratic theorists had to find ways to balance two different demands on a political system: the demand for order and stability, and the demand for participation and spontaneity.” The New Left sought to overcome potential threats to stability as it extended civil rights and equal political participation to the full population. At the same time, active citizens might work for the transformation of representative political institutions at the local level. According to Kaufman, “this balanced vision stemmed from the liberal tradition, but a liberal tradition of his own making.”

In unfolding his argument, Kaufman focuses on John Stuart Mill, Leonard Hobhouse, and John Dewey—all liberal theorists who remained distinct from Karl Marx; J.S. Mill, L. Hobhouse and J. Dewey. He prefers them because they appreciate the damage of capitalist inequalities on democratic values and institutions. Each of them believes in individual rights, the common good, state intervention to protect the public interest, and political participation as a means of educating citizens on the responsibilities of a democracy.

As described by Kaufman, radical liberals criticize mainstream liberalism for its theoretical base centered on the individual. He defines that base as “the protection and promotion of each person’s equal opportunity to develop his potentialities as fully as possible,” within the “constraints of civility.” Liberals seek to create a “society in which each individual has a roughly equal opportunity to carve out a destiny in conformity with his own nature and deliberative choice.” Radical liberals share a number of goals in common with mainstream liberals. They seek to eliminate poverty and racism, to guarantee full employment, to provide adequate housing and medical care, to preserve the environment, and to ensure equal access to higher education. However, radical liberals do not work for these surface goals alone. They aim to reform the entire government system by supporting participatory democracy instead of indirect representative democracy. Thus, they attempt to keep the government in check with direct influence in government decisions for all citizens.

Kaufman also noted that radical liberals emphasize the need to reevaluate the key concepts of liberalism—individualism, private property, and political democracy. They object to the “contradiction between political democracy which...
extends human rights, and private property, which abridges human rights. In order to find a solution of this contradictions they emphasize some key concepts to reevaluate.

According to Peter Lichtenstein, radical liberals espouse six propositions that challenge traditional liberal concepts:

1. Pluralism: The autonomous and voluntary associations of people, “in which political and economic power are equally shared; a society made up multiple centers of power and coalition of peoples with diverse interests.”

2. Developmental Individualism: Individualism distinct from possessive individualism, based on the argument for “human essence not as a consumption of utilities but as the active exertion and development of individual potentialities.”

3. Solidarity: A concept similar to the “fraternity” slogan of the French Revolution, and “it implies that we are all in the same boat and must travel in the same direction without leaving anyone behind. It contains sentiments of anti authoritarianism, and is fundamentally opposed to systems of meritocracy and hierarchy... If everybody is to be free, everybody must be equally free. My liberty must be consistent with the liberty of others. If some are less privileged, they are also unfree to that extent. Without human solidarity, inequality and unfreedom would immediately reappear... solidarity nukes freedom and equality possible.”

4. Egalitarianism: Opposition to all social privilege and social oppression, and the search for a future in which all individuals are “equally free.”

5. Participatory Democracy: The direct participation of individuals in decision making in all spheres of social life, not by representative mechanisms.

6. Social Transformation: A belief in both the goal of modern liberalism and the need for change in itself. For radical liberals, emancipating people from the bondages of tradition and liberating their creative potential is of the upmost importance. Egalitarianism, solidarity, democracy, and developmentalism are all necessary pieces for this emancipation. These principles frame freedom, equality, democracy, and justice in a pluralist understanding, developed in the context of post-modernity instead of modernist explanations for social happenings in a single way. According to Anthony Giddens, “The post-modern outlook has a different ontological perspective and sees a plurality of heterogeneous claims to knowledge.” Post-modern outlook seeks to use science to define single explanations for occurrences in life.

The significance of the post-modern perspective is its discussion of various subjects and its contributions to their evolution. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, postmodernists began to debate cultural and religious values in the context of political equality and freedom, and they revitalized human rights discussions.
Even more so after the Cold War’s end, post-modernity mounted a serious challenge to traditional liberalism. Their emphasis on cultural values and religious beliefs lent to further evolution of liberal values.

In addition, alternative models of economic success and development, as seen in China and Brazil, challenged the internationally preeminent Western liberal values. This challenge introduced new considerations for the formation of a post-Cold War world order. In the 2000’s, emergent global powers became increasingly vocal in their demands for a stronger position in international system. In view of this tension, the US sought reform to the global order that would appease subjugated countries without diminishing its power. A clear example of this American perspective, John Ikenberry warned of a mounting crisis to the liberal world order—the very order responsible for America’s international supremacy.25

The argument for significant change to the international order continued under these tense conditions. Political scientist Robert Cox evaluated the possibility of an overhaul of the world’s current political order, asserting, “The contradictions and conflicts that arise within any established structure create the opportunity for its transformation into a new structure. This is the simplest model of historical change.”26 The victims of the current liberal order express these contradictions and conflicts between the international reality and liberalism’s core values. For example, at the World Social Forum in 2001, the global justice movement aired its frustration with these inconsistencies, and emphasized with a rallying cry, “Another world is possible.”

In search of “another world,” the United Nation’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change released its report in December 2004, addressing international problems in an intellectual framework. The report appealed for reform to the liberal world order, and it had three complementary themes: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and the right to live in dignity through the rule of law, the concept of Responsibility to Protect, and full respect for human rights. To achieve this vision a program of reform was prepared for the management processes and institutions of the United Nations.27 This suggestion for international reform opened a “battle ground,” and the 2005 UN Summit produced few results satisfactory for anyone.

This was not the first attempt for reform to the UN. Kofi Annan himself, he then UN Secretary-General, promoted reform and supported the agenda pre-
pared by Maurice Strong in his 1997 paper, “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform.” However, this ambitious project was unsuccessful in producing real change. Maurice Strong explained the impediments to his project, saying, “[T]he concept of national sovereignty has been immutable, indeed a sacred principle of international relations… What is needed is recognition of the reality that … it is simply not feasible for sovereignty to be exercised unilaterally by individual nation-states, however powerful.”28 Reform attempts to the UN’s institutional structure, especially to the UN Security Council, have also experienced serious difficulties. In discussion, UN representatives argued over two reformed institutional models. Model A offered increases in both the permanent and non-permanent membership categories, and Model B suggested an increase in only non-permanent members. India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and other countries – “Uniting for Consensus” – had long opposed preferential permanent membership category created by the post-World War II order. Thus, they supported variations of Model B, in hopes of countering the UN hierarchy.29 During discussions, these countries’ did not hide their hostility towards the US, arguably the current structure’s greatest beneficiary.30 Critics harp on the UN’s policies on impunity, disarmament, and the International Criminal Court, but they regard its stance on nations’ responsibility to protect as especially weak. However, the international community does appear able to agree upon a normative framework to correct this problem. Countries have designed global institutions in a centralized, nation-state style, with the protection of their national interests in mind. However, these institutions must operate with a global mindset in order to confront global challenges. The UN must establish a consensus for a normative framework favoring comprehensive global governance that works more than the individual nation interest.

New liberal ideas about domestic order are critical in considering justice in a system of global governance. Left-wing radical democracy and post-colonial subaltern studies offer a nuanced, comprehensive view of a cosmopolitan world. According to these approaches, development is a matter for global security, and the international community - namely globality - is responsible for finding a solution. As development has become a priority in the global agenda, liberalism has transformed to account for it. Radical liberalism emerged from this adaptation of liberal values to a new set of ideas and problems. For example, radical liberals have questioned the role of the state in the domestic market according to liberal principles of fairness. They argue that the government may not intervene in the distribution of the wealth, but they must find a way to help...
poor. Tangentially, radical liberals think that global institutions should exist to improve human security and to protect human rights.

Klaus Schwab, the chairman and founder of the World Economic Forum in 2006, provides insightful analysis of the current challenge to the liberal order. He argues that the world urgently needs a better understanding of global interdependence. In his view, reform efforts have only solidified the current order and protected the national interests of powerful countries. Schwab argues reforms must instead foster a true global trusteeship. He promotes “planetization,” defined as the mobilization of universal cooperation in the service of world governance. However, the ineffectiveness of UN reforms impedes the realization of this idealistic perspective.

The entrenched focus of all states on national interests also stands in the way of such cosmopolitan ideas. As Hellena de Bress asserts, the cosmopolitan understanding emphasizes the need for a single set of fundamental norms of justice applies to all individuals, regardless of citizenship. “Cosmopolitans generally conclude that we should be concerned about inequality, fairness and poverty as a matter of justice internationally, just as we have traditionally been concerned about such things as a matter of justice domestically. The statist, by contrast, denies that any norms of distributive justice apply across the borders of states or nations.” Cosmopolitanism centers on democracy and legitimacy, and to this end, cosmopolitan reformers of the international system seek to create of “concert of democracies” instead of alliance system against security challenges arose with globalization. They hope nations will rally around democratic values and provide a representation of individuals. Thus people work for solutions to global problems.

These efforts to create a political consensus on global norms of politics reflect efforts by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas to form a rational consensus in place of the problematic *modus vivendi*. Both philosophers promote international cooperation and consensus as the guarantee of liberal democratic institutions. While Rawls viewed justice as the cornerstone for such a consensus, Habermas emphasized the legitimacy. Rawls espoused the concept of justice as fairness, based upon stability and citizens’ approval of established institutions. On the other hand, Habermas asserted that a consensus could be built upon the legitimacy of an impartial democratic system that values the interests of all citizens equally. The success of the institutions of complex democratic societies hinges upon free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern. In this vein, deliberative democracies operate on a rationale based on communication and free popular reason, not on the promotion of self interest.

The manipulation of knowledge and language plays a significant role in this theoretical conversation. Public discourse is central to the construction of re-
ality. Belgian theorist Chantal Mouffe criticizes the manipulation of language and ethics, claiming that deliberative democracy focuses too heavily on morality and does not recognize the realities of politics. She asserts, “If we accept that relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the main question for democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic values.”37

All of these arguments contribute to the formation of a new phase in human history, governed by pluralistic perspectives for a cosmopolitan world. Propo-nents of this new world order promote respect to differences instead of international recognition of a universally unified principles to protect individual freedoms. There are many threads of this movement. For example, Robert W. Cox explains the current state of world politics as post-hegemony, post-globalization and post-Westphalia. According to Cox, the developing world order has depart-ed from traditional Western values for a new political agenda concerned with humanity as a whole. Under this new agenda, individual states have changing roles in view of a developing political solidarities and eroding sovereignty understanding.38 Cox founds his analysis on an assumption of historical change in world politics. The post-hegemonic dynamic forces the West to understand the “Rest” in their own term and to reevaluate its relations with them. Reformers seek to establish not only mutual recognition between all actors, but also to de-velop a supra-inter-subjectivity “that would provide a bridge among the distinct separate subjectivities of the different coexisting traditions of civilization”39

Consistencies and Contradictions between Davutoğlu and Radical Liberalism

In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) emerged the majority party in the general elections. For an Islamist, conservative right-wing party, JDP has many liberal qualities and has served as a continuation of previous liberal movements, including that of Turgut Özal. Former President Özal is well known for his liberal economic reforms in Turkey. Carrying on this legacy, the JDP discourse in politics has been dominated by the concepts such as equality, republicanism, and parliamentarianism. JDP leaders attribute a relationship between governing elites and Western hegemony. They protest the entrenched top-down style of government, which subjects the Turkish masses to the will of a small political elite, and often to foreign influence.

In its campaign against the supremacy of the secular elites, the party has organized a framework of values, similar to those of opposition groups in the world politics. The JDP has pushed for increased political representation for Turkey’s religious masses, arguing the importance of religious values and re-pect to for democracy. The JDP has sought to reform national political values
according to the beliefs of the Turkish masses—strong beliefs in Islam and a different definition of Turkish identity. In this spirit, these political reformers introduced a new vision for Turkey as a representative Islamic civilization with secular democratic framework.

Under this new definition, Turkey no longer serves as a bridge between Western countries and Middle Eastern and Asiatic countries, and instead acts as a center in itself. The country aims to play a significant role in the construction of the new world order, according to justice, freedom, and human rights. In order to promote these qualities, the JDP fixates on promoting great reforms. In the definition of the Turkey’s new identity and new global role, the party reflects on history of Turkey as it considers reform to international standards.

The JDP unifies Islamic values and Turkish national culture in its vision of a new country.40 Party leaders describe the Ottoman Empire as the highest form of Islamic civilization in history, and they bestow upon Turkey the duty of upholding this legacy. In the interest of upholding the legacy of Islamic civilization, Turkey will take on a significant role in the new world order. The JDP has developed a foreign policy stance criticizing the modern view of world affairs, which describes a global system based on a diversity of interests and opinions between higher and lower sources of solidarities. Their ideas have sparked intellectual discussions in the international community, and they have found parallels with radical liberal discourse. For example, Abdullah Gül states, “Tur-
key is in a position to be an intermediary that can promote universal values shared with the West, such as democracy, human rights, the supremacy of the law and a market economy in the region.\(^{41}\)

In this effort to integrate Turkish values with those of the international community, Ahmet Davutoğlu played a major role as a leading thinker in Turkish foreign policy. Beginning in 2002, Davutoğlu began serving as a foreign policy advisor, until he became Turkish Foreign Minister in 2009. Due to his background in academia, his terminology when discussing international relations varies from that of the average politician. He often receives criticism for being overly theoretical. Yet, he has a deep knowledge of the subject matter, and he applies academic concepts to form policy for real world situations. In view of his education and insight, Davutoğlu offers discourse more thought-provoking than any other Turkish politician in recent history.

From one point of view, Davutoğlu’s ideas about world politics fit the mold of radical liberalism. He frequently references central liberal principles, including multilateralism, human rights, and pluralism. Davutoğlu observes a transforming system of world politics, and he has reorganized the Turkish Foreign Ministry with respect to this new dynamic.\(^{42}\) He also reflects the liberal agenda in his attention to global threats and to opportunities for global humanitarianism.

On the other hand, Davutoğlu’s references to Ottoman legacy and its Islamic affiliations do not promote liberal attitudes. He links Turkey’s identity to its distinctive history and geographical location, and he attributes the country’s potential as a dynamic regional and global actor to these two factors.\(^{43}\) He criticizes Turkey’s traditional foreign policy stance as having barred the country from claiming a stronger international position. Davutoğlu frequently discusses world politics in terms of paradigmatic shifts, and he focuses especially on the crises of the post-WWII liberal world order and the resulting challenges for other civilizations including the Islam.\(^{44}\)

Davutoğlu has set the new agenda for Turkish foreign policy:

\[
\ldots\text{in nine years Turkey has experienced a revolution in foreign policy mindset}\ldots\text{even the university youth of 60’s 70’s in Turkey had different ideological perspectives, all we had a dream to have a much different Turkey and much different world. What lies at the root of search of a different Turkey was independent, dignified country which pays its way. Both leftists or Islamists had such a dream...some called the dream as Great East, some says fully independent Turkey and the other called as Great Turkey as a part of their conceptualization. And for Turkey, our dream was creation of an order based on equality and justice and against repression, exploitation, imposition. Now we try to make these two dreams real.}\]

\(^{45}\)
His explanations about Turkish foreign policy underline the need for another role and identity for Turkey different than the role during the Cold War years. In addition, he defines his reformative perspective in harmony with intellectual accumulation of Turkish political life. Additionally, he defines universal moral framework by underlining importance of equality and justice that are important in radical liberal literature, too.

As discussed earlier, Peter Lichtenstein has identified the six key principles of radical liberals with relation to globalized world politics. An analysis of each of his principles helps to illuminate Davutoğlu’s relationship to radical liberalism.

**Pluralism:** From Davutoğlu’s viewpoint, pluralism is essential for the recognition of different beliefs and respectful coexistence. The international community must embrace pluralism in order to create global solidarity for the common good of humanity. In this vein, Davutoğlu argues, “Over time, the presentation of the Muslim world as a potential enemy has also resulted in encouraging oppressive political tendencies in Muslim countries for the sake of preserving Western interests and thus exempting the Muslim world from enjoying the universality of democratic values.” This observation demonstrates Davutoğlu’s desire for equality throughout the world, and his emphasis on pluralism in order to elevate the victims of the global order. According to the Frankfurt School, radical democracy seeks participation and representation at every level of administration, in order to improve the world order and to rectify the problems of disadvantaged groups. Radical democracy supporters call for the UN to promote reforms for equal representation between nations, in the manner of a global parliament. In this way, underprivileged countries would achieve an international voice with which to improve their well-being. This line of thinking embodies the search for a more liberal liberalism, and Davutoğlu frequently expresses his support for similar reforms to the UN system. In addition, Prime Minister Erdoğan regularly criticizes the organization of the UN Security Council as violating democratic ideals.

Supporters of pluralism demands respect for different cultures and different ideologies, and they seek to restructure the world order according to this principle. This new order would also operate on a more cosmopolitan set of values. It would support equal representation and radical democracy in order to permit disadvantaged groups to express their views in the formation of new global humanitarian values. From a similar viewpoint, Davutoğlu criticizes the current world order, centered on modernity and Western values, as a crisis. An
ideology preferential of the West, modernity emerged as a European phenomenon, and continued to prosper in America. However, as the concept spread to other parts of the world, especially the new economic centers of Hong Kong and Singapore, it began to lose its Western meaning. Thus, globalization overturned the traditional ideology of modernity, and brought about a search for a new definition. Post-modernism emerged in this vacuum, assuming the existence of opinions at a local level as the base of pluralism. However, Davutoğlu argues that post-modernity is a cynical reaction, incapable of producing a productive world order. He suggests the new world order must go further than pluralism, and he believes that a post-modern new world order would lead only to despotism.

Davutoğlu believes the creation of a common normative framework will establish improved global trusteeship, communication, and the resulting collaboration with multilateralism will bring about solutions to world problems. In this way, Davutoğlu’s perspective appears highly similar to Habermas’ consensus concept. Like Habermas, he supports the creation of global norms to promote consensus between different civilizations and value systems. They both view multilateralism as the solution to global disorder.

Davutoğlu suggests that the US, as leader of the current global system, should rally other countries around new philosophical reform. He argues that the traditionally Western order is no longer Western, but cosmopolitan. In view of this transition, the world order faces the issue of internalization of cosmopolitan values by all actors. Assuming that the US cooperates with reform and supports the representation of all countries, the global system will survive with necessary changes.

According to Davutoğlu, the new global norms should be universal and respectful of the values of all civilizations, and not only the West. This perspective is related with feeling as a part of either of the Eastern and Islamic world. In many of their speeches, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu have mentioned civilization as an essential part of Turkish political identity. In the definition of this particular civilization they have emphasized the importance of Islamic values.

For this purpose, Davutoğlu espouses a cosmopolitan understanding from pluralist perspective of Islam. He argues that Muslims must play an important role in the recreation of the world consensus, and that Islamic values should be
represented in the new around a common normative framework. He asserts, “It is not important to create concepts which are meaningful only in their own world, but it is important to create reflection of these concepts outside of it.”

The United Nations Alliance of Civilization (UNAOC) initiative serves as a good example of this sentiment. Turkey and Spain serve as co-chairs of the UNAOC, and Davutoğlu welcomes this responsibility as a way to raise the level of international tolerance and mutual understanding.

Although these foreign policy ideas might be circuitous for Turkey’s national interests, Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance of these reforms for Turkey’s global position for the future. He argues that the upheaval of the entrenched world order brought a historical change and inevitably improvements. As an example, the ruling nationalist ideology of nations across the globe stands out to him as an issue requiring major reform because it is unable to solve new domestic and global sociopolitical problems. From an ontological perspective, Davutoğlu questions the international standard of the nation-state and its social structures. Therefore, his perspective is similar with new medievalism notion of Hedley Bull with references to rising overlapping authorities, multiple loyalties and universalistic claims as challenges of globalization.

Davutoğlu blames nationalism with the destruction of unity between different ethnicities, and he criticizes artificiality of national barriers. He believes in a natural togetherness of the people in Turkey’s region, and he sees the current disorder under nationalism as unnatural, and thus temporary. He predicts departure from the current nationalist dynamic in the near future.

As mentioned earlier, Davutoğlu frequently references the Ottoman past as an essential piece of Turkey’s identity. For this reason, he receives criticism for having a retrospective view of historical change and an unrealistic vision for pax ottomanica. In actuality, in order to explain the current search for a new world order, he refers to Arab Muslim historiographer Ibn Haldun’s idea of cyclical historical change of civilizations, an alternative to the linear understanding of history. From this angle, Davutoğlu argues that Western civilization has begun another decline, while the East has entered an upswing. He believes that over time the world changes for the benefit of less powerful people, as Ibn Haldun asserts in his assabiyya concept. Davutoğlu refers to the ex-Ottoman territories as belonging to a common culture on the rise, with Turkey as its center. These beliefs fall under the so called neo-Ottomanism. In defense of his beliefs, Davutoğlu responds to his critics with explanations of expanded identity in terms of regional realities:

I have dreamed to bring Bosniac and Serbian Ministers together in the Balkans; to bring the groups in conflict together who are the members of the same cultural basin; to help oppressed people of the underdeveloped countries who live in problem of hunger and many difficulties.....when we realized Summit of the Least
Developed Countries last year, when we went to Somalia and Arakan to embrace with the victims, we were acting for the same dream of justice for all humanity. When we opened Embassies in Central and South Africa, Latin America and East Asia which have never been under the Ottoman rule we neglected them as missing link for realizing our dreams for our country. If they describe all these ideals as Neo-Ottomanism, this is their opinion, not mine.52

Despite the conservative reputation of pan-Ottomanism, Davutoğlu expresses his desire for a broad, cosmopolitan cultural framework based on multilateralism. This sentiment aligns him with radical liberalism. He solidifies his liberal ties in his efforts to engage with the global order by encouraging reform and transformation. He also espouses a cosmopolitan view more than pluralistic one that encouraging only respect and coexistence with respect to cultural and ideological differences. He refers also need to promote global normative understanding as a common set of values of all humanity. Thus, despite his references to Islam, Davutoğlu does not fit the mold of conservatism and radical Islamism, because he underline need to communicate and collaborate for cosmopolitan future.

Developmental Individualism: “Human” is the central word to Davutoğlu’s explanation of world politics in the context of Islam. In his eyes, human dignity has the utmost importance, and the individual cannot be regarded only as a subject to global and national administration. Davutoğlu has described the culture of individualistic consumption as a disgrace to humanity. He believes that social mechanisms should have a foundation in an accepted set of values representative of nature of the human being.53 He once said, “human nature is not based on the consumption of utilities, but on the development of personal potential.”54 Intellectuals and political actors must arrange a global framework with recognition of these qualities of humanity. Just like modern liberals, Davutoğlu views the human mind and capacity as the cornerstone for designing the world’s political future. In view of these liberal ideas, he appears to align with Richard Falk and those behind World Orders Model Project (WOMP), who work to design a model of world governance for a fair world in order. Similarly to Davutoğlu, Falk promotes bottom-up globalization and global reforms for world governance fora just world order—ideas central to developmental individualism.55

Solidarity: Since the globalization in world politics, international threats and exchanges have proven that a country’s isolation from the rest of the world is impossible. In view of this reality, all people face the same uncertainty, and they must work with one another for the benefit of the others, and themselves. As Peter Singer asserts, well-being and welfare of everyone is a crucial matter for the peace and security on the earth. This perspective encourages a global community based on the values of freedom, equality, justice/fairness. In
Turkey, references to solidarity as a concept differs from that of radical liberalism, as Turkish officials frequently uses solidarity term in the context of cooperation and collaboration in bilateral relations for specific purposes. However, without using the term of solidarity, they refer equality, justice, human rights and freedom as crucial elements for global cooperation especially about Palestinian question. In their considerations of this instance of global division, Turkish officials regularly refer to inequality and injustice in Palestine as a major impediment to peace in the Middle East.56

However, Turkish foreign policy officials frequently blame the liberal establishment for rising global economic inequality and inability of the liberal institutions to find a solution. As it is in the case of starvation in Somalia, international community could not be organized to help starving children. In one effort to counteract this inability, the Turkish government intervened in the Somali crisis, in keeping with Kantian ethics, help just because they are human. In addition, prominent JDP leaders have frequently accused the Western world of not adopting the Rawlsian view of justice as fairness. Turkish officials assert that helping the victims of poverty is an obligation, promoting subaltern and post-colonial perspectives, and fairness at a very basic level. From this view, there is need for a global governance work to balance the inequalities resulting from Rawls’ ideas.

The Platform of the Least Developed Countries offers another view of these issues of inequality.57 Although the platform does not stress the same concept of solidarity verbatim, it considers international problems of stagnated development and economic inequality as related to global disunity. The Turkish Foreign Ministry takes the issue of terrorism very seriously, and it views terrorism as an extension of this polarization and inequality of development.58 The Turkish government considers the concept of human security a matter of upmost importance for international attention. Specifically, Turkish officials urge coordinated, international action in response to terrorism, poverty, climate change, internet freedom, and nuclear proliferation.59 In order to find solutions to such issues, and to promote sustainable development, the international community must sustain a dialogue on peace, security, democracy, human rights, multilateralism, and diplomacy. Therefore, Davutoğlu urges the international community to work together on a basis of solidarity.60 He and other Turkish officials call for a system of international and regional multilateralism, based on an established set of values, in order to encourage common action. As such, Turkey adopted the Charter of the Organization, which seeks
to establish solidarity and cooperation among Islamic States in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, and social spheres.\textsuperscript{61}

**Egalitarianism:** Egalitarianism is essential for freedom and equality. In this spirit, Davutoğlu says, “For me, an egalitarian, participatory, and synthesizing world order is the only viable answer in overcoming the current global challenges.”\textsuperscript{62} He emphasizes his faith in the power of egalitarianism between different states and cultures.

The Muslim peoples have experienced many difficulties, and the JDP views egalitarianism as the natural step to counteract the human rights violations against them, which were most prevalent immediately following 9/11. Davutoğlu believes that Turkey has the greatest potential to represent Islamic civilization and values on the world stage. He frequently refers to Islamic literature in terms of human rights and equality, and he sees the existing definition of human rights as consistent with, and essential to, Islamic values. Thus, the JDP relies on law-governed regimes and liberties, just as radical liberals do. Davutoğlu goes further to analyze Turkey as a country egalitarian in its legislative order, but falling short in its stance of women rights.\textsuperscript{63}

The Turkish judicial system has run into many problems of equality and justice. Even leading political figures have noted Turkish law’s troubling inequality with reference to political and ideological affiliations. Turkish law is also lacking in its protection of individual rights, especially those of minorities. The JDP takes issue with these shortcomings in egalitarianism. Party members accept individualism as a liberal way of promoting liberty, and they view it as an important Islamic value, especially in the promotion of solidarity. However, they have problems about egalitarianism for minority opposition groups.

Leaders of the JDP frequently speak out against the minority’s domination of the majority in Turkey. In this spirit, they characterize their party as a transformative political movement for the common people of Turkey, who by and large support the JDP. The JDP calls for a resurgence of the social majority’s conscience and respect for social values, in order to form a foundation for improved democracy within the country. In this way, the party supports the individual rights of the majority. Additionally, the JDP government enacted changes in the property rights of religious minorities as in took away during the previous governments. On the other hand the toleration of opposition groups can be problematic, as they sometimes pose a threat to national order.

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**In search of a consensus, JDP leaders have promoted the establishment of a global value system, combining the Western values with the values of other groups, such as the Muslims**

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and well-being according to the JDP. In Turkish political culture, there exists a negative connotation to opposition groups, and the Turkish conservative tradition prefers the protection of the majority to that of the individual. Radical democrats would not view this tendency as egalitarian, and even classical liberalism would find objection.

**Participatory democracy:** Supporters of participatory democracy call for direct participation of individuals in decision-making mechanisms at all levels. They see the existence of parliamentary government and universal suffrage as insufficient. These radical democrats believe in participation beyond the classical democratic representation mechanisms, and they place an emphasis on local government and civil society initiatives. They promote a more developed form of representation with expanded political rights and freedoms.

In the case of JDP and Davutoğlu, free parliamentary elections and people’s representation through political parties are the core of democracy. While radical democracy asks something more, in the JDP view, the stability and order of democracy depends upon the representation of the majority as the source of legitimacy. In discussions about the Arab Spring, the Turkish government emphasizes that freedom and democracy depend on the establishment of free elections and representative government, in place of elitist systems. According to Davutoğlu, Arab states have shown that stability is meaningless in the absence of a social legitimacy based on the rule of law, human rights, transparency, accountability, and equality. He asserts the need for reform in Arab governments to accommodate the aspirations of its citizens, in order to promote regional security and stability. In view of these ideas, JDP sympathizers view the party as a government for the masses, instead of select elites. The party also emphasizes the need to incorporate popular Islamic groups and structures as part of a government’s democratic system. Still, Davutoğlu maintains his support for an improved liberal order based on equality and liberty. For this reason, he labeled the Arab Spring as a time of true “spring” and “change.” However, he cautions against formulaic solutions, “Change and dynamics differ from one country to the other. Therefore, a ‘one size fits all’ approach cannot be applied to the countries in transition.”

These ideas promote the freedom of the masses and protection from authoritarianism. Radical liberals differ from Davutoğlu and the JDP in their insistence on the representation of all individuals, even minority opposition groups.

**Social transformation:** Every human being has the potential to change himself and his environment—a belief at the core of social constructivism. In order to have such an effect, people must have the benefit of freedom, based on egalitarianism, solidarity, democracy, and developmentalism. In this context, Davutoğlu and the Foreign Ministry emphasize the issue of underdevelopment in
the third world and the need for reform in effected countries. He asserts the responsibility of developed countries to find solutions to the localized problems of underprivileged countries. He claims that these local difficulties pose threats to peace for the entire world. In this spirit, President Abdullah Gül promoted social transformation as an essential concept for confronting problems in Africa. The president claimed, “The international community has a responsibility to contribute to the democratic, economic and social transformation processes of African countries, and Turkey has made a great effort to provide such support.”

**Conclusion**

In the new millennium, change and reform have emerged as two preeminent concepts in Turkish political discourse. Turkish thinkers have emphasized the importance of democracy and human rights as the foundation of legitimate political activities. For a long time, left-wing movements have referred to equality and justice as two critical concepts for the promotion of a comprehensive democratic consensus. These two concepts have a central role in neo-liberal discourse about the future liberal order.

Liberal ideas progressed with the communication revolution that emphasized by the Frankfurt School raised important questions about reform for a more just world order through more participation and negotiation. These considerations of the world order have dominated the discourse of both radical liberalism and Davutoğlu’s Islamic view. Both perspectives include this focus on the world stage in hopes of establishing an improved power distribution and global justice, on the basis of human rights. Although total equality is a very ambitious goal, global cooperation should be able to establish fairness as a central part of the political order. This fervor for freedom, democracy, and justice has been at the core of radical liberalism’s emergence in world politics. Assistance to underdeveloped countries has become an especially important idea for the protection of global order and security.

Taking part in this effort, Turkey has pushed for an improved world order through diplomacy and multilateralism. Diverging from radical liberalism, Turkish leaders imagine a world order based on an ideological perspective including Islamist and conservative ideas. Turkey speaks for the interests of Muslim people, especially those who have been victimized. In search of a consensus, JDP leaders have promoted the establishment of a global value system, combining the Western values with the values of other groups, such as the Muslims.

Davutoğlu’s foreign policy ideology has both consistencies and contradictions with radical liberalism, and he does not qualify as a pure radical liberal. On
one hand, he has starkly liberal tendencies. He promotes reform in world politics, and he questions the current global order for its concert of democracies, in place of true liberalism. His foreign policy perspective includes new ideas belonging to Liberal Internationalism 3.0, and he has introduced several radical liberal ideas into international discussion. Thus, his ideas for change differ from the views of Turgut Özal with parallels to radical liberalism. As a representative of Turkey, Davutoğlu aspires to play a prominent role in the formation of a new global order and consensus. While there remain continuities with the previous Turkish foreign policy stance, including the attention to national interests and rationalism, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has redefined Turkish policy with a complex blend of radical liberalism and conservative Islamism.

Endnotes
3. Ibid. 25.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Especially, modern liberals such as John Stuard Mill says that, “man as a progressive being” has capacity to develop itself. Ibid.
8. It is important to explain briefly the relationship of post-structuralism and radical liberalism. Post-structuralism is more related with ontological discussions and the shift to post-positivist way of thinking. On the other hand, radical liberal principles are updated versions of liberal principles with a post-structuralist basis.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. p.212.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. p.213.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Peter L. Lichtenstein, op.cit.. p. 333.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
23. Ibid. p. 339
28. Ibid. Please see Maurice Strong’s website, http://www.mauricestrong.net/index.php/renewing-the-united-nations
29. Ibid., p.200.
31. Ibid., pp. 235-236.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 152.
40. It is tightly connected to Turkish-Islam Synthesis which is defined by Mustafa Şen, as “the idea of return to the Turkish ‘national culture’ which is seen as a product of the synthesis between Turkishness and Islam”, Mustafa Şen, “Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of Justice and Development Party”, Turkish Studies Vol.11 no.1, (March 2010) p.62.
42. His explanations at UN summits and his argumentations in his master peace Strategic Depth are full of expressions about this sort of historical change.
43. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik.
44. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım, pp. 6-7.


52. Ibid.

53. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım…, s. 8.

54. Ibid.

55. For more information please look at Richard Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward A Global Politics, (Pensylvania State University, 1995).


61. For example, “Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), held in Jeddah on 29 February-4 March 1972 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-islamic-conference--_oic_.en.mfa


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Bringing the European Union Back on the Agenda of Turkish Foreign Policy

ÖZGE ZİHNİOĞLU*

ABSTRACT The EU has been successfully exercising its conditionality as a key aspect of its enlargement strategy since the 1990s. However, with no accession prospect in sight and the perceived lack of credibility and consistency of the EU’s conditionality, Turkey’s already unequal partnership with Europe has been thrown further off balance. This article argues that this is not the case, as the EU retains its leverage over Turkey, even in the absence of factors that are known as central to the successful implementation of the EU’s conditionality. This article suggests two main reasons. First, despite the rhetoric on the interdependence of Turkish and the EU economy, this interdependence is not on equal footing and the Turkish economy is heavily dependent on the EU. Second, there is rising concern in Turkey over free trade talks between the EU and the United States, with its potential impact on the Turkish economy.

Introduction

At the time of Turkey’s membership application to the European Community in 1987, Turkey’s then prime minister (later president) Turgut Özal, said, “we are in a long and narrow path.” No doubt, the late president’s analogy proved correct, though the path seems to be getting longer and narrower, with no accession prospect in sight. In addition, the EU’s fine-tuned strategy of conditionality, a key aspect of its enlargement policy, has lost its credibility and consistency in the eyes of both Turkish officials and public opinion. The absence of credible conditionality and the EU’s ‘gate-keeping’ role may seem to have strengthened Turkey’s hand vis-à-vis the EU. But this article argues that the EU retains its leverage over Turkey due to a heavy dependence of the Turkish economy on the EU combined with the concerns stemming from the free trade talks between the EU and the United States. This article suggests that both these factors taken together, in particular the recent revival of the free trade talks, are likely to bring the EU accession back on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy.

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Insight Turkey Vol. 16 / No. 3 / 2014, pp. 149-164
Accession Process and the EU’s Conditionality

Conditionality is the key mechanism used by the EU to influence the existing practices and structures in the candidate and accession countries. For the first time, in the 1990s, conditionality became the EU’s accession strategy. It was initially applied to the central and eastern European countries and was rapidly considered an effective means of influence for the 2004 and 2007 enlargements.1

Conditionality as a policy may take different forms. The EU’s conditionality is based on the strategy of ‘reinforcement by reward.’ Under this strategy, a social actor (in other words, the EU) tries to change or control the behavior of another social actor (in other words, candidate and/or accession countries) through granting or withholding rewards. The two main ‘rewards’ the EU employed in its conditionality to central and eastern European countries are assistance (financial and/or technical) and institutional ties.2

Conditionality became more tangible in Copenhagen European Council in 1993, where the EU leaders set out the conditions for EU membership. These conditions, which came to be known as the Copenhagen Criteria, require that a country has a stable, democratic political system, a functioning market economy, and the ability to apply the EU law as well as European norms and principles. The EU further clarified these conditions through a pre-accession strategy based on the Accession Partnerships that provided for a detailed list of tasks and measures to be undertaken by accession countries. Although conditionality may appear as something fixed, it is indeed a dynamic process.3

Conditionality, by nature, entails an unequal partnership. While conditionality can have uneven effects over each applicant country due to several reasons,4 the EU nonetheless should have sufficient leverage over these countries to sustain this partnership in an effective and productive manner. This is particularly important considering the ‘time inconsistency’ between the expected reforms and the actual delivery of the benefits.5 For this purpose, the EU’s conditionality involves different processes and tools to influence the institutional structures and transformations of the applicant countries. Quite expectedly, the most powerful tool of EU conditionality and one that provides the EU its leverage, is the EU’s gate-keeping role, in other words, the power to determine when to allow the applicant countries access to further stages in the accession. Other tools and measures of the EU’s conditionality include, benchmarking and monitoring, aid and technical assistance, privileged trade access, provision of legislative and institutional templates, and technical advice.6

Although the EU’s conditionality comes with a considerable amount and value of material and institutional incentives, these incentives alone are usually
not enough to bring about change in the applicant country. A number of additional measures are also necessary for the EU’s conditionality to succeed. There is widespread agreement in the literature that successful conditionality requires, more than any of the additional measures, creditability of the membership incentive. If the membership prospect, being the main incentive (or ‘reward’) of the EU’s conditionality is not explicit, becomes blurred or will not be provided within a reasonable period of time, it may adversely impact the transition process.

Credibility of the conditionality goes hand in hand with consistency, meaning that if criteria other than those spelled in the Copenhagen European Council are enforced to an applicant country, it may hamper the credibility of the membership incentive. This is particularly true for those criteria that have highly symbolic value for the applicant country. In other words, if the credibility and consistency of the ‘reward’ are put into doubt, the applicant country may conclude that either way, it will never receive the reward and hence, will fail to comply with the conditions.

**Turkey and the EU’s Conditionality**

The positive mood that came with the official announcement of Turkey’s candidacy to the EU in 1999 and later with the European Commission’s Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession in 2004 promoted significant changes for improving the legal framework, accompanying the changes in social and political life in Turkey. However, the honeymoon was soon over and despite the few amendments and changes, the reform process in general has lost its pace in late 2006, after the final Harmonisation Package, and approximately one year after the opening of the accession negotiations.

The EU’s conditionality that had thus far functioned somehow smoothly in previous accessions and was believed to be the formula of the EU accession process was now “on the blinks,” in the case of Turkey. Turkey’s accession process difficulties have brought the EU’s conditionality under scrutiny. For one thing, there is a huge question mark over the credibility and consistency of the EU’s conditionality. The references to issues that are not directly related to the Copenhagen Criteria and that have high symbolic value for Turkish national identity, such as the peaceful settlement of disputes with Armenia and Cyprus, significantly contributed to tarnishing the initial positive mood towards the EU accession in Turkey. In addition, the EU’s absorption capacity was
somehow the forgotten criterion of Copenhagen Criteria during the eastern enlargement. However, it was launched again with the European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy in 2005, and came to be referred to quite frequently with respect to Turkey’s accession. Likewise, the open-ended nature of accession negotiations has been emphasized much more during Turkey’s accession process than it had had to central and eastern European countries. Finally, possible referendum for future enlargements (i.e. Turkey’s accession) in France and Austria as well as the insinuation of a ‘privileged partnership’ debate by some EU member states, since 2005, introduced further uncertainty to the already slowly-progressing accession negotiations. These additional measures linked to the membership incentive severely compromised the credibility of the EU’s conditionality in the eyes of both government officials and public opinion in Turkey.

What eroded the credibility and consistency of the EU’s conditionality in Turkey the most is probably the progress of the accession negotiations. Since the start of the accession negotiations in October 2005, only 13 chapters
out of the 33 negotiable chapters have been opened to negotiations and one chapter (Science and Research) has been provisionally closed. The EU General Affairs Council, during its meeting on June 25, 2013, decided to open the negotiations on one more chapter (Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments), though actual negotiations on this chapter started on November 2013, after the European Commission presented its annual progress report.

One of the major issues that brought the accession negotiations to a de facto halt is the ongoing problems with Cyprus. On July 2005, in conjunction with the Additional Protocol extending the Ankara Agreement to those countries that acceded to the EU in 2004, Turkey made a declaration that the signing of the Additional Protocol does not mean the recognition of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ by any means. In response, on December 2006, the EU Council decided not to open negotiations on eight chapters and that no chapters can be provisionally closed until Turkey changes its position. Soon after in 2007, France blocked the opening of negotiations on five chapters on the grounds that they are directly related with membership. Finally, on December 2009, Cyprus declared that it would block the opening of six further chapters. As a result, not only the accession negotiations reached a stagnation point, but also, the EU’s will in this process and accordingly the credibility of the membership reward began to be questioned by Turkish officials and by the public. This is reflected in the public support for Turkey’s accession, in which Turkish people that consider EU membership as something good dropped from 62 percent in 2004 to 41 percent in 2011.

Although the EU’s conditionality comes with a considerable amount and value of material and institutional incentives, these incentives are not enough to bring about change in the applicant country

What Keeps the EU Leverage over Turkey?

While this article acknowledges that conditionality is by nature an unequal partnership, it is also more than a simple equation of compliance and benefits. Indeed, conditionality requires credibility and consistency in the eyes of the applicant country. As such, the afore-discussed developments since the beginning of Turkey’s accession negotiations establish that the credibility and consistency of the EU’s conditionality in Turkey has clearly been shaken. This may suggest that the EU is faltering in this unequal partnership of conditionality in the Turkish case.
In addition, starting in late 2009, the failure of some EU member states—Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—to generate enough economic growth to be able to pay back the bondholders their guarantee has sparked the debt crisis that swept across Europe. The debt crisis was a huge blow to the once called ‘economic giant’ and had a profound impact on the structure and management of the European economies. Turkey followed the Eurozone debt crisis with deep concern not only for economic reasons and for its economic outcomes, but also for its potential impact over its own relations with the EU. When Turkey suffered relatively less damage from the global financial crisis, triggered by the U.S. subprime crisis, it turn out that being out of Eurozone somewhat insulated Turkey from the repercussions of the crisis. Moreover, it led Turkish officials (along with a good part of the public opinion) to feel that Turkey may now have an upper hand in its relations with the EU.

However, this article argues that the EU retains a considerable amount of leverage over Turkey despite the troubles its conditionality strategy has been facing during the accession process, and should the EU use this leverage constructively, the accession process may once again prevail on the agenda of Turkish foreign policymakers. This article suggests two reasons for this continuing leverage. First, the economic and trade relations between the EU and Turkey reveal how heavily the Turkish economy relies upon the EU. The second reason concerns the recent proposals for a free trade agreement between the EU and the United States. Such a transatlantic agreement, if and when it is finalizes, has the potential to form a giant economic bloc between two of Turkey’s major trading partners. Even more importantly, one that Turkey cannot risk being left out of. This section looks into these reasons in more detail.

**Economic and Trade Relations**

With the completion of the transitional stage as set out in the Ankara Association Agreement of 1963, the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU entered into force on January 1, 1996. By all means, the Customs Union constitutes an important stage for Turkey’s integration with the EU. However, unlike what many believe, strong economic ties between Turkey and the EU did not start until as late as the second half of 1990s, after the entry of the Customs Union between the two parties. Indeed, Turkish goods had an ‘entry permit’ to
the then-EC market long before the Customs Unions was concluded. Following the Additional Protocol in 1970, as envisaged by the Ankara Association Agreement, the EU opened the doors for Turkey, gradually reducing industrial tariffs throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By the time Turkey and the EU were negotiating a Customs Union in early 1990s, there were only limited tariff barriers left on few sensitive products. Indeed, ever since the European Economic Community came into being in late 1950s, it has been one of Turkey’s key trading partners.  

This is not to suggest that the Customs Union was an uncalled-for effort with no particular impact. On the contrary, the Customs Union helped deepen the volume of bilateral trade between Turkey and the EU over the past two decades. It is worth mentioning that the Custom Union is not necessarily and always perceived positively by Turkish public opinion. Indeed, ever since its inception, Turkish public opinion has been suspicious of the Customs Union and its contribution to the Turkish economy and thus, the Customs Union served as a rallying point bringing together the anti-EU groups. The aim of this article is not to engage in the debate on whether or not the Customs Union has benefited the Turkish economy or was it a price Turkey had to pay in order to establish closer political ties with the EU. However, this article accepts the opinion that the Customs Union has resulted in ‘trade creation,’ meaning that the elimination of tariffs among the EU and Turkey has led to additional trade and has become welfare enhancing, as it replaced high cost domestic products with low-cost imports. However, it is also true that Turkey has suffered from the so called ‘trade diversion,’ in which case Turkey could not take advantage of replacing the lower-cost imports from the rest of world with additional trade with the EU, as the tariff barriers with the rest of the world remained high. Nevertheless, what is important for the purposes of this article is that the Customs Union further enhanced both the economic ties between Turkey and the EU and also Turkey’s reliance on the EU as a trading partner.

Table 1: Turkey’s Trade with Its Main Partners (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Import Partners</th>
<th>Major Export Partners</th>
<th>Major Trade Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Mil. €</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 EU 27</td>
<td>68,055</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Russia</td>
<td>20,739</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 China</td>
<td>16,580</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 U. S.</td>
<td>11,001</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Iran</td>
<td>9,290</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities18
At the current state of economic relations between the two partners, Turkey is heavily dependent on the EU. The figures are illustrative in this respect. As Table 1 shows, the EU is by far the largest trading partner of Turkey, accounting for 31.7 percent of Turkey’s trade alone, followed by Russia that accounts for less than a quarter of its trade with the EU. Indeed, trade for Turkey with the EU is more than the sum of trade with the following four trading partners – Russia, China, Iran, and the United States. Along similar lines, the EU is also Turkey’s biggest import and export partner. The figures are especially striking with respect to export. The EU amounts to 29.3 percent of Turkey’s total exports, which is approximately 5.4 times more than the exports to Turkey’s second major export partner, Iraq.

On the other hand, Turkey is one of the major trading partners of the EU, but not on the same plane as the EU is for Turkey. Turkey is the EU’s fifth largest export partner, but only 4.5 percent of the total EU exports go to Turkey. Turkey is at an even lower ranking with respect to the EU’s imports, in which case, as the seventh major partner, Turkey accounts for only 2.7 percent of the EU’s total imports. All in all, Turkey is the EU’s sixth major trading partner, holding up a share of only 3.5 percent (see Table 2).

Table 2: The EU’s Trade with Its Main Partners (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Import Partners</th>
<th>Major Export Partners</th>
<th>Major Trade Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Mil. €</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 China</td>
<td>289,915</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Russia</td>
<td>213,212</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 U. S.</td>
<td>205,778</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Switzerland</td>
<td>104,544</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Norway</td>
<td>100,437</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Japan</td>
<td>63,813</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Turkey</td>
<td>47,739</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities

The figures become more meaningful in comparison to one another. While the EU is Turkey’s number one import and export partner, Turkey ranks only as seventh in the EU’s top import and fifth in export markets. On the other hand, the EU’s share in Turkey’s total trade is approximately nine times more than Turkey’s share in the EU’s total trade. Furthermore, Turkey’s trade with the EU has steadily grown, with the exception of a short period between 2008 and 2009, possibly due to the early stages of the Eurozone debt crisis (see Figure 1).
Not only is the EU Turkey’s largest trading bloc, but the individual EU member states are also among Turkey’s top trading partners. Accordingly, five of the top ten countries in Turkey’s export market are EU member states: Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Spain (in ranking order). Of these countries, Germany has enjoyed the highest share in Turkey’s export market over the last decade. In addition, Germany is ranked as the second in the list of Turkey’s major import partners, following Russia. Furthermore, Germany, Italy, France, and Spain are also among the top ten countries in Turkey’s import market.20

Foreign direct investment inflow to Turkey is another key indicator showing the EU’s share and input into the Turkish economy. The geographical breakdown in Table 3 indicates that the EU makes up most of the foreign direct investment inflow to Turkey in comparison to other regions and continents in the world. In 2012, more than 70 percent of the foreign direct investment in Turkey came from the EU. It is true there has been a relative decrease in this exceedingly high share in comparison to the previous years—which had reached as high as 78 percent in 2009. However, this decrease partly stems from the Eurozone financial crisis. The figures both as value and as percentage may well increase once the EU recovers from the crisis.

Apart from the United States, the countries from which most of the foreign direct investment inflows to Turkey originate are EU member states. These

Figure 1: The EU’s Trade with Turkey

Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2013
countries include, but are not limited to Austria, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.21

Table 3: Geographical Breakdown of Foreign Direct Investment Inflow to Turkey (2008–2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>January-October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU countries</td>
<td>6,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU Countries</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European Countries (Non-EU)</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African countries</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central-South America and Carribeans</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near and Middle East countries</td>
<td>1,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf countries</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Near &amp; Middle East countries</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy22

It is also striking to see that the EU countries hold the largest share in the number of foreign owned enterprises (see Table 4). It is true that the EU countries held a higher share (around 50 percent) in the number of foreign owned enterprises only five to six years ago and that the EU’s share gradually declined due to both the EU financial crisis and Turkey’s efforts to open to new markets. Nevertheless, more than 36 percent of foreign owned companies are still owned by EU countries—a share difficult to overlook.

All these figures illustrate not only how integrated the Turkish and the EU economies are, but also, and more importantly for the purposes of this article, that Turkey is comparatively much more dependent on the EU for its trade and economy. The EU is by far the largest economic partner, impacting Turkey’s economy – one that Turkey cannot afford to lose in any foreseeable future.
Table 4: Geographical Breakdown of the Number of Foreign Owned Enterprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>January-October</th>
<th>1954-2013/October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU countries</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU countries</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries (non-EU)</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African countries</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America, Caribbeans</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near and Middle East countries</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Rep. of Chine</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>2,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy

Towards a Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the United States

The idea of transatlantic trade partnership is nothing new. As early as 1995, the former EU Trade Commissioner, Leon Brittan called for a free trade agreement between the EU and the U.S. However, a more conclusive step to that end came almost two decades after. Following nearly two years of preparation, the United States and the EU started talks in July 2013 with the goal of achieving a broad and comprehensive free trade agreement.

Reasons behind the recently reinvigorated freed trade talks are diverse. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, strongly emphasize the economic growth expected to result from this agreement that would bind up the wounds of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis. In his single sentence endorsement of the free trade agreement during his State of the Union address on February 12th, 2013, President Barack Obama defended the launching of the “talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the
European Union – because trade that is free and fair across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” On the other side of the Atlantic, José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, also expressed clear support to a trade agreement by claiming that “trade is the most economic way of promoting growth,” which both the United States and the EU need. The heads of leading EU member states, such as British Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, equally, endorsed a transatlantic trade deal to stimulate the struggling European economies.

Emerging economies in Latin America and Asia, in particular the rising economic power of China, foster greater incentive pushing the United States and the EU towards a trade agreement, as these “new comers on the block” threaten the economic supremacy of the United States and the EU. In the words of the EU’s trade commissioner Karel De Gucht, these talks are “about our place — and by our place I mean the United States and Europe — within a decade on the world economic scene.” And hence, such a broad agreement could help ensure that it is the Transatlantic partnership, and not China, that sets the standards on various issues from product safety to intellectual property.

The United States and the EU are major trading partners of one another’s and trade among both partners already accounts for almost half the world’s global economic output. If the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership comes into being, it is expected to cover about 30 percent of global trade and 20 percent of global foreign direct investment, which could boost U.S. and EU economic growth by more than $100 billion annually and add some two million new jobs. Although some find these figures exaggerated, they emphasize that the expected additional economic output will come in the short-term, therefore suggesting that “this trade agreement is not about promoting prosperity for all… [but about] providing powerful industry lobbies with an opportunity to circumvent the normal political process.”

Following the negotiations launched in Washington in July 2013, a second negotiation round took place in November, and a third one in December 2013. Both sides have expressed their desire not to spend a lot of time negotiating and hope to reach a finalized agreement by the end of 2014. Although the similarities between American and European culture and legal systems make harmonization of regulations possible, this deadline may be unrealistic. This is mainly because of the sensitive issues on both sides like the “Buy American” initiative, the EU’s aversion to genetically modified crops as well as EU privacy and data protection rules that put U.S. technology companies at a disadvantage.

Tariffs on goods traveling across the Atlantic are already low, in average about 3 percent, which is because both sides impose different forms of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs). Therefore, the negotiations are likely to go beyond tariffs and try and resolve these NTBs. While there is not yet any talk of establishing a joint regulatory agency, the negotiations may also focus on reducing and/or preventing regulatory barriers to trade in different areas.31

In Turkey, over the past several months, some have raised concerns about a future Transatlantic free trade agreement. Turkey’s concerns are not without foundation. Turkey is in a unique position, as being a member of the EU’s Customs Union without being a full member of the EU. Consequently, the goods of third parties that sign free trade agreements with the EU are able to enter the Turkish market through the EU without paying any duties. Yet, Turkey does not automatically enjoy those privileges granted to the EU as part of the free trade deal. Should the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership come to fruition, this would create an imbalanced situation for Turkey. This is because Turkey will be subject to one of the largest free trade deals, without being part of the negotiations. Moreover, Turkey would be subjected to unfair competition in the trade and industry sectors. Earlier in May 2013, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said that “We will not only keep Turkey informed of every step of the negotiation with the EU, but we believe that if in fact, we can get by some of the divisions and the differences we have with regard to free trade agreements, that if we can get there before the time we settle the EU new trade agreement, that it will be a great opportunity for Turkey.”32 However, such rhetoric will neither alleviate the concerns of Turkish officials, businessmen and industrialists nor it will not bring an easy solution to this complicated problem.

Conclusion

Just as any other practice of conditionality, the EU’s enlargement strategy since the 1990s is also one of an unequal partnership between the EU and the applicant country. In this partnership, the EU has successfully exercising its leverage over the applicant countries by virtue of its “gate keeping” role. This equation proved successful during the eastern enlargement of the EU. Then-applicant (later accession) countries, eager to access to further stages in the accession process, had bowed to the demands of the EU, without putting up much of a fight. Other tools and measures of the EU conditionality, including aid and technical assistance, privileged trade access, provision of legislative and institutional templates, and technical advice helped the EU to strengthen its hand during this process.
Despite appearances, the EU’s conditionality is more than a simple carrot and stick approach. Earlier theoretical and empirical studies have emphasized the need for additional measures for the EU’s conditionality to succeed. Domestic factors, including the domestic costs of the requested reforms, receptiveness of conditions, and preferences of the “veto players” at home, are important for the successful implementation of conditionality. However, it is the credibility and consistency of the conditionality – or lack of it – that has been determinative in Turkey’s accession process to the EU and has thrown the EU’s conditionality off balance.

The credibility and consistency of the EU’s conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey has increasingly been questioned during Turkey’s prolonged candidacy. The slowly-progressing accession negotiations along with the eastern enlargement’s forgotten criteria of the EU’s absorption capacity as well as debates on privileged partnership led both the officials and the public to lose faith in the attainability of the membership reward. This article argues that the EU retains its leverage over Turkey, despite the loss of credibility and consistency of the EU’s conditionality as well as the current stagnation of Turkey accession process. However, this leverage may in turn be instrumental in reviving the accession process and reincorporating it into the agenda of Turkish foreign policy makers. This article suggests two main reasons for the EU’s continuing leverage. First, despite the rhetoric on the interdependence of Turkey and the EU economy, this interdependence is not on equal footing. The figures clearly demonstrate that the Turkish economy’s dependence over the EU is much greater than the EU’s dependence on the Turkish market. While it is true that Turkey is an important trade partner for the EU, it is an indispensable part of Turkish economy, giving it a preponderant and even a dominant negotiation position. Such uneven economic interdependence strengthens the EU’s hands vis-à-vis Turkey.

Second, the EU and the United States have launched the talks for what may become the largest free trade deal in history. Any third country with strong trade ties and geographical proximity may want to be included in this deal. However, Turkey’s ongoing customs union with the EU would already make Turkey a part of the final deal, while Turkey may not be part of the negotiations. This is because the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU allows the goods of the third parties that have a free trade agreement with the EU to be able to enter the Turkish market through the EU without paying any duties, while not
automatically entitling the same right to Turkey. As the achievements of this deal-to-be would have direct impact upon Turkey’s trade and hence, economy Turkey has been looking to both the EU and the United States to alleviate its concerns.

The growing resentment against the credibility of the EU’s conditionality along with the current stagnation of the accession process have created the illusion that the EU’s leverage over Turkey has diminished. This article argued and discussed that this is not the case. While the EU may not be resorting to its leverage in appearance, it would hardly go unnoticed in the halls of Turkish bureaucracy. If used effectively, this leverage may be the right instrument to help Turkey proceed along the “long and narrow path.”

Endnotes


8. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” p. 666


12. Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations

13. Agriculture and Rural Development (it had been blocked also due to Additional Protocol), Economic and Monetary Policy, Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments, Financial and Budgetary Provisions, Institutions


17. Ülgen and Zahariadis, “The Future of Turkish-EU Trade Relations Deepening vs Widen ing,” pp. 3-4.


22. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy: Tables.

23. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy: Tables.


Can the Kurdish Left Contribute to Turkey’s Democratization?

ÖDÜL CELEP*

ABSTRACT The current peace process regarding Turkey’s Kurdish question could pave the way for the normalization of politics and democratization in Turkey if the existing opportunities are not missed. The major actors that represent the Kurdish left in Turkey, the PKK and the HDP (formerly BDP), are all equally significant parts of the peace process. The HDP in particular has the potential to turn into a constructive actor for Turkey’s democratization in the near future. This article argues that the Kurdish left of the democratic, parliamentary stage, lately the HDP, could contribute to Turkey’s democratization if it can fulfill the libertarian left policy space in Turkish politics, which has long been abandoned by all existing political parties.

Introduction

The ongoing peace process between the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Party) government and the Kurdish left, represented by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) and the Democratic Party of the Peoples (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), the neo-successor of the former Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), is an extraordinary achievement. After over thirty years of armed clashes between Turkey’s civilian governments/military forces and the PKK’s paramilitary groups, both sides have agreed to end the fighting and permanently establish peace. Despite the recent corruption charges against the AK Party government and the AKP-Gülen split within the conservative right, the peace process retains the commitment of its major actors: the AKP, BDP-HDP and PKK. The conflict between the AK Party government and Fethullah Gülen’s group (Cemaat) has far from undermined the dedication to peacemaking. The purpose of this article is to shed light on the politics and rhetoric of the Kurdish left with legal, parliamentary status,

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Insight Turkey Vol. 16 / No. 3 / 2014, pp. 165-180
Since the transition from the ashes of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to a modern Turkish nation-state in 1923, the Kurdish question has been an ‘existential’ issue for Turkey.

namely the BDP-HDP political line, and explain how it can contribute to Turkey’s democratization from an objective perspective.

Though the AK Party and the BDP-HDP line come from anti-establishment roots, the two political traditions do not have much in common. The AK Party defines itself as a ‘conservative democratic’ movement. Although ‘conservative democracy’ sounds like a novel term, it is hardly a new concept in Turkish politics. The term marks a reinterpretation of an existing political tradition in Turkey’s long-standing center-right and a break away from the old-fashioned religious populism of the former Islamist right.1 For instance, while the former Islamist right perceived the EU as a Christian club, the AK Party embraced the Republican project of integration with the West and Turkey’s EU membership process.2 Furthermore, the AK Party amalgamated the pro-Islamist and pro-Western foreign policy schools by embracing the idea that Turkey belongs to both Islamic and European civilizations and could represent the Islamic civilization within the EU.3

In contrast, the BDP-HDP line represents a progressive, left-wing party tradition. An observer party member of the Socialist International, the former BDP was a secular party with no defense of traditional morality, religious principles or family values. Nevertheless, the Kurdish left-wing parties have been regarded as regional/ethnic movements due to the fact that their priority has been the rights and liberties of Kurdish people in Turkey. On the one hand, the Kurdish left party tradition started out as a regional movement and concentrated in the Kurdish-populated east and southeast regions of Turkey. On the other hand, it has recently embraced a wider spectrum of issues including equal citizenship, democratization, freedom of expression, social justice, gender equality, ecology and labor rights. Furthermore, the BDP-HDP is the only parliamentary actor to have actively defended LGBT rights in Turkey.

The BDP recently founded a new group, the Democratic Party of the Peoples (HDP), for the long run purpose of creating an all-inclusive, umbrella party that would not give the image of a Kurdish regionalist party or ‘a party of Kurds.’ The BDP and the HDP ran separately in the March 2014 local elections in the East and West respectively. After the local elections, the BDP dissolved itself and joined the HDP, while a group decided to maintain the old party by changing its official title to Democratic Regions Party (Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi, DBP) as a regional cadre party for the long-run purpose of ‘democratic autonomy’ of Turkey’s Kurdish-populated regions. The HDP is expected to be-
come a party of Turkey while the DBP is not planned to contest local or general elections. In the first presidential elections of Turkey, The HDP nominated its co-president Demirtaş, who raised the party's traditional 6-7 percent in Turkey to over 9 percent, which was a breakthrough in the electoral history of the Kurdish left-wing party tradition.

Although the BDP-HDP line shows signs of evolving into parties of Turkey today, the Kurdish left movement did start out as an ethnic/regional actor. In the broader context, the party family known as 'ethnic/regional’ constitutes the most ideologically disperse group of political parties in democratic systems. Social scientists have debated whether ethnic/regional parties play a constructive or negative role in democratic systems and democratization. This article puts forward the idea that the Kurdish left possesses the potential to play a positive role in Turkey’s democratization process. The extent to which today's HDP can contribute to democratization in Turkey depends on whether it remains a regional actor in the Kurdish-populated East and Southeast or goes further to embrace larger social strata and plays a broader progressive role in Turkey.

The Political History of Turkey’s Kurdish Left

The ‘Kurdish left’ (Kürt solu) is a novel term. Neither the BDP-HDP nor the PKK refers to itself as the ‘Kurdish left.’ The term is used in the context of this article with not an ethnic but political connotation. Although the current Kurdish party tradition started out as a relatively strict ethnic/regional movement, it later showed a willingness to diversify its base with non-Kurdish progressive groups such as independent socialists, ecologists, urban feminists and non-Kurdish minorities. Today’s Kurdish left is an outcome of Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish issue and its socio-political evolution as well as the Turkey's democratization history. It took quite a long time after the proclamation of the new Turkish state in 1923 for the Kurdish awareness to develop itself into a political movement and subsequently a political party.

Since the transition from the ashes of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to a modern Turkish nation-state in 1923, the Kurdish question has been an ‘existential’ issue for Turkey. The radical transformation from the Ottoman state to a new Turkish nation-state broke some institutional traditions that connected the Turkish cultural ‘center’ with the ‘periphery’ that included the Kurds. The Turkification and secularization processes of the early Republican years led to the emergence of resistance movements as early as 1925 with Sheikh Said Rebellion and other social unrests during the 1930s. These events did not mean anything more than rebellion, tribal resistance, backwardness, banditry and reactionarism (gericilik) to the early Republican elites. All Kurdish uprisings
were silenced through violent suppression by the state-led security forces. For decades to come, the identity or ‘Kurdishness’ of the Kurdish question in Turkey was largely overlooked by the political establishment.8

The emergence of Kurdish political awareness at the party level can be traced back to the rise of radical left-wing parties after the 1960 coup and the subsequent 1961 Constitution, which created a libertarian environment for the formation of new political actors in Turkey. In fact, the very first party that voiced the ‘Kurdish reality’ in Turkey was not a Kurdish party. The first party to raise the existence of Kurds and an independent Kurdish identity at the national stage was the electorally weak yet politically loud Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP). Founded in 1961 by a dozen labor union leaders, the TİP was the first electorally relevant party to openly embrace socialism. The TİP defended a socialist economic system as opposed to a free market system, ‘democracy and freedoms’ rather than restrictions on individual liberties and legal-political censorship, as well as an independent foreign policy instead of unconditionally friendly relations with the US and NATO in the Cold War context. The TİP also advocated Turkey’s independence by abrogating all Turkey-US and Turkey-NATO treaties.9

The TİP organized ‘Meetings of the East’ (Doğu Mitingleri) in a number of Kurdish-populated provinces in the East and Southeast, including Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Tunceli (Dersim) and Batman, in 1967. During the early 1960s, the TİP’s program contained sensitive language about Turkey’s ‘Eastern’ (Kurdish) problem. Although the party denied regionalism and territorial separatism on all accounts, the TİP’s program mentioned that the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey were “hardship areas” (mahrumiyet bölgeleri), particularly with respect to economic and cultural conditions. Furthermore, it was asserted that people who spoke Kurdish and Arabic and those from the Alevi denomination were discriminated against in Turkey.10 The TİP further reinforced its stance on the Kurdish identity in a resolution adopted during the fourth party congress in October 1970. The TİP resolution declared that the “natural and requisite revolutionary duty” of the party included support for the struggle of
The emergence of Kurdish political awareness at the party level can be traced back to the rise of radical left-wing parties after the 1960 coup and the subsequent 1961 Constitution.

The Kurdish people, their constitutional citizenship rights and the realization of all other democratic desires and hopes. After the 1971 military memorandum, the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) shut down the party on the account of violating the principle of the state’s integrity and indivisibility of its territory. The TİP was re-established with the same title in 1975, but as a far more electorally marginal and orthodox Communist movement.

Although the 1980 coup and the subsequent military junta regime (1980-83) banned all existing political movements, the major target was the left, which was subject to political repression throughout the 1980s. The vacuum left by the TİP party tradition in Turkey was only filled a decade later by a variety of fringe radical left-wing parties together with a novel but definitely non-fringe Kurdish left-wing party tradition, which remained on the political stage for much longer. Fringe left-wing parties included the left-libertarian Party of Freedom and Solidarity (Özgürlik ve Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP) and Equality and Democracy Party (Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, EDP), the relatively authoritarian Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP), the socialist pro-Kurdish Party of Labor (Emeğin Partisi, EMEP), and many others. Among the radical left, the most visible and only politically relevant party tradition proved to be the Kurdish left, starting with the People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP) in the early 1990s until today’s HDP (see Table 1).

The current Kurdish left-wing party tradition dates back to the early 1990s with the formation of the HEP, the first electorally relevant Kurdish left-wing party in Turkey’s recent political history. It emerged as a splinter group of ten representatives from the center-left Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP). Founded officially on June 7, 1990, the HEP’s primary demands included the extension of Kurds’ linguistic, expression and publication rights, allowing education in the Kurdish language, ending the state of emergency law (Olağanüstü Hal, OHAL) and village guard (köy koruculuğu) system in the east and southeast regions, as well as labor rights such as the right to strike with collective bargaining. The HEP contested the 1991 parliamentary elections under the SHP’s ticket and received 22 out of 450 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM).
The controversy of the Kurdish left party tradition is rooted in its refusal to disassociate itself from the PKK and refer to it as a ‘terrorist organization,’ which is a serious defection from the official state discourse. The HEP’s formation and parliamentary entry led to a highly controversial polarization between the party and nearly all other right-wing conservative and nationalist parties. Some HEP deputies switched to Kurdish language during their oath-taking in November 1991 and later displayed symbols associated with the PKK. These actions triggered a legal process that ended with the closure of the HEP by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of cultivating social differences for the purpose of destroying the inseparable unity between the Turkish state and its people, and becoming a center of illegal activity for the PKK.13

Table 1 presents the entire series of left-wing pro-Kurdish parties founded and later banned by the Constitutional Court. During the legal process of the HEP’s closure, the same political group founded the Freedom and Democracy Party (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi, ÖZDEP), but the Supreme Court of Appeals Prosecutor’s office (Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı) began a parallel closure lawsuit against the ÖZDEP on similar accusations. After the ÖZDEP’s closure in 1993, the same political group founded the Freedom and Equality Party (Özgürlük ve Eşitlik Partisi, ÖZEP) in order to merge with the newly founded Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP). The DEP cadres were divided into moderate and radical factions, with the latter maintaining more control over the party’s political discourse. With almost no sensitivity to mainstream public opinion in Turkey, the DEP’s actions proved to be even more radical and controversial than its predecessor, the HEP.14 Eventually, the DEP was also shut down by the Constitutional Court on similar accounts.

The next primary successor of the Kurdish left party tradition was the People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP), which was founded in June 1994. The HADEP did not participate in the 1994 municipal elections as a show of protest against the political establishment and electoral laws in Turkey, which its members found disproportionately unfair. The HADEP was later succeeded by the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP), then the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) which was shut down in 2009, and Peace and Democracy Party, the BDP. Most recently, the BDP decided to dissolve itself and join the HDP. (see Table 1).
The AK Party government took several legal reforms to acknowledge the Kurdish identity and culture in Turkey. In the summer of 2009, the AK Party government initiated a process called ‘democratic opening’ for the purpose of normalizing and desecuritizing the Kurdish issue and providing a resolution through democratic and civilian means. Despite skepticism about the sincerity of the AK Party government, the spirit of peace deal with the Kurdish left has been maintained. Although the term ‘democratic opening’ is no longer a salient agenda item, as of late there has been a debate on the ‘democratization package’ within the larger picture of the ‘peace process.’ Erdoğan recently announced this package, which includes new legislation to make it easier for small parties to receive treasury funds, new membership and assembly rights, the legalization of political propaganda in languages other than Turkish (i.e., Kurdish), strengthening of legislation to protect against hate crimes and respect for the individual sphere, as well as the legalization of education in the Kurdish language in private schools. Accordingly, the most recent democratization package in March 2014 indeed legalized the use of Kurdish for political campaigns and as education language in private schools, lifted bans on the use of former Kurdish names for formerly ‘Turkified’ settlement places, and declined the minimum national vote share requirement for political parties to receive treasury funds from seven to three percent, which made it possible for the BDP to benefit from treasury funds.
During its first term and in accordance with EU harmonization reforms, the AK Party government adopted a series of reforms that involved the extension of cultural and language rights to Turkey’s Kurds. During the AK Party’s second term, the state television institution, TRT, started to broadcast a public channel, TRT-Şeş, which broadcast in the Kurdish dialects of Kurmancî, Sorani and Zazakî for the first time in Turkey’s Republican history. Printing in the Kurdish language and Kurdish literature was a priority of the AK Party government’s ministry of culture.

Despite all these developments, many Kurds still believe that the reforms must continue with socioeconomic improvement, furthering of democratic rights and the recognition of the Kurdish identity. Some of the democratic achievements on the cultural front were overshadowed by mass detentions of members of the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, KCK), an organization founded by the PKK. Selahattin Demirtaş, the former BDP co-president, declared that the democratization package was “nothing novel” but a reformulation of what has already been achieved through political struggles on the streets. Demirtaş criticized the weakness of the democratization package on the Alevi’s culture and identity, particularly its silence on Cemevis, the gathering and holy places of the Alevi-Bektashi culture in Turkey. Emphasizing the density of low-income people and poverty conditions among the Kurdish population, Demirtaş denounced the limited provision of Kurdish education in private schools for the wealthy strata only.

Demirtaş also criticized the AK Party for failing to eliminate the 10 percent national electoral threshold, which has restricted the electoral opportunities of Kurdish left parties since its formulation after the 1980 coup. Indeed, the national vote share of the Kurdish left since the early 1990s has been around 5-6 percent, which is significant but still below the national threshold. In order to bypass the threshold, the Kurdish left devised an electoral strategy of running with independent candidates, to whom the national threshold rules do not apply, in the 2007 and 2011 elections. The Kurdish left contested the 2007 elections with a list of independent candidates entitled “Candidates of One Thousand Hopes” (Bin Umut Adayları) under the umbrella of the DTP and another group of fringe radical left-wing parties. The Kurdish left pursued a similar electoral strategy with “Labor Democracy and Freedom Bloc” (Emek, Demokrasi ve Özgürlük Bloku) candidates in 2011, this time under the BDP’s umbrella and a variety of fringe left-wing movements.

Although the Kurdish question has been the primary axis of the AK Party-BDP political conflict, the divergence between the two parties on this question reflects the differences in their broader vision on human rights, democracy, multiculturalism, personal freedoms and identity issues. The BDP has developed a largely progressive political discourse in its criticism of the AK Party, reflecting the lan-
guage of the libertarian left in European democracies. It is this left-libertarian soul of politics that Turkey lacks in its party system. The essence of the Kurdish left’s contribution to Turkey’s democratization therefore lies in its left-libertarian elements, such as gender equality, freedom of expression, decentralization of power, the environment and grassroots democracy.

One major weapon that the former BDP used against the AK Party was its fairly intelligent and articulate progressive political discourse. Furthermore, today’s BDP is the most internally democratic party in the TBMM. Contrary to the other charismatic male led parties, the BDP was the only party with two ‘co-presidents’ (eşbaşkan) of different genders, Selahattin Demirtaş and Gültan Kışanak. The new HDP has implemented the same policy with Sebahat Tuncel and Ertuğrul Kürkçü as the first co-presidents, and today with Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, a woman. The BDP was also the only party that applied a gender quota to recruit more women. Among the existing parliamentary parties, the BDP-HDP line has had the highest seat share of women deputies in Turkey’s national legislature.

During the 2011 parliamentary election season, the motto of the Kurdish left centered on the theme of ‘Democratic Republic’ (Demokratik Cumhuriyet), whereby Turks and Kurds would constitute the “two founding communities.”²² The party increased its parliamentary seats decisively from 22 with the DTP in 2007 to 36 with the BDP in 2011, a major electoral achievement. Recently, the BDP voiced its demand for the decentralization of Turkey’s administrative system with a redistribution of administrative powers to local governments and municipalities. The BDP also called for ‘democratic autonomy’ (demokratik özerklik) on the grounds that people in the East and Southeast should be able to govern themselves in internal domestic affairs. The BDP elite generally put forth the idea that democratic autonomy is a project to bind the people of Turkey together, rather than undermining its territorial integrity. Although the project has not yet been open to a democratic discussion in the country, the concept reflects a demand for self-determination in internal affairs and domestic policy, while being connected to the center (Ankara) on foreign affairs. Gültan Kışanak, the newly elected mayor of Diyarbakır, recently expressed their municipal administration’s request to receive a share from the petroleum and other energy sources produced in the region as a part of their democratic autonomy project.²³

Systematic analyses of party ideology and rhetoric often require a comprehensive examination of political parties’ written manifestos that are publicized before general elections.²⁴ In these documents, parties extensively map out their
Many Kurds still believe that the reforms must continue with socioeconomic improvement, furthering of democratic rights and the recognition of the Kurdish identity.
 regional and global terms, which reflects the foreign policy understanding of the radical left of the 1970s in Turkey.

In a more recent party document (e-bulletin), it is stated that ambiguous concepts, such as ‘morality’ and ‘public order,’ are not to be used to restrict basic freedoms and rights in the new constitution. The text also reveals a social democratic, even socialist, philosophy owing to its demand for free healthcare, education and housing for everyone, as well as its defense of labor rights such as collective bargaining and solidarity strikes. In addition, there is a call to the abolishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) in favor of a more decentralized structure of religious communities with more autonomy. The BDP e-bulletin also demands the abolishment of compulsory religion/Islamic education at schools and recognition of the right to conscientious objection (vici’dani red hakkı). It also presents opposition to climate change, the destruction of nature and habitats, and calls for protection against the threat posed by all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

In harmony with its adherence to equal citizenship, the Kurdish left has prioritized the issue of gender equality in its platforms. The BDP openly opposes all types of patriarchal policies and traditional practices that disadvantage women in society. For instance, Selma Irmak, the HDP Şırnak representative, recently released a column in the BDP-leaning daily newspaper, Özgür Gündem (Free Agenda), in support of Fatma Salman Kotan, the AKP’s female deputy from the province of Ağrı who was subjected to violence by her husband. Arguing that violence against women is an issue above political parties and ideologies, Irmak showed unconditional support for Kotan and emphasized on women’s universal solidarity. Irmak criticized both the AKP government and Prime Minister Erdoğan for pursuing a hypocritical policy on women’s issues.

The Kurdish left has been the most vocal parliamentary actor on the rights of sexual minorities in Turkey. Sebahat Tuncel from the Kurdish left became the first deputy to bring the problems faced by the LGBT community in Turkey to the TBMM. In her written question to PM Erdoğan in 2010, Tuncel raised the issue of LGBT rights within the broader context of patriarchy, traditional moralism, homophobia and heterosexism in Turkey. Around that time, Aliye Kavaf, the AKP minister responsible for family and women’s rights, referred to homosexuality as “a biological disease to be cured.” Referring to Kavaf’s anti-gay statement, Tuncel raised the fact that homosexuality is no longer considered deviant behavior by international institutions (i.e., World Health Organization) as well as respected psychologist and psychiatric associations in Turkey and the US.

One unique aspect of the Kurdish left should be emphasized. Although the Kurdish left movement has secular left-wing origins, the BDP’s pluralism accommodates religious-conservative figures as well. For instance, Altan Tan, the current
HDP representative for the province of Diyarbakır, defines himself a follower of Sharia (Şeriat), Islamic moral code and law. In his recent book, Tan criticizes ‘secularist’ (laikçi) Kurdish intellectuals who claim Kurds’ true religion is not Islam but Zoroastrianism (Zerdüştlük). In his criticism of the Kurdish secular intelligentsia, Tan contextualizes Islam as the true historical faith of the Kurdish people and demands respect for the faithful from Kurdish secularists. Nevertheless, Tan’s opinions on Islam do not represent the majority of the Kurdish left.

The Kurdish left has not perceived the concept of ‘religion’ in abstract, faith-based and theological terms, but rather in the broader and concrete framework of earthly cultural rights. İsmail Beşikçi, a well-known progressive and pro-Kurdish intellectual, raises the argument that all people of the Middle East have used the religion of Islam for their national interests, including Arabs, Persians and Turks. In fact, the BDP is broadly neutral on faith issues: neither anti-clerical nor religion-driven. Its non-reactive attitude towards religion is also a rational strategy as the electoral base of the Kurdish left is mostly Kurds, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims belonging to the Shafi school, with some from the Alevi denomination. Sunni Muslim Kurds are generally known to be observing, pious people and appealing to them requires a certain level of connection with Islam.

The Kurdish left has never acquired ‘coalition potential’ for a variety of reasons including its controversial relations with the PKK. Nevertheless, when the political establishment showed signs of accommodation in legal and parliamentary terms, it behaved responsibly. With the 2007 and 2011 general elections, the Kurdish left won enough parliamentary seats to become an effective political actor. Despite its lack of government experience, the BDP has shown signs of intra-parliamentary cooperation in a variety of TBMM group work since 2007. This includes commissions in which the DTP-BDP participated, such as the justice commission, the constitutional consensus commission and the gender equal-opportunity commission.

**Conclusion**

Turkey’s democracy and party system have always been volatile and open to rapid and abrupt changes. It is fair to say that watching Turkish politics is like watching a suspenseful movie. Although the system has rather centralized and top-down decision-making structures, the political party culture is quite dynamic. There is an observable trend in Turkey’s electoral politics: the majority of voters have been casting their ballot for conservative, right-wing political parties. With the formation and subsequent rise to power of the AK Party in 2002, as well as its continued electoral strength in the following parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011, Turkey has come quite close to a predominant party
The BDP has developed a largely progressive political discourse in its criticism of the AK Party, reflecting the language of the libertarian left in European democracies

Despite the political turmoil, however, both the AK Party and the actors of the Kurdish left (BDP-HDP, PKK and Öcalan) have demonstrated a commitment to maintaining the soul of the peace process. Although the PKK unilaterally halted its withdrawal from Turkish territory due to the AK Party government’s failure to fulfill its promises for democratization and the resolution of the Kurdish question, the ceasefire was maintained. Furthermore, Öcalan refrained from blindly supporting the allegedly Cemaat-backed corruption charges against the AK Party government and called those charges “a coup attempt targeting the government.” Backing the AK Party against those charges, Öcalan openly vowed not to “add fuel to the fire.” It is possible that the understanding of Kurdish and Turkish identities are evolving from a zero-sum relationship, where the two are defined as ‘oppositional,’ to a positive-sum relationship, in which the two are seen ‘complementary.’

It is true that the BDP-HDP’s politics is controversial and problematic at times. Despite some of the legitimate criticisms, such as the PKK’s excessive oversight system with one dominant party and three opposition parties. The role played by the BDP-HDP line and the response of the AK Party and other parties are important in the context of resolving Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish question.

In 2013-14, there were unpredictable developments in Turkish politics, such as the Gezi Park protests and the subsequent debates on Erdoğan’s authoritarianism; Erdoğan’s meeting with Masoud Barzani in Diyarbakır along with famous Kurdish singers Şivan Perwer and İbrahim Tatlıses in November 2013; the major split within the conservative right, namely between the AK Party and the Gülen Movement; and the popular election of Erdoğan as Turkey’s 12th President after Abdullah Gül’s term ended in August 2014. Some of these developments uncovered the bitterness between the Kurdish left and the AK Party government. For instance, during the Gezi Park protests, the Kurds experienced a dilemma of their own, stuck among the pro-peace AK Party, the Gezi activists, which included some segments of the anti-Erdoğan secular and radical left, and other Gezi protesters who opposed to everything about the peace process (i.e., neo-nationalists). The BDP did not support the Gezi protests as a political party, but individual BDP members participated in the demonstrations. The BDP gave a mixed reaction to the Erdoğan-Barzani meeting in Diyarbakır, with some elements endorsing the meeting, while others criticized both Erdoğan and Barzani for undermining and ignoring the BDP and the PKK as peace actors.
over the BDP, the BDP’s overly regional focus and its under-institutionalization due to legal restrictions on the movement, the Kurdish left has shown signs of becoming a party of Turkey by embracing issues other than the Kurdish rights. For instance, the BDP contested and won seats with socialists like Ertuğrul Kürkçü from Mersin, as well as the first-ever Syriac deputy of Turkey, Erol Dora, from Mardin. The BDP’s decision to nominate an environmentalist like Şahbal Şenyurt Arınlı from the province of Muğla in the 2011 elections also demonstrated its willingness to go beyond the Kurdish issue and becoming a party of Turkey. The newborn HDP is likely one of the final stages of the Kurdish left’s path from local to universal.

As political conditions developed and party closures occurred less frequently during the 2000s, the Kurdish left became a more ‘normalized’ actor in Turkey’s party politics. The BDP-HDP line currently refers to Öcalan as the leader of the Kurdish people and demands that his prison conditions be rehabilitated. In fact, Öcalan’s personality constitutes an even more significant appeal to the Kurdish left than the PKK as an organization. Under these circumstances, there is no point in expecting the BDP-HDP to disconnect itself from either the PKK or Öcalan. On the contrary, a complete democratization process requires making peace with the Kurdish left altogether, including all of its extensions and representatives. Recently, the new PM Ahmet Davutoğlu, Erdoğan’s successor, expressed his commitment to maintaining the Kurdish peace (resolution) process in his new, slightly revised Ak Party government together with new promises in the future including a new civilian constitution.

Nevertheless, the normalization of the Kurdish left requires a more widespread adoption of the peace process by the other two major parties in parliament, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). With the AKP government’s increasing authoritarianism in all domains of social and political life in Turkey (i.e., the press, social media, the internet and civil society) together with corruption scandals, mass relocations of the police and legal bureaucracy, and complaints about judicial degeneration, the normalization of politics has become essential for Turkey. The BDP has been recently criticized for toning down its sharp language against the AK Party government and remaining silent on its authoritarianism. If the CHP and the MHP can take successful steps towards embracing the peace process, the Kurdish left could become a more normalized actor and less dependent on the AK Party, which will likely contribute to the normalization of the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
The Kurdish left has the opportunity to become a more mainstream actor in Turkish politics if the current dedication to the peace process is maintained and the Kurdish question is normalized. The three major parties – AK Party, CHP and MHP – cannot produce libertarian left-wing policies for various reasons. In its current political shape, the Kurdish left fills an important vacuum in Turkish politics: the left-libertarian policy space. The BDP-HDP line brings much from the European libertarian-socialist and green-ecologist traditions to the politics of Turkey. If the Kurdish left becomes a regular component of the state establishment, it can truly contribute not only to the resolution of the Kurdish question but also Turkey’s democratization.

Endnotes
7. In the case of Turkey’s political culture, the ‘center’ represents the highly Kemalist, secular, pro-Western and mostly urban Turkish social strata, while the ‘periphery’ includes a variety of other’s, including the religious, rural and traditional strata as well as the Kurds and the Alevis. See Şerif Mardin, “Center-periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 1 (1973), pp. 169-190; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Dynamics. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
11. Erkan Doğan, p. 316.
12. Village guards are state-hired paramilitary forces originally set up and funded in the mid-1980s under Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) government. They acted as local militias in villages to protect against attacks by PKK insurgents and guerrillas. The Kurdish left heavily criticized this policy on the account that the state was using and provoking brothers against brothers.

19. İMÇ TV (08.10.2013).

20. Even though Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) does not formally recognize Cemevis as holy temples or places of worshipping, the Alevi-Bektashi organizations often demand cemevis to be recognized as distinct places of worshipping (i.e., equivalents of mosques).

21. Independent candidates from other parties in the pre-election coalition of the Kurdish left include Şerifettin Hafiz, the former chair of Participatory Democracy Party (Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi, KADEP), and Levent Tüzel, the former chair of the Party of Labor (Emek Partisi, EMEP) in 2011, as well as Ufuk Uras, the former chair of left-libertarian Freedom and Solidarity Party ( Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP), in 2007.

22. See Tank Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kıbaroğlu, p. 587.


26. Ibid.


30. Selma Irmak, “Violence on Women Escalated up to the Assembly” [Kadına Şiddet Meclis’e Kadar Yükseldi], *Özgür Gündem*, 07.03.2010.


33. “BDP’s Tan: We need a Middle East like union of states” [BDP’li Tan: Eyaletler birliği gibi bir Ortadoğu lazım], *Radikal*, 22.04.2013.


36. The head of the autonomous Kurdish government in northern Iraq.


43. For instance, the HDP mayor candidate Sırrı Süreyya Önder was criticized for bashing the CHP and its Istanbul candidate Mustafa Sangûl but remaining silent on both the AK Party and its Istanbul candidate Kadir Topbaş. Murat Yetkin, “İşte Çalışıyor ya Muhalefet”, *Radikal*, 06.02.2014.
Russia, Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: From Common Neighborhood to Spheres of Influence?

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ABSTRACT This paper provides an analysis of the most recent changes in Russian foreign policy that became a matter of global concern in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. The author advocates for a discourse-based approach to comprehend the new shifts in Russia’s international posture. First, Russia has launched its own normative policies that incorporate a set of conceptual arguments, such as portraying Ukraine and Russia as allegedly bound by civilizational ties. Second, Russia is not only unilaterally imposing its power; it is also exploiting the opportunities for raising its role, which are embedded in the structure of its relations with post-Soviet states. Third, Russia’s policies are largely inconclusive and inconsistent, which is conducive to the dispersal of hegemonic discourse and its potential fragmentation.

Introduction

The crisis in Ukraine triggered a feeling that drastic changes are happening in the system of international relations that is still weakly articulated academically. Policy commentators mostly intuitively claim that after the events in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine the structure of East-West relations underwent drastic alterations, which permanently altered the status quo. There are strong voices claiming that in this new reality, we should primarily focus on the often underestimated issues of physical force, military strength and energy resources. A new wave of Realpolitik epistemology seems to be underway.

Unlike these voices, I deem that ideational issues still matter for unpacking the intricacies of new trends. How identities are articulated, how norms are implemented and how new ideas are infused in the debate are all of utmost salience for studying international relations in times of crisis. Ukraine is an ideational and normative challenge to the Kremlin, which by and large over-
Policy commentators mostly intuitively claim that after the events in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine the structure of East-West relations underwent drastic alterations shadows rational calculus. Paradoxically, while both countries build their international identities on the post-colonial assumption of “rising from the knees,” the way the two do so are strikingly dissimilar.

It is from this perspective that the question of Russia’s instruments in areas of vital interest can be most effectively studied. What does Russia want in its policies toward the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries – Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan? Are these policies rational or emotional, offensive or defensive? What toolkits would Russia be able to apply against neighboring countries with strong pro-European ambitions, and how effective would Russian pressure be in the long run? It is this set of questions that inspired me in this analysis.

In this paper I argue, first, that Russia has launched its own normative policy toward the EaP countries that incorporates a set of conceptual arguments, such as portraying Ukraine and Russia as allegedly bound by civilizational ties, referring to the core conservative tenets of international politics – the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention – or reactivating the Soviet mythology. Second, Russia is not only unilaterally imposing its power, but also exploiting the opportunities embedded in the structure of its relations with post-Soviet states. Against this backdrop, Russia sees its policies as mostly reactive and defensive rather than offensive, which is overwhelmingly denied in the West. Third, Russia’s policies are largely inconclusive and inconsistent, which is conducive to the dispersal of hegemonic discourse and its potential fragmentation.

Russia and the EU build their policies on drastically dissimilar concepts of power and divergent conceptualizations of the state and its functions. That is why I base this analysis on the idea of competing realities, which might be instrumental in explaining the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy from accommodation and imitation of the West in the early 1990s to the current contestation and challenging of alleged Western hegemony.

More specifically, I offer two main propositions. First, normative disconnections are becoming increasingly important in all EU-Russian relations. Unlike the past two decades, Putin’s Russia nowadays conveys its own normative messages to its neighbors. They may be either hypocritical or vulnerable, but they are part of the Russian hegemonic discourse. Of course, Russia’s normative arguments drastically differ from the normative base of the EU’s eastward policies, but the very prominence of a normative (and sometimes even value-based) logic in Russia’s policies toward its neighbors certainly deserves attention. Moscow understands that realist policies are mainly be conducive to
an economic and financial integration, bereft of political underpinning that Moscow strives for. This is why Russia is keen on developing a number of normative frameworks to streamline its integrationist policies.

Second, most of the disagreements between Moscow and Brussels boil down to different interpretations of sovereignty. Russia’s vision of sovereignty is grounded in a number of assumptions:

- Unity, centralization and hierarchy;
- Supreme authority autonomous from both society and other international actors;
- Territorial instinct, geographical expansion and fortification of borders;
- Coercive and punitive measures of control and surveillance (“power over lives and deaths”); 
- Domination of political reasoning as exemplified by exceptional decisions not necessarily harmonious with the law.

Realist Models of the International System

This vision of sovereignty is grounded in a realist approach to international politics, with the cornerstones of a Westphalian system of sovereign nation states and the principle of non-interference. The most important models of foreign policy in realist interpretation are spheres of influence or interests (that can evolve into a balance of power) and great power management (known as a concert of great powers). The common denominator for all these models is the Kremlin’s eagerness to be recognized in the West as a legitimate hegemon in the region.

Theoretically, the great power management model is feasible, but in practice it does not work due to mutual misperceptions and incorrect assessments of intentions. The idea of an EU-Russia co-management of the Ukrainian energy transportation system was previously refuted by Russia, while the Putin-Yanukovich proposal to start trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia talks was rejected by Brussels.

The conflictual tug-of-war between the EU and Eurasian Union might be interpreted from the viewpoint of power balancing. Yet this model fails to work as well due to the fact that Russia and the EU have different types of power that do not necessarily match or balance each other. The crisis in Ukraine only confirmed this discrepancy.

Russia overtly strives for the spheres of influence model, while the EU decries it. Moscow has reacted to the EaP by accelerating the Eurasian integration proj-
ect, which only strengthened the perspective of the Russia-promoted (and the EU-denied) concept of zones of interests. The war against Georgia in August 2008 confirmed Russia’s strong penchant for spheres-of-influence policies in its “near abroad.”

Yet there are several weak points in the Russian logic of spheres of influence. First, there are domestic factors, especially in Ukraine and Moldova, that make this model highly questionable from the viewpoint of its societal legitimacy. Second, the common neighborhood is not only about EU-Russia geopolitics; it involves other important actors with stakes in the region (Turkey, China, Iran, etc.), which complicated all possible lines of political demarcation. Third, Russia’s interpretation of the mass protests in Ukraine as a new edition of the Orange Revolution, with all its previous negative connotations, was generative of a strong perception among Russia’s neighbors that the Kremlin-promoted idea of spheres of influence is hardly compatible with democracy. It presupposes the dependence of rulers like Viktor Yanukovich on Moscow rather than on their own people. Fourth, Russia’s discourse on respecting its “legitimate interests” and “areas of influence” betrays Moscow’s overt penchant for exceptionality and freedom of action that ultimately means impunity from external influence. This certainly delegitimizes Russia’s policies of “reunification” pursued in the post-Soviet area.

More importantly, Russia’s narrative rebuts even a hypothetical possibility for indigenous political action that does not necessarily have to be directly co-
ordinated with external actors. This reveals a significant difference between the EU and Russia, which is manifested in their divergent attitudes on the subjectivity of neighboring countries located in-between the two poles. The EU’s policies may be better comprehended through the Foucauldian concept of governmentality that includes the transfer of administrative and managerial practices across the border in order to enable partners to take care of themselves and therefore make their own decisions as its pivotal component. In other words, the EU aims to strengthen the capabilities of its neighbors to act independently and pursue their interests accordingly. Being consistent in its governmentality policies, the EU respects decisions taken by its partners and never applies sanctions against those countries that discontinued their association agreement negotiations with the EU, like Armenia and Ukraine under the Yanukovich regime. The EU keeps its options open for Azerbaijan, which expressed little interest in adjusting its legal system to meet EU standards from the onset of the EaP.

Russia’s policy is conceptually grounded in the presumption that its neighbors are inherently unable to make autonomous political moves, which leads Russian discourse to explain developments in countries like Georgia or Ukraine as a submission to external actors, such as the U.S. Russia persistently denies the subjectivity of its neighbors and portrays many of them as targets – if not victims – of a malign imposition of Western recipes. In this logic, Maidan is not a grassroots revolutionary movement, but an artificially U.S.-inspired action. The same was logic applied to the regime of Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia, which was perceived in Russia as overwhelmingly manipulated from abroad. This highly securitized approach to spheres of influence borders on an aptitude for conspiracy theories.

“The Realist Conservatism” and Russia’s Soft Power

As I ventured to demonstrate, Russian foreign policy has a realist background, and the annexation of Crimea, along with instigation of domestic violence in eastern Ukraine, seems to illustrate this sympathy for realism. Indeed, there are some vindications for this trend. First, the ‘finalité politique’ of Russia’s strategy in what it calls “near abroad” is the idea of spheres of influence, which explains Russia’s reluctance to accept any legitimate role for the EU or NATO in this region (the possible roles of China is herewith ignored). Second, Russia exten-
Russia and the EU build their policies on drastically dissimilar concepts of power and divergent conceptualizations of the state and its functions

Excessively uses its military resources not only in Ukraine, but also in Georgia and Armenia. Third, Moscow is not a politically neutral player, since it takes sides (in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, as well as Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and thus acts politically. In the meantime, the crisis in Ukraine has drastically enhanced the appeal of nationalist ideas that were activated by the Kremlin for both domestic and international purposes.

Yet the realist components of Russia’s foreign policy conservatism should not be overrated. Putin and his ideology increasingly prefer to accentuate identity rather than material interests. This is well illustrated by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which is overwhelmingly portrayed by the officialdom as an indispensable element of retrieving Russian territories and reassembling the fragmented world of Russian-speakers. Russia’s “normative offensive” is more identity-driven than grounded in rationality and economic calculus. This explains why the Putinist version of realism merges with the conservative tradition in international relations, which is present in many other countries as well.

Conservatism remains a highly contested concept in political theory and comes in many varieties. The Kremlin’s conservative turn, which evolved into the core element of Moscow’s official political philosophy since the commencement of Putin’s third presidential term, has to be understood against the backdrop of the events of 2011-2012, when the regime faced harsh domestic opposition (mass protests that questioned the legitimacy of the ruling elite) and international challenges (related to the far-reaching effects of the EaP).

Both conservatism and realism are inherently anti-universalist and opposed to the global expansion of liberal principles and lifestyles. Against this backdrop, it is not incidental that pro-Kremlin discourses were meant to gradually set up both substantive and procedural alternatives to the EU’s normative leadership, while being perfectly aware of Brussels’ sensitivity to norm-related matters. The Kremlin’s conservatism has to be understood within the framework of the debate on EU normative power as ideational diffusion, which operates through the emulation of EU norms. Normative power, as an ability to shape conceptions and ideas, can be viewed as a form of hegemony projected through soft power. As many analysts opine, the EU’s normative hegemony was conducive to the production of “essentialized differences between two spatial markers (‘Europe’ and ‘East’), a practice that is heavily imbued with an identity dimen-
sion: ‘we’ are the former, ‘they’ are the latter.” It is against this background that Moscow launched its own normative discourse grounded in its interpretation of conservative ideology.

Conservatism advocated as a basis for Russian foreign policy explicitly counter-distinguishes Russia (and potentially its partners in Eurasian integration) from the liberal emancipatory Europe. This type of discourse repositions Russia from its previously advocated belongingness in Europe to an alliance with forces eager to counterbalance and de-center the West. The rearticulation of this conservative turn deprives Russia of one of its earlier arguments addressed to its neighbors, which promoted a strategy of moving together towards a wider Europe. In the meantime, Putin's accentuation on conservative values might have some traction among large social groups within neighboring countries where societal traditionalism trumps liberal emancipation, such as Hungary and Turkey.

Within the conservative interpretation, the state claims its status as the ultimate source of the truth, which evidently contradicts the currently dominating European political and intellectual traditions. Another point of disagreement between mainstream Europe and Russia boils down to the supremacy of human rights over the interests of society as a whole (understood in Russia as its Orthodox majority). It could be argued that an imperial Russia cannot tolerate the domination of citizens' rights over religious traditions that are conservative by definition.

Russia’s conservative agenda contains a number of variations:

- A civilizational approach that is seemingly consonant with an UN-supported concept of “dialogue of civilizations” in general and the Rhodes Forum in particular. This approach may come in three different versions – as an ideology of Eurasianism, as an apology of an alleged “eastern Slavic unity” or as a pro-European discourse. The latter has been intentionally marginalized by the Kremlin starting with Putin’s third presidency, which attempts to portray its integrative efforts in the near abroad as contributing to the strengthening of a common Europe.

- The re-actualization of the Soviet legacy as a normative foundation for furthering the post-Soviet integration. The Kremlin not only instrumentalizes and politicizes its status as the successor of the Soviet Union, but also projects its traumatic interpretation of the fall of the USSR to other former Soviet republics. This discursive strategy, despite being incompatible with the EU’s normative logic in most respects, still envisages certain symbolic references to the EU that, according to the Kremlin’s narrative, has started its integrative project with a lower level of interdependence yet ultimately achieved a great
deal of success. Of course, Russia continues to claim that it does not intend to revive the old Soviet practices ultimately conducive to the Cold War. Yet this is exactly what Russia is doing – steadily reviving its imperial identity and making no difference between nation state and empire. This creates tensions with some neighbors: for example, Ukrainian self-perception is contrary to an empire. Ukraine is painfully and painstakingly building its nation state, and Ukrainian identity is very much grounded in the idea of being culturally and ideationally European. Ukraine defines itself though constitutive references to its European neighbors, which is completely non-existent in the Russian hegemonic discourse.

The normatively loaded idea of sovereignty as an underpinning principle of international relations, which transforms into Russia’s defense of the Westphalian normative order and the rule of international law. Many pro-Kremlin speakers claim that the dilemma faced by Ukraine, Moldova and perhaps other EaP countries is between preserving (allegedly within the Eurasian Union) or losing (within the EU) their sovereignty. More specifically, Russia pragmatically uses the concept of sovereignty as leverage against the governments of Moldova and Ukraine, which, in Moscow’s interpretation, are willing to delegate their sovereignty to the EU.

Arguably, both in its domestic and “export” versions, conservatism became the basis of Russian soft power – a concept that needs further reconceptualization and reframing. Genealogically, the idea of soft power, as conceived by American scholar Joseph Nye and his multiple followers, was connotative with the spread of democratic values and norms of governance. Yet the Putin regime’s policies made clear that authoritarian regimes can develop their own versions of soft power, based on the promotion of explicitly illiberal principles aimed at challenging the normative hegemony of the West. That is why we should not discard soft power as a Russian foreign policy tool, even against the backdrop of the de-facto application of military force in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Rather one should engage in a critical debate on the variety of regime-specific interpretations of soft power.

At least two major points betray the vulnerability of Putin’s understanding of soft power. First, it is not used for engineering new communicative spaces for shared norms, ideas and values, but rather for a top-down imposition of Russian worldviews and foreign policy principles on its neighbours, allies and partners. In this respect, soft power might correlate with Russian neo-imperial project. Secondly, Russia does not utilize soft power for the sake of fostering Europeanization and comprehensive modernization; instead, Moscow uses soft power to voluntarily detach itself from the group of democratic nations that share common normative approaches to world politics. It is against this backdrop that the whole political pedigree of Russia’s soft power has to be as-
ruined, with such cornerstone concepts as multi-polarity, sovereignty, spheres of influence, domestic and foreign policy conservatism, and the protection of Russian speakers.

**Limited Rationality**

Two major issues pop up at this juncture. The first is how effective and rational is Russia’s realist conservatism? This question boils down to the conceptualization of Russia’s national interests in the neighboring areas, and a cost-benefit analysis.

Russia’s policies are certainly based on some rationale. First, Russia was intentionally and consistently reducing the whole set of *normative* issues pertaining to the EaP (with the attractiveness of European values at its core) to purely *material* arguments (how costly is the integration with the EU for Ukraine, who gets what, how generous are the EU’s offers to Kyiv or Chisinau, etc.).

Second, Russia has effectively used its *security* trump cards, which are particularly powerful in the case of Armenia’s discontinuation of association talks. In Ukraine, Russia used its forces to organize the referendum in Crimea, and orchestrated military rebellion in eastern Ukraine.

Third, Moscow is fully aware of the economic importance of the millions of Russia-based migrants for most neighboring countries. Since migrants are often employed by violating Russian laws, their deportation from Russia would cause negative effects to the country of origin, both economically and socially.

Fourth, in some cases, Russia selectively refers to *legal* arguments. Indeed, the Russian-Ukrainian Agreement on Strategic Cooperation of 1997 does contain a clause (article 6) stipulating that each party ought to abstain from actions that might be detrimental to the other partner. In Russia’s eyes, this justifies the restrictive economic measures that Moscow applied against Ukraine as a reaction to its association negotiations with the EU. Yet Moscow completely disregards other legal commitments, such as respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine as part of the Budapest memorandum of 1994 that Moscow co-signed with the UK and the U.S. WTO regulations are also largely ignored in Moscow despite Russia’s membership in the organization.
Fifth, it is noteworthy that some of Moscow’s policies are consonant with local discourses in neighboring countries. The Kremlin does its best to exploit a situation of “normative fatigue” in many EaP capitals due to their frustration with the inability to meet the EU’s high normative standards. Against this backdrop, Russia pragmatically offers its mostly authoritarian neighbors a partnership that would not require serious domestic changes. The explicit disregard for the EU’s normative basis for integration can be rhetorically justified by referencing the conservative norm of non-intervention as one of Russia’s foreign policy tenets, yet what it hides is Russia’s commitment to a status-quo type of policy devoid of strong connotations with European values.

Yet Russia’s rationality is of only limited character. The annexation of Crimea made it clear that Russia’s strategy can be enormously costly, and Russia has paid a dear price for its pursuance due to the unprecedented worsening of relations with the West, including the EU, NATO and the G7 countries. Financially, sustaining separatist and irredentist territories is a heavy load for the Russian budget, already overburdened by enormous investments in North Caucasus and Far East, and in corruptive mega-projects like the Sochi Olympics, among others. All this profligacy takes place against the backdrop of an economic slowdown and troubles with modernization. Besides, by unilaterally integrating separatist territories, Russia could devalue the legitimacy of the Customs Union project. Neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan were consulted before taking decisions that ultimately triggered economic sanctions from both Western and Russian sides.
As the case of Ukraine shows, Russia runs the risk of overspending by dragging the country into its sphere of influence. The price to be paid for reinstalling Russia’s sway over Ukraine is enormous, yet the Kremlin believes that it is necessary in order to be recognized as a legitimate actor in a wider Europe and Eurasia. Moscow is ready to disburse money from the National Well-being Fund for economically questionable, yet politically salient purposes beyond Russia’s borders. The EU is not, which adds one more point to the list of drastic differences between Moscow and Brussels.

Russia’s lavish expenditures in Ukraine, Belarus and Armenia will inevitably ignite domestic debate on the rationality of sponsoring foreign countries, given the fact that many policy spheres in Russia itself are largely underfunded. In the coming years, the government will certainly have a hard time explaining and defending the economic rationale of its Ukraine policy.

Failed Socialization

The second question that looms large is how Russian Realpolitik conservatism functions with another major issue on Russia’s foreign policy agenda – obtaining legitimacy for its policies from key international institutions and individual actors. Legitimation relies on certain norms that could justify the undertaken measures. Russia is experimenting with a number of normative points, from the accentuation of sovereignty to appeals to the Soviet past, yet still desperately lacks support in its anti-Western policies.

Against this backdrop, a number of weak points in Russia’s strategy can be identified. First, Russia is weak in implementing its soft power. It lacks regional strategies for its near abroad comparable to the EaP, the Black Sea Synergy, etc. A particularly strong blow against Russia’s soft power resources is the growing appeal of anti-immigrant, nationalist and racist discourses all across Russia. Civilizational discourse, wrapped in Eurasian clothes, remains Orthodoxy-based, which certainly has its limitations for many neighboring countries.

Second, Russia’s claimed role as the key security provider in the post-Soviet region remains questionable after the intentional destabilization of Ukraine and annexation of a part of Ukrainian territory. Due largely to Russia’s support for separatist territories all across the former Soviet Union, Moscow has earned a reputation of being an unreliable security partner, and Russia’s policies toward Ukraine have only strengthened this negative perception. Moscow vociferously proclaimed itself the leader of post-Soviet Eurasia, but lacks a successful record of conflict resolution, which is particularly evident in its policy towards Ukraine.
Third, Russia's realism does not extend to a clear comprehension of the key realist concept – that of interests. Russia might imagine itself as only reacting to the supposedly unfriendly policies of the West, yet the question of the nature of the alleged threats to Russia remains highly debatable. The EU does seek to expand its normative order, but in many cases it reacts to demands from its neighbors for inclusion. The EU does not unilaterally impose its norms and does not punish those partners that choose to stay aloof, be it Armenia or Azerbaijan. Besides, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area can be used by Russia to gain entry into the EU market – a perspective that Russian policymakers completely miss in their blueprints.

**Conceptual Pitfalls**

The main controversy of the Kremlin's policy is that Russia has voluntarily deprived itself of a key argument that earlier shaped its relations with its Eastern European neighbors – building a wider Europe together. Russia failed to acknowledge its interest in associating with the European normative order and turning it into a political argument for convincing its neighbors of its pro-European strategy. As a reaction to the protests in Ukraine against Yanukovich's pro-Russian tilt, the Kremlin has reformulated Russian identity as un-European or even counter-European. This is how the Kremlin propaganda machine currently works, arguing that EU membership is conducive to economic degradation and political dependence on Brussels or Berlin. Yet by voluntarily distancing itself from the EU, Russia invalidates its own idea of “moving together to Europe,” which – though highly hypothetically – could constitute the basis for a new, non-confrontational Russian foreign policy.

In fact, this betrays the core rationale for Russia's resistance to Europeanization in the neighboring nations – the Kremlin's reluctance to deeply modernize the country. It is only unmodernized and unreformed Russia that has the reason to consider a more EU-bound Ukraine as a challenge to Russian interests. In a wider sense, the Kremlin comprehends that the closer the EU normative order moves towards the Russian borders, the harder it gets to maintain the most essential characteristics of the ruling regime, including its corruptive economic system, clan-like political system and an underdeveloped civil society. It is in this sense that, in spite of a politically correct denial of the impossibility for EaP countries to integrate with both Russia and the EU, Moscow believes that they will ultimately have to make a “historical” choice between two different models of development.
In the meantime, by claiming Russia’s role as a guarantor of its post-Soviet neighbors’ sovereignty, Moscow has in fact disavowed any parallels between the EU and the Eurasian Union. The latter, according to the sovereignty-centered interpretation of Russian policies, can only be an intergovernmental organization bereft of supra-national competences. This means that Russia is not going to model the Eurasian Union on the basis of EU experiences, which again will inevitably fuel anti-Moscow sentiments in Ukraine and Moldova.

Russian approaches to the EaP countries are vulnerable in many other respects. One of the weaknesses lies in the experimental and artificially synthetic nature of Russian discourses. Russia loses its credibility because of its promiscuous combination of different arguments – for example, explaining the economic rationale for sponsoring the Ukrainian and Belorussian economies through references to explicitly normative arguments of “Slavic brotherhood.”

Moscow tries to capitalize on a number of arguments that can have some traction in certain contexts, but under closer scrutiny turn problematic. Thus, the Kremlin points to the domestic roots of what it calls “the Ukraine crisis,” and avoids calling it the “Russian-Ukrainian crisis.” There are indeed domestic roots in the challenges that Ukraine faces – from the feeling of alienation in Crimea and the eastern provinces that date back to at least 2004, to the peculiar western Ukrainian identity that is both pro-EU and inward-oriented. Moreover, the domestic instability is instigated by the resources of those connected to the Yanukovich family to a large extent.

Yet many of the key Russian arguments look flawed. Qualification of the Euromaidan as a coup d’état ignores the fact that revolt against tyranny is always part of democracy. Besides, the former president, Viktor Yanukovich, left the country himself after being cornered by protesters who accused him of multiple wrongdoings.

Radicalism and nationalism, to which the Kremlin often refers to as well, is indeed part of the Ukrainian domestic political landscape. Based on nationalist exposures, the Kremlin tries to propagate that all of Ukraine is under the dominating influence of far-right radicals. Discursively, this thesis is well known – from the Soviet propaganda that equated Ukrainian nationalism with pro-Nazi sympathies to lambasting Viktor Yuschenko back in 2004 as a fascist sympathizer. However, the truth is that it is Russia - not Ukraine - that cooperates with the most far-right, nationalistic forces all across Europe. It was the Kremlin that was the object of admiration of the Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik; and it were Russian officials who positively spoke about Hitler (Andranik Migranian) and characterized Russians as the “Arian race” (Viacheslav Nikonov).
Ukraine definitely has multiple domestic vulnerabilities, but these are intentionally instigated by Russia, which acts not as an “older brother,” but as an external force inimical to Ukraine’s independence. What Moscow tries to prove is that Ukraine is a failed state that lacks national identity and therefore can’t survive as a sovereign nation without Russia’s control and surveillance. The key thesis of Moscow is that Ukraine is an artificial country with unfixed identity, numerous domestic rifts and competing interests, and an inability to sustain its unity. Therefore, Ukraine has to delegate its sovereignty to Russia. In a radical version, the two countries form a single historical and political community. Moreover, Russia reserves a right to protectively intervene in Ukraine based on the “Russian world” concept, which remains an inherently elusive and blurred idea.

What Putin evidently underestimates is that Ukraine’s identity-in-the-making is consolidating on the basis of a century-old anti-Moscow attitude. Russian language is not necessarily a symptom of political loyalty to the Kremlin; people can speak Russian and still be sympathetic with Ukraine’s identity. Besides, the Ukrainian Orthodox church is obviously loyal to the idea of a unified and single Ukrainian state, which deprives the “Russian world” concept of its coherence.

Politically, building Russia’s discursive strategy on the thesis of unquestionable historical, cultural and linguistic bonds between Russia and Ukraine seems quite risky for the Kremlin. If the two constitute a single political body, events like the EuroMaidan can spill over into Russia as well, which would certainly destroy Putin’s regime. Moreover, for the sake of consistency, Moscow would have to apply the principles that it promotes in Ukraine domestically, including federalization, which is an equally questionable prospect for the ruling elite in Moscow.

Moscow’s federalization argument in Ukraine seems to resemble the European principles of subsidiarity, grassroots democracy and respect for local identities on the surface. However, the annexation of Crimea, which for more than two decades enjoyed the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine, invalidates the veracity of Russian claims for federalization. Russia itself implicitly demonstrated that it wants autonomy to morph into separatism and irredentism, with the aim of ultimately challenging the very existence of Ukraine.

The question is whether Moscow has its own “normative power” to set the standards of decentralization and the gamut of center-periphery relations. Russia can hardly be a good model for sustainable federalism. In terms of security, the crisis in Ukraine unveiled a clear interference of the Chechen subnational authorities in the sphere of federal competences, as Ramzan Kadyrov has publicly pledged to deploy thousands of Chechen fighters in Ukraine. In terms of the economy, the annexation of Crimea has spurred concerns over the amount of
federal funds that will need to be spent to transform the region into a showcase of Putin’s policy of “reassembling Russian lands.” The budgetary allocations for Crimea will significantly exceed central funding for the whole Far East in the coming years. These disproportions are likely to trigger a new wave of critical debate within Russia on financial federalism and the fair distribution of federal funds.

Moscow’s insistence on the federalization of Ukraine shows that Russia is attempting to normalize itself by mimicking, appropriating and adopting Western political concepts, and by formulating its policy agenda in seemingly European terms. For example, Russia exploits the concept of global interdependence to refute economic sanctions as unsustainable. In other words, Russia wants to position itself as a country like all others, following the same political rules as Western governments but forced to react to allegedly unfriendly gestures from the West. Yet this is not always the case.

For instance, Moscow claims that it is the EU that started demanding that Ukraine make a political choice, to which Russia could not stay indifferent. However, at this point, Moscow falls into a logical trap: it is impossible to argue that the EU has nothing to offer Ukraine, while also insisting that the EU forced Ukraine to make a political choice. In reality, the EU’s policy (including the Association Agreements) is much more of a technical instrument than Russia imagines, and it was Russia that politicized the whole situation by placing it in a false dichotomy of “either-or.” The example of Turkey shows that a country may sign similar agreements and even join the EU’s free trade area, while also enjoying the freedom to make foreign policy choices.

Ukraine Against the Backdrop of Russian Euroscepticism

Another element of Russia’s discursive arsenal is the claim that Europe is of no help to Ukraine militarily and has little to offer politically. The EU is indeed indecisive and divided between different policy groups, with many right-wing and left-wing parties taking a pro-Kremlin position. Nevertheless, Ukraine is still one of the most pro-European countries among the EU’s neighbors, ultimately signing the Association Agreement and continuing to move closer to the EU-structured normative order from which Russia has voluntarily excluded itself.

Regretfully, anti-European rhetoric in Russia is on the rise. The Russia Today (RT) TV Channel readily covers the most Euroskeptic parties all across
Europe. Pro-governmental commentators like Alexander Dugin contemplate Russia’s chances to subsume the crisis-ridden Europe. Fiodor Lukianov, a pro-Kremlin journalist and the head of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, mocked European politics for an alleged inability to give floor to a new generation of young politicians while referring to the reelection of an elderly Italian President. The Valdai Club engages in more sophisticated discourse, misrepresenting the pro-European sentiments in Russia as liberal (one of the most negatively marked words in the vocabulary of the Putin regime), and then ritually asking a question of whether a European choice exists at all.

Titles like “We are not Europeans? Thank goodness!” in newspapers reflect a Kremlin-fostered mood in Russia. Against this background, it is only logical that Russia and the EU failed to talk business in the Ukrainian case.

The Russian version of Euroskepticism is an interesting phenomenon as it develops in a country with neither the intention nor ability to join the EU. Thus, unlike similar platforms within the EU, the Russian anti-European discourse is much more political than economically based. In previous years, the Kremlin tried to play a more sophisticated language game by formally accepting the key European normative signifiers (democracy, human rights, etc.), while simultaneously infusing their own (sometimes implicitly non-European) meanings. Nowadays, the strategy is simplified, and a more clearly articulated anti-European narrative appeared.

Thus, in spite of these gaps and rifts between Russia and Europe, Putin’s strategy is not entirely anti-European. It consists of two major elements: the diversification of Russia’s economic options in Asia, specifically its relations with China; and forging political alliances with “Russia understanders” in Europe, who basically occupy the far-right (the National Front in France, Vlaams Belang in the Netherlands, Jobbik in Hungary, Ataka in Bulgaria, the National Democratic Party in Germany, the Northern League and Forza Nuova in Italy, Freiheitliche Partei in Austria, the Golden Dawn in Greece, the British National Party, etc.) or far-left (Comunisti Italiani) in European politics. Against this background, it is possible to presume that, first, Russia’s widely publicized turn to the Orient is an expensive gesture whose main audience is Europe itself. As a recent gas contract with China made clear, Russia can only be an important player in Asian markets through its traditional role as energy supplier and by offering price discounts for political purposes. Second, in capitalizing on pro-Russian sympathies in both flanks of the European political spectrum, the Kremlin’s policy transcends ideological lines and represents a pragmatic utilization of the divisions among European elites. This is the case particularly
in countries like Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria, whose governments are opposed to sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, and other EU member states (specifically the Baltic states) that insist on a consolidated EU response to what they see as Russian interference.

More specifically, there are at least two discursive strategies towards Europe that Russia pursues in the Ukraine crisis. The first one can be formulated as “Russia is in Europe.” Russia thinks of itself as a democratic country, which only reveals how democracy is perceived in Moscow – as majority rule, not as the protection of minorities. Russia claims that it is guided by a “European orientation,” which explains that belonging to Europe is viewed as being based on history and geography, rather than shared norms. In this light, the official discourse presents Russia’s policy in Crimea as “normal” in the sense that it is comparable to other cases with both positive (the reunification of Germany and the referendum in Comoro Islands) and negative (Kosovo) connotations.

The second strategy boils down to the maxim “Crimea is Ours.” It is proclaimed as a sacred place for Russia, symbolized and glorified as part of its imperial Self. What is more, the whole array of Crimea-related issues was securitized, i.e., elevated to the very top of Russia’s priorities, much higher than economic rationale.

This strategy betrays deep gaps between Russia and the West. What annexation means for most Western countries is portrayed as a family reunification in Russia. The difference is due to divergent language registers: the West prefers a legal qualification of the event, while the Kremlin sticks to a more political (even biopolitical) type of narrative. The Russian thesis of Crimea voting for its “independence” also has very little weight in the West.

**Conclusion**

The current crisis in Ukraine has widened the existing political, ideological and normative gaps between Russia and the EU, and created new ruptures.

First, against the backdrop of Russia’s policies toward Ukraine, it became obvious that Moscow’s understanding of soft power is drastically different from that in the West. The Kremlin’s soft power strategy is based on three key components: first, the idea of the “Russian world” that has evolved from a humanitarian to geopolitical concept with clear security dimensions; second, conservatism as a newly discovered ideology that is aimed to simultaneously secure the regime from external interferences and appeal to like-minded conservative groups across the globe; and lastly, resistance to what Moscow dubs the expan-
sion of the West, which, in Putin’s eyes, might be appealing to countries whose elites share post-colonial or anti-American ideologies.

Second, what is often overlooked is the continuity of Russian policy. In the West, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was largely perceived as a rupture with previous efforts to socialize in international milieu, and as a disruption of the existing international order. Yet the Russian government views its action in Ukraine as a continuation, rather than a cancellation, of its previous efforts to “rise from the knees.” Arguably, the West overestimated Russia’s resolve to integrate with the dominating international order and failed to notice a great deal of consistency in Russia’s disputes with both the EU and NATO.

Third, even those in Russia who understand that Moscow’s policy in Ukraine is not in line with international norms claim that Western countries (particularly the U.S.) acted similarly many times, which deprives them of the moral right to blame Russia. Indeed, many Western countries are not without sin in this respect. However, there is one profound difference between Russia and the West: Russia’s reaction to the events in Ukraine elucidated a direct and inevitable linkage between foreign policy interventionism and the toughening of domestic policies. This certainly distinguishes Russia from Western democracies. It is not incidental that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the creeping involvement in eastern Ukraine were paralleled by growing bans and restrictions within the country (e.g., foreign travel bans for employees of law enforcement agencies and judges, de-facto criminalization of second citizenship, greater control over new mass media and political blogging, etc.).

Fourth, the question of what Putin’s Russia wants ultimately remains open. The simplest answer would be power, both soft and hard. However, this constitutes a problem, since this power-seeking strategy developed from a gross misinterpretation of the key drivers and vectors of world politics. In Putin’s reading of international relations, the possession of physical force (energy resources and military might) is essential for being recognized as a member of the great powers club. This leads him to misunderstand why the West cannot accept Russia as a fully-fledged and equal partner, and why there is so much mistrust of Russia worldwide. What the Kremlin fails to comprehend is that the marginalization of Russia is not an intentional policy of the West; rather, it is an effect of the complex mechanisms of international socialization grounded in the normative principles of inclusion and exclusion. Russia is also reluctant to admit that the idea of spheres of influence – its most cherished concept – is only implementable on the basis of a certain normative...
order, based on a variety of institutional and communicative power resources that Russia lacks.

Against this background, it might be concluded that the rules of the game for Russia will get more complicated with the rising costs for implementing the idea of spheres of influence. It is far from evident that Russia’s policy in Ukraine is instrumental for promoting the Eurasian Union project, as the Kremlin claims. Both Belarus and Kazakhstan are skeptical about politicizing the integration project, and about negative effects of economic warfare between Russia and the West on their economies that are connected to the Russian market. The Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine is not necessarily conducive to the consolidation of Russian power in other near abroad nations. By focusing too much attention on Ukraine, Russia runs the risk of losing its sway over other neighbors.

Endnotes

3. Ian Kline, “Postmodern Geopolitics? The European Union Eyes Russia,” Europe - Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 8, (July 2012), p. 930
Southern Gas Corridor and the Potential for Genuine Diversification

Andrey Makarychev
Introducing the FPC-TR Dataset: Dimensions of AK Party Foreign Policy*

NİMET BERİKER

ABSTRACT This paper presents the Foreign Policy Circumplex (FPC) coding framework and the (FPC-TR) to identify aspects of Turkish foreign policy behavior between 2002 and 2011. The findings show an increase in cooperative foreign policy behavior and relational third party engagements in the second term of the AK Party administration. Turkey increased its third-party role in the context of crises with Iran and Syria. In relations with Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Israel/Palestinian and Russia/Georgia conflicts, the same role, albeit with a decreasing tendency, continued. There were a number of decreased interactions related to issues, such as EU-Cyprus, Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, and Israel-Palestine. That said, we see an increase in relations with North Africa, the Balkan countries, Syria, the Middle East, Armenia and Israel. There is also greater cooperation in the context of Turkey’s high priority bilateral relations, such as with the US, the Middle East, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia, as well as with the UN and European Council. With the EU and Israel, however, a reverse trend is observed.

Datasets of the behavior of international and intrastate actors reflect a rich tradition. Following the behavioral revolution in political science, scholars interested in capturing patterns of war and armed conflict introduced seminal datasets, e.g., Correlates of War (COW), Uppsala Conflict Data Program UCDP /PRIO and Minorities at Risk (MAR). Event data is another established tool in studying political behavior patterns of international actors. Event data relies primarily on news sources to capture cooperative and competitive actions between and within states. It contains information about dyadic interactions of international actors over a particular time period and consists of coding categories and subcategories. Common in all conflict event datasets is conflict-cooperation as a standard analytical continuum. These schemas are constructed to depict foreign policy behaviors of the international actors when they are generally direct stakeholders to conflicts. An exception to this observation is “Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO),” an event dataset generated to identify third-party mediation in international conflicts.
Turkey adopted a balancer role in its region by engaging in various peacemaking activities in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucuses, and Africa

The CAMEO framework follows the neutral-cooperation-conflict pattern and allows the observation of gradual moves from neutrality to cooperation. It also contains specific subcategories formulated to detect mediation activities e.g., appealing to engage in or accept mediation (028), expressing intent to mediate (039), and mediating (045). That said, the 20 main categories of CAMEO are not organized to differentiate between the two distinct roles, i.e. when the actor is a direct stakeholder in the encounter and when the actor acts as a third-party intervener in other actor's conflicts. Therefore, in the absence of such analytical refinement, categories (and their sub-categories) such as, “make public statement (1),” “appeal (02),” “express intent to cooperate (3),” “disapprove (11),” “threaten (13),” “exhibit force posture (15),” and “use conventional force (19)” are, unless specified in the subcategories, evaluated in the context of a dyadic relation between the source and the target; that is, when the source is a direct stakeholder in the encounter. The same categories, however, have the potential to describe actions of the source as a third-party intervener in its roles as facilitator, muscle mediator, peacekeeper, peace enforcer, invader, etc. Such fine-tuning is not possible with the above-mentioned categories. However, some other categories, such as consult (04), are designed to consist of sub-categories that address both party and partisan roles.

In addition to CAMEO, there is an increase in the number of datasets specifically constructed on the role of mediators in interstate and intra-state wars, including: the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset, International Conflict Management and International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) among others. These datasets are particularly designed to conduct explanatory studies to measure the impact of the third-party intervener on the success of conflict termination. These efforts do not treat third-party intervention roles in the context of the overall foreign policy behavior of international actors.

Recent contributions in the development of even datasets revolve around technical challenges of automated coding and the development of machine-assisted systems. What is missing in this debate, however, is the use of datasets in addressing other important issue areas of international studies, such as debates on bridging the theory-policy gap, foreign policy roles, international interventions, foreign policy restructuring and middle power/major foreign policy behavior. The current research contributes to the existing knowledge through its extended analytic focus and research goals. More specifically, the FPC is a theory-driven framework. Unlike other data sets, its coding categories have not been generated on an ad hoc basis, but rather are induced from the operational capabilities of different
sub-fields of international relations. Therefore, the model provides the means through which the researcher can address important issue areas and explore connections between theory and practice. Similarly, the model enables the analyst to differentiate third-party behaviors and identify their roles in disputes, and makes possible further qualifications on the nature of outside interventions and forms of competitive engagements.

The next section offers a brief overview of Turkish foreign policy practices, lays out the basic features of the FPC-TR dataset, and introduces the codebook of the dataset and data collection procedures.

**The AK Party Foreign Policy**

In 2002 the AK Party came to power, introducing changes in Turkish foreign policy practices. The leaders formulated such new principles as “zero problems with neighbors”, “proactive multi-dimensional foreign policy in multiple geographies”, and “regional and global responsibility for peace and stability”. Following these principles, Turkey adopted a balancer role in its region by engaging in various peacemaking activities in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Africa.

These engagements were mostly complementary initiatives with the priorities of the international community in consideration. Beginning in 2009, however, tensions rose between Turkey and its traditional allies. In January 2009, a public disagreement between the Turkish Prime Minister and Simon Perez on a high-level panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos could be considered an early sign of these rising tensions. Another incident took place on May 17th when Turkey and Brazil brokered a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran, challenging the US plans for a unanimous UN resolution imposing sanctions on Tehran. This was followed by a flotilla crisis between Turkey and Israel, when an international flotilla challenging Israel’s blockade was hit by the Israeli army, killing 10 Turkish activists, in international waters. Further, Turkey and the US have had differences on the crisis in Syria and on relations with Iraq’s central government. Despite the aforementioned incidences, however, there have been considerable positive developments in Turkish-US relations. In April 2009, President Obama paid his first presidential visit to Turkey and called Turkish-US relations a “model partnership.” During the Turkish Prime Minister’s visit to Washington DC in December 2009, the US president highlighted the critical role of Turkey in helping to achieve peace and stability, not only to its neighbors but around the world. In March 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry selected Turkey as his first official overseas trip.

The aforementioned developments signal different trends in Turkish foreign policy. The current study introduces the FPC model, which intends to capture
patterns of foreign policy, by focusing on Turkey's foreign policy roles, geographical priorities, interaction patterns, and types of foreign policy orientation.

**The FPC-TR Data**

The FPC is a model that presents 25 foreign policy categories, divided into partisan foreign policy actions (where a party is a direct stakeholder in the dispute) and actions performed by interested outsiders. In either type of action, actors may choose between cooperative and competitive behaviors.10

Figure 1 introduces the FPC model, which integrates foreign policy instruments of decision-makers (partisan or third-party) in a continuum ranging from cooperation to competition.
Data Collection

With the use of the FPC, two data sets on Turkish foreign policy between 2002-2007 and 2007-2011 were generated. These data sets comprise a chronological account of the actions and intentions of government representatives (the prime minister, the foreign minister and representatives of the executive body) in the first and second terms of the AK Party administrations. The data examines instances wherein Turkey acts as a direct stakeholder and those wherein Turkey performs a third-party role. For this purpose, “verbatim” policy declarations and “factual” reported data on foreign policy actions and intentions were collected, and six major newspapers (liberal and conservative) were screened on a daily basis: Radikal, Zaman, Milliyet, Turkish Daily News, Today’s Zaman, and Vatan. In addition, each entry was doubled-checked with other related web sources containing data on Turkish foreign policy. Data was collected and coded on a sheet by entering: a) the date of the policy declaration; b) the quotation of the action or intention; c) the source of the quotation; d) the code of the FPC category and e) the geographical code concerning the action or intention. The data was transformed and analyzed by means of content analysis.

Codification

There are three technical decisions that need to be made when conducting content coding: the definition of coding categories, the selection of the recording units, and the system of enumeration. In this study, the 25 categories of the FPC were used and a coding schema to identify targeted countries, geographies, or conflict episodes was also developed. Recording units are defined as “all words spoken by a single representative in making a foreign policy statement or declaration, or expressing intention.” As for the codification of regions in cases where two different targeted countries or geographies were found, the recording unit was divided in two and treated as two different statements. In cases where one targeted geography was depicted but more than one intention or action was found, the most dominant final expression was coded. In cases where Turkey adopted a partisan role geographical entry consisted of the “other” actor’s geographical identity. In situations where Turkey acted as a third-party, the number of the country or region under consideration was coded.
Data Generation and Coding Procedures

Before starting the actual coding process, two graduate assistants were trained in the analytical components of the FPC. At this initial stage, methodological decisions had to be made on critical issues regarding the selection of databases, composition of the data sheet, definition of the recording category, and establishments of coding protocols. This stage was followed by a pilot data generation and codification exercise, and a data collection and codification protocol was subsequently developed.

The two-term data contains a total of 4,673 entries on Turkish foreign policy actions and intentions. As for the first-term data set, the two graduate assistants shared the data equally and conducted analyses. Later, in order to measure inter-coder reliability, each coded year was divided into six two-month periods. Among these phases, three periods per coder were randomly selected. This time, one coder had to analyze average of 350 entries that had originally been coded by the other. The second dataset was formed and analyzed in the same manner. The combined inter-coder reliability of the two data sets was 78%.
Findings

The analysis shows that cooperative foreign policy behavior during the second term of the Turkish government is greater than during the first (Table 1). Similarly, Turkey’s engagement as a third party in international conflicts was higher in the 2007-2011 period than in the 2002-2007 period (Table 2).

Table 1: Turkish Foreign Policy Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Partisan</th>
<th>Third Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data also shows an increase in relational interaction in the second term (Table 3). During the 2007-2011 period, this style was predominantly performed by adopting third-party roles (Table 4).

Table 3: Interaction Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural</th>
<th>Relational</th>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Structural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Relational Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Third Party</th>
<th>Partisan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for coding frequencies, there was a decrease in interaction with the key allies – the US and the EU – during the second term. A similar trend was also observed with respect to key policy issues of special interest for Turkey, such as EU-Cyprus, Cyprus, Greece, and Iraq, and Israel-Palestine (Table 5).
Another interesting trend is observed in relation to the geographies with which Turkey increased its interaction from 2007-2012 (Table 6). In particular, there was an increase in relations with North Africa, the Balkan countries, Syria, the Middle East, Armenia, and Israel.

Table 5: Coding Frequencies (Decrease)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/Cyprus</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cyprus</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second term of the AK Party government, there was greater cooperation among Turkey’s high priority bilateral relations, such as with the US, the...
Middle East, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. With the EU and Israel, however, the reverse was observed (Table 7).

**Table 7: Important Bilateral Relations (Cooperation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Mid. East</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High priority relations within the relational and procedural interaction axes are revealing. As presented in Table 8, only with Iran and Syria were the procedural versus relational interaction balances changed in favor of relational interaction in the second term. With Israel, however, a reverse trend was found.

**Table 8: Important Bilateral Relations (Relational-Procedural)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Mid. East</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>1-97%</td>
<td>3-97%</td>
<td>28-67%</td>
<td>7-93%</td>
<td>7-86%</td>
<td>3-93%</td>
<td>0-96%</td>
<td>0-98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>3-97%</td>
<td>0-100%</td>
<td>27-73%</td>
<td>47-53%</td>
<td>8-92%</td>
<td>45-55%</td>
<td>21-79%</td>
<td>0-100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 9, Turkey’s relations with neighbors generally improved in the second term of the AK party government.

**Table 9: Relations with Neighbors (Cooperation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N. Cyprus</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 2007 and 2011, the Turkish government adopted a more cooperative stance in handling international conflicts (Table 10). In dealing with these conflicts, Turkey increased its third-party role, particularly those involving Iran and Syria. With respect to conflicts in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan and between Israel/Palestinian and Russia/Georgia, Turkey’s role was similar, albeit decreased (Table 11).

**Table 10: Conflict Zones [World] (Cooperation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Afghan.</th>
<th>Isrl./Palest.</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Rus/Georgia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 11: Conflict Zones [World] (Third Party)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Afghan.</th>
<th>Isrl./Palest.</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Rus/Georgia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Turkey also increased its relations with the UN and the European Council during the AK Party’s second term, though not with NATO (Table 12).

Table 12: International Organizations (Coding Frequencies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>European Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-07</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-11</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion and Contributions of the New Dataset

As demonstrated in the above tables, the analysis shows an increase in foreign policy cooperation during the AK Party’s second term. Similarly, Turkey’s engagement as a third party in international conflicts was higher in the Party’s 2007-2011 term than in its 2002-2007 term. In dealing with international conflicts, Turkey increased its third-party role in Iran and Syria, to a lesser extent in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and in those between Israel/Palestinian and Russia/Georgia. The data also demonstrates an increase in relational interaction during the second term. There was a decrease in interaction with key allies, particularly the US and the EU, as well as key policy issues, such as EU-Cyprus, Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, and Israel-Palestine. That said, there were increased relations with North Africa, the Balkan countries, Syria, the Middle East, Armenia, and Israel, as well as greater cooperation among high priority bilateral relations, such as the US, the Middle East, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. Finally, relations with the EU and Israel decreased, while relations with the UN and the European Council increased.
The analysis reveals that of the 25 FPC categories, only 3 categories - offering CR training (A3), interactive conflict resolution, (A2) and negative sanctions (B4) - had no corresponding texts in the data studied. This finding is not surprising given that offering CR training and conducting interactive conflict resolution workshops are second-track diplomatic activities and are rarely reported in the daily newspapers. Negative sanctions, however, is an interesting category, as actors who execute negative sanctions often also have the capacity to offer rewards to the same actor. Therefore, this category may be more effective in examining the foreign policy behavior of actors who have the capability of using both rewards and punishments in international affairs. As for theory practice relations, daily practices of liberal understanding of international relations could be materialized with all of techniques listed in the FPC, except those activities that are described in the “strategic” quadrant. The execution of realist theory to international affairs, however, rely on those techniques that are listed in the structural, procedural and strategic quadrants (see, figure 1).

Another finding is that traditional diplomacy constitutes the backbone of international relations and incorporates all the techniques listed in the structural and procedural quadrants of the FPC. Problem-solving diplomacy, however, involves relational aspects of international relations. The findings suggest that the majority of the coded techniques are procedural in nature, meaning that all the techniques employed to conduct daily affairs, diplomatic routines, and protocols are essential activities in the execution of international relations. Techniques that are listed in the peace studies and diplomatic studies quadrants of the FPC (see, figure 1) demonstrate dual characteristics, as they could be both competitive and cooperative in nature. For example, structural interventions (a third-party role) in the peace studies quadrant could easily be part and parcel of the realist understanding of international relations.

The findings suggest that the FPC has both an analytical and diagnostic value: The FPC captures a wide range of foreign policy behavior and depicts the underlying theoretical and disciplinary foundations of each action in an attempt to reconnect theory and practice of international relations. It could be further used for testing hypotheses, conducting comparative case studies, or in time-series research. At a practical level, the FPC could be employed as a toolbox for foreign policymakers and diplomats. Similarly, it could serve international relations analysts, journalists, and academics as a basis upon which post-hoc analyses of foreign policy behavior can be conducted.

There was a decrease in interaction with key allies, particularly the US and the EU, as well as key policy issues, such as EU-Cyprus, Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, and Israel-Palestine.
### Appendix A: The FPC codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (US)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (The Cyprus Conflict)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cyprus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Cyprus (Cyprus question as part of the Turkey-EU relations)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (Middle East Region, also an aggregate category for Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Iraq</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan-Armenia (the conflict)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia (Aggregate category for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East (North Korea and South Korea)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations (UN)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan countries (Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, Slovakia)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux countries (Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian Countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Island, Denmark)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somali, Eritrea, Djibouti)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia (Sri Lanka, Eastern Timor, Nepal, Malaysia, Philippines)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-Georgia conflict</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (Horn of Africa, Northern Africa, South Africa)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix B

Regional categories, high priority relations, international organizations

**Regional Categories**

**Far Regions:** (44+45+46+52)+13+47+(26+25+15)+49
- Africa -general (44+45+46+52)+Central Asia -general 13+South Asia 47+
- Far East -general (Far East 26+Japan25+China 15)+Latin America 49

**Neighboring Regions:** 40+ (6+8+7+21+22+20+9+14+17)+ (24+10+23)+16+51
- Balkan Countries 40+ (Middle East general )+ Caucasus (24+10+23) +Russia-Georgia 51+ Russia16
INTRODUCING THE FPC-TR DATASET: DIMENSIONS OF AK PARTY FOREIGN POLICY

Close Regions: (43+41+42)
- Baltic countries 43 + Benelux countries 41 + Scandinavian countries 42

Africa –general: (44+45+46+52)
- Horn of Africa 44 + Northern Africa 45 + South Africa 46 + Africa 52

Central Asia –general: (13)

South Asia –general: (47)

Far East –general: (26+25+15)
- Far East 26 + Japan 25 + China 15

Latin America –general: (49)

Benelux –general: (41)

Scandinavia –general: (42)

Balkan –general: (40)

Middle East- general: (6+8+7+21+22+20+9+14+17)
- Middle East 6 + Northern Iraq 8 + Iraq 7 + Israel 21 + Palestine 22 + Syria 20 + Iran 9 + Afghanistan 14 + Israel-Palestine 17

Caucuses: (24+10+23)
- Georgia 24 + Armenia 10 + Azerbaijan 23

Old Europe:
- England 19, France 30, Austria 35, Germany 29, Italy 32, Benelux 41

Conflict regions (international):
- Cyprus 3, Northern Cyprus 4, Iraq 7, Northern Iraq 8, Iran 9, Armenia 10, Azerbaijan-Armenia 11, Afghanistan 14, Israel-Palestine 17, Syria 20, Georgia 24, Russia-Georgia 51

Conflict regions (Turkey):
- Cyprus 3, EU-Cyprus 5, Northern Iraq 8, Armenia 10, Azerbaijan-Armenia 11

High priority relations

Important relations (Turkey)
- EU 1, US 2, Northern Cyprus 4, Middle East 6, Iraq 7, Northern Iraq 8, Iran 9, Armenia 10, Greece 12, China 15, Russia 16, England 19, Syria 20, Israel 21, Palestine 22, Azerbaijan 23, Georgia 24, Japan 25, France 30, Spain 31, Poland 34, Romania 36, Ukraine 37
- India 48

International Organizations
- NATO 18, UN 27, European Council 28

Endnotes


2. Databases Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) are similar methods of studying international terrorism.

3. For contemporary event datasets, see Schrodt, “Precedents, Progress and Prospect in Political Event Data.”


11. 52 geographical codes were used, including hybrid categories such as regional relations, high priority bilateral relations, conflict prone relations (for Turkey), and conflict zones (for the international community). Operational definitions of geographical codes and conflict episodes are reported in the coding protocol (see Appendix A).

12. Data was collected and codified by Sami Cebi, as part of his graduate research project.

* Replication data: Please contact the author: E-Mail address: nimetberiker@gmail.com

Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Dennis Sandole, Fatma Elif Kalan, Funda Özçelik, Ezgi Şeref, Michelle M. H. Şeref, and Onur Şeref for their contributions and comments on earlier versions.

Funding: Part of this research was supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), under contract no. SOBAG-107K460.
The Loss of Humanity
The Human Rights Dimension of the Civil War in Syria

By YAVUZ GÜÇTÜRK

The Loss of Humanity tries to take a picture of Syria accompanied by cross-sections reflecting sufferings of Syrian people who are turned into nothing but statistics.

Since the onset of the civil war in Syria, not only human rights are violated but also crimes of humanity are committed right before our eyes. This study assesses the developments in Syria from March 2011 to date only and fully through a human rights perspective. If said properly, The Loss of Humanity: The Human Rights Dimension of the Civil War in Syria tries to take a picture of Syria accompanied by cross-sections reflecting sufferings of Syrian people who are turned into nothing but statistics. Their story has now become an entry in the chronicles of history that are gathered through individual cases from different documents. That being said, we also acknowledge and are aware of the fact that this report cannot cover the anguish felt in Syria to the fullest extent.
BOOK REVIEWS

The Worlds of European Constitutionalism
GRÁINNE DE BÜRCA and J.H.H. WEILER

Institutional Change in Turkey
LEILA PIRAN

The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game
BENTE SCHELLER

Turkey and the Arab Spring
GRAHAM E. FULLER

The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbors
ANN-KRISTIN JONASSON

Biography of an Empire
CHRISTINE M. PHILLIOU

The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq
EBUBEKİR CEYLAN

Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Question
FEVZİ BİLGİN and ALİ SARIHAN

No Establishment of Religion
T. JEREMY GUNN and JOHN WITTE, Jr.

Return of a King
WILLIAM DALRYMPLE

Healing the Nation
YÜCEL YANIKDAĞ

The Berlin-Baghdad Express
SEAN MCMEEKIN

The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity
TANER AKÇAM

Türkiye Dış Politikası
ALİ BALCI
The Worlds of European Constitutionalism

Edited by Gráinne de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler

Reviewed by Bertil Emrah Oder

This edited volume on European constitutionalism is a compendium of essays with different interpretations on the constitutional authority and nature of the European Union (EU). This issue has faced various challenges in the last decade not only by national courts and referenda, but also vis-à-vis other international and regional actors, such as United Nations (UN) and European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The volume begins with Joseph Weiler’s prologue and includes five essays that focus on original and deeply entrenched questions surrounding the political and legal constitutionalism of the EU – such as federalism, supremacy, democratic legitimacy, polity questions, constitutional pluralism and the role of international law – by elaborating on judicial responses and transnational developments that embrace international international and regional actors of governance beyond the EU. The most striking and intellectually stimulating part of the book is the “Dialogical Epilogue,” where Joseph Weiler interacts with the authors by posing questions and reflecting his criticism. In his prologue, Joseph Weiler defines the book itself as a “critical exposé” that casts doubt on global and pluralist constitutionalism. By expressing skepticism about a “constitutional discipline without polity and without something resembling the habits and practices of democratic legitimacy,” Weiler emphasizes that global constitutionalism is problematic both normatively and prescriptively since it lacks the relevant prerequisites. He regards both global constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism as “terribly underspecified terms.” Here, it should be noted that Weiler was opposed the European Constitution because he believes that it threatens both the originality and nobility of European integration and its legal order. Emphasizing voluntarily subordination and acceptance of European legal premises, he defends constitutional tolerance, but not constitutional pluralism, and rejects the presumption of incommensurably of authority in case constitutional orders contact. According to Weiler, a pluralistic approach that denies hierarchy ignores the fact that democratic constitutionalism is based on self-restraint while striking a balance between hierarchy and pluralism. His thoughts transcend the boundaries of EU law and contribute to constitutional theory: “I would even risk suggesting that in our advanced market societies, the pendulum has swung, perhaps, too much in the direction of the pluralism, to the detriment of the social and the polity (p. 18).”

The first two essays of the book focus directly on the debate on the character of the EU and assumptions of being international and constitutional, as well as the place of the EU in political modernity. Bruno de Witte analyzes the EU as an international and continuing legal experiment by referring to its history, states’ practices as well as its basic doctrinal and judicial interpretations. De Witte follows...
the conclusion of Wyatt and Dashwood, accepting the EU as a developed international organization containing an embryonic federation (Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, p. 132). He states that the member states have clearly experimented with the Lisbon Treaty’s “toolkit of international law” through the extensive use of opt-outs, declarations, transition clauses, etc. Even from the perspective of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its purposive interpretation approach that defends the autonomy of EU law, de Witte defines EU law as “an advanced species of the genus international law.” He claims that classifying EU law as an international law experiment will have internal and external benefits. Internally, this would offer a sober assessment about member states’ position as “master of the Treaties” and their dedication to international law, e.g., rule of consensus on the treaty revision. Understanding EU law as a special part of international law may also maximize its external effect as a source of legal inspiration for other states and organizations.

In the second essay, Neil Walker concentrates on the assumption that the EU reflects a variation of political modernity that contributes to late modernity. He submits a frame of modernity based on a threefold scheme, including collective agency (popular sovereignty and its challenges), generative resources (interaction of particularist and Universalist themes), and political ontology (tension between collectivism and individualism). By using this frame, he aims to refrain from “terminologically reductive answers” to the nature of the EU. Walker also draws attention to the “instrumentally grounded legal supranationalism” provided by ECJ during the developmental stages of the EU, where the legal instrument was both the object and agent of integration (p. 86, comp. also Dehousse, T & Weiler, J, “The Legal Dimension”, in Wallace, W, (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (London: Printer, 1990), p. 243). He assumes that “the prominence of institutional and legal-instrumental dimension offered both a vital channel and a limiting condition of its (EU’s) collective agency.” Most importantly, Walker affirms that the ECJ’s rights-centered approach refers to an individualist emphasis in the EU, which “sits in an increasingly uncomfortable balance with the more collectivist traditions and imperatives of the EU” (p. 91). In favor of documentary constitutionalism, he comes to the conclusion that a revival constitutional alternative or project cannot be ruled out (p. 102-104).

The essays by Gráinne de Búrca and Daniel Halberstam look at the pluralist and constitutionalist approaches based on the positions of the Court of First Instance (CFI, namely General Court after Lisbon Treaty) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Kadi cases (see especially T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II 3649; C-402/05 P and C-451/05 P Kadi and Al Barakat v. Commission and Council, [2008] ECR I-6351; T-85/09 Kadi v. Commission, 30 September 2010). These well-known cases have external implications for European constitutionalism. While the CFI adopted a constitutionalist approach in Kadi 1 by referring to the unity of EU and international law, and accepting the hierarchy of international law, the ECJ upheld a diametrically opposing stand – judicial pluralism – on appeal. The ECJ defined the EU as an autonomous system that decides its own standards and values separately from international law. De Búrca presents an insightful analysis of pluralist approaches that favor politics over international legal norms. She also co-existence of fragmented entities and decisions on the one hand, and constitutionalist approaches based on Kantian cosmopol-
itanism and global harmonization of values on the other. Here, Kantian constitutionalism and new interpretations submitted by Habermas and Koskenniemi are of particular relevance. De Búrca offers a soft constitutionalist approach by referring to a renewed scholarship of Kantian cosmopolitanism and dialogic approaches after the Solange case law (Solange I in 1974 and Solange II in 1986) was discussed in the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 37, 271; 73, 339 BvR 197/83). De Búrca’s soft constitutionalist approach is a clearly structured and balanced conceptualization of the mutual recognition and preservation of European and universal spheres as well as legal-constitutional values of European and international legal orders. It provides a path for the EU to keep its commitments to international law as a global actor and its own values regarding fundamental rights and guarantees of due process: “Had the Court of Justice (…) invoked international norms rather than insisting on the primacy and the relevance of internally determined EU standards when refusing to implement the Security Council Resolution without due process guarantees, it would not only have provided a better example for other states and organizations contemplating the implementation of the UN sanctions regime, but it would have also strengthened the claim of the EU is an actor which maintains a strong commitment to international law and institutions” (p 138). By citing the ECJ’s developing case law on international economic and maritime law, de Búrca comes to the conclusion that the EU resembles the U.S. in regards to “instrumentalist engagement of international law” (p. 148-149).

In the fourth essay, Halberstam offers a plural constitutionalism approach for the competing claims for local and global, while he accepts the EU as “perhaps the most advanced institutional embodiment of taking constitutionalism beyond the state” (p. 152). He analyzes the CFI’s global constitutionalism approach in Kadi 1 as a denial of the EU’s authoritative political will and circumvention of the member states’ voices. In this respect, the ECJ’s approach in Kadi 1 is seen as a consolidation of local constitutionalism. Halberstam’s position purports Advocate General (AG) Maduro’s assumptions that comply with plural constitutionalism and provide “openness to governance beyond Europe,” as AG Maduro states that other international institutions “are sometimes better placed to weigh those fundamental interests” (Opinion of AG Maduro on January 23, 2008 in C-402/05 P and C-451/05 P, Kadi 1, para. 44). As a proponent of plural constitutionalism, Halberstam claims that the concept of primacy refers to primus inter pares, but not supremacy with a hierarchy.

Nico Krisch’s final essay on pluralism in postnational law could be regarded as an argumentative paper in support of normative pluralism. Regarding pluralist alternatives and criticism of classical constitutionalism, Krisch supports a normative appeal of pluralism not only as a paradigm that reflects the fragmented structure of the postnational order, but also as a chance for divided societies “to contest, destabilize, and delegitimize entrenched power positions” (p. 261). Since Krisch relates his normative pluralism to public autonomy and prefers it to the ultimate claim to authority, he clearly defines hierarchy, entrenched institutions, and the unifying or accommodating tendency of constitutionalism. He also rejects “all-out laissez-faire” and speaks of polities that deserve respect and tolerance. Accordingly, depending on practices of public autonomy, he determines the polities that deserve respect: “The weight of a collective’s claim will follow from the strength of its social grounding, of the par-
ticipatory practices that support as well as the plausibility of its attempt to balance inclusiveness and particularity” (p. 252). However, as Weiler asserts, it is not clear who and which method determines the polities that deserve respect (p. 302). Here, Krisch does not have assurance against the risk of arbitrariness (p. 303-304). Assessing the pluralist approach from the perspective of the rule of law, Krisch attacks its core concepts – legal certainty and integrity – by stating that those are often elusive even in domestic constitutional settings. Although Kirsch adopts a normative pluralist approach in compliance with the notion of systemic pluralism based on conflicting conceptions of laws for each polity, the concretization of this approach and its interaction with current conflicts are largely absent.

*The Worlds of Constitutionalism* is not only a stimulating book with in depth discussions on European constitutionalism(s), but also a printed forum of high quality intellectual debate on the dominant issues of constitutional theory in general. It appeals to EU law circles, legal and political researchers, and decision-makers. Providing the same intellectual challenge and motivation as *European Constitutionalism Beyond State* by J.H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), the book could be regarded as the most recent innovative work on European constitutional scholarship. The book’s dialogical epilogue is a vivid element and provides the opportunity for interaction and responsiveness. Through its Turkish lens, where socio-political fragmentation and the dominance of politics are striking features and the EU has never been discussed in the political arena from constitutionalist point of view, the book becomes more inspiring and deserves ultimate attention.

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**Institutional Change in Turkey**  
*The Impact of European Union Reforms on Human Rights and Policing*

*By Leila Piran*  

*Reviewed by Haitham Saad Aloudah*

As a researcher interested in Turkish foreign policy and domestic politics, I was very captivated with the book’s title as it entails an analysis of the way in which the EU reforms have impacted Turkey’s human rights record and development. However, this also raises questions, such as what were the sources of the democratization and human rights reforms? Has the EU been the main force behind such transformation? Or, are there other domestic factors that we need to take into account as well? Such analysis enables us to draw significant conclusions on the development of the role of the police and other government control and protection tools in a human rights context and evaluate possible causes of such reforms.

According to Piran, this book was motivated by her interest in human rights issues and democratization reforms in states that are dom-
inated by the militarily, i.e., Turkey. It should be noted that Turkey has undergone a huge transformation under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and is no longer militarily dominated, at least compared to prior governments. However, her work is significant in understanding the development of human rights in Turkey as a state that previously dominated by the military. Piran investigates the domestic causes behind police reforms, particularly after the 1980 military coup. Moreover, her book focuses on the role of the Turkish National Police in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against any domestic or external threats to the Republic. This mainly included counterterrorism campaigns against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

This volume includes five main chapters; chapter one, “The Theoretical Terrain,” describes the institutional history of the Turkish National Police. It shows the way in which it steadily shifted from an unclear law enforcement body to a more independent law enforcement agency that was trained to fight terrorists and insurgency groups. In this chapter, Piran presents a theory that explains the reasons behind such a shift and examines other theories from Europeanization, police reform and democratization literature. This section of the book is of great importance due to its theoretical nature and analysis of additional literature. Although it must have been difficult for Piran to cover three different literatures and bring them together in a limited space, she was able to present an interesting theoretical account for readers to ponder before exploring her findings.

Chapter two – “Overview of the Turkish National Police: Historical Continuities and Change” – looked at the bureaucratic nature and structure of the National Police and the way in which policemen are viewed in society. Generally, Piran presents a clear picture of the development of the National Police’s role since the 1970s, including Turgut Ozal’s reforms to professionalize the agency. Although this chapter was dominated by a historical description of the institution’s development, it is necessary to explain its historical development to expand our understanding of the case in hand.

Chapter three – “Research and Findings” – combine the author’s own research and fieldwork. It begins with a general view of the National Police’s position and role using questionnaires that contained open-ended questions from 2007. The second part focuses on analyzing the participants’ responses and the author’s findings. Piran also supported her findings through casual interviews carried out between 2007 and 2008, taking into account different internal and external factors. The author utilizes a comparative approach to study Turkey’s progress against two different countries: Bulgaria and Romania. She states, “in comparison to Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey has shown the greatest level of commitment to fulfilling the EU’s democratic criteria” (p.93). This is one of the main contributions of this book as it acknowledges that the two countries that recently joined the EU were actually less committed to fulfilling the EU’s democratic criteria compared to Turkey, a country that is still seeking membership. However, the most important point to raise here is that the author argues that the EU was not the main force behind the transformation of Turkey’s National Police, human rights and democratization since the 1970s; rather, it gained its position of influence after 1999.

Chapter four, entitled “Institutional, Legal, and Policy Changes,” examines how the Turk-
ish government’s reforms from Turgut Ozal through the ruling AK Party have been carried out to meet the people’s wish for a democratic transformation and, later, to please the EU. This chapter looks specifically at the growing power of the National Police and the development of new policing practices, including the creation of the Office of Special Operations. Piran stated, “I addressed the dismal and undemocratic state of the Turkish judiciary that has contributed to the EU’s concerns as expressed in the Commission’s 2012 Annual Report” (p. 124).

Chapter Five is the concluding chapter that reflects on the study’s findings, as well as Piran’s expectations on future reforms and Turkey’s relations with the EU. She also emphasizes the importance of such a study for Turkey and its benefits for future policies and reforms. Piran analysis focuses mainly on security and identity perceptions in both Turkey and the EU, which is important as identity and security influence Turkey’s potential to become an EU member.

Dr. Piran was able to gather a variety of evidence through her fieldwork and presents a captivating account on the democratic and police reforms in Turkey, including an analysis of both international and domestic factors. It can be argued that this book is successful in offering a general introduction to Turkish institutional reform with a particular focus on the police and law enforcement. However, this volume could have been benefitted from the utilization of a process tracing methodology. Process tracing is very useful in cases where there are a number of different explanations to what motivated police and democratization reforms because it allows us to test and evaluate the significance of the various accounts offered in the literature. This method of analysis allows the researcher to filter previous theoretical explanations (variables), including the researcher’s own theory, and arrive at a necessary and sufficient answer.

This book is of great value to scholars and researchers who study Turkish domestic politics. Furthermore, it is interesting for students and observers who seek to understand both Turkish-EU relations and the democratization process in Turkey. Personally, Piran’s work has enhanced my knowledge in two main areas: 1) EU-Turkish relations and the EU’s impact on the Turkish democratization process; and 2) the role of the Turkish National Police and development of human rights issues. Overall, Piran’s book is well structured and very enlightening. I advise academics from different universities to recommend this book to politics and International Relations students who are interested in understanding the connections between security and democracy in Turkish politics.
The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game
Foreign Policy Under the Assads

By Bente Scheller

Reviewed by Jinan Bastaki

How has the Syrian regime, being the ‘odd man out’ in the Middle East, survived for so many years under the Assads? Given its survival, what makes the current uprising, now nearing its third year, different? And did the Assads always act on ideological grounds? These are the central questions that scholar and foreign policy analyst Bente Scheller tries to answer in her book, The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game: Foreign Policy Under the Assads, by analyzing the Assads’ foreign policy and the link to domestic policies and the current revolt.

Scheller argues that a central tactic for Hafez al-Assad’s 30 year rule was ‘waiting’ – meaning that if they waited long enough, international actors’ policies towards Syria would shift – and that Bashar al-Assad continued this tradition. She supplants this with many examples where Hafez al-Assad was successful; for instance, Rafiq al-Harriri’s assassination in Lebanon in 2005 was widely blamed on Syria and there was much international and regional criticism. However, the international approach changed without Syria altering its stance or bowing to pressure and nothing was ever done to hold Syria accountable. Furthermore, she argues that the regime was willing to compromise on ideology when it would be beneficial for their longevity. Yet as the Syrian revolt has shown, this strategy has not been successful in suppressing the uprising nor in deflecting international criticism. Nevertheless, the strategy of waiting has not been a complete failure, as Syria has managed to avoid any international military intervention. In order to show how ‘waiting has served the regime well, Scheller describes Syria’s relations with its neighbors and major international actors, such as the U.S. and Russia, as well as its foreign policy strategy with the various players.

Scheller’s book is valuable at this time particularly as it highlights Syria’s previous relations with its current allies, and how that relates to the uprising. In particular, her chapter on Iran shows that the relationship goes deeper than simply a “Shiite axis,” as Syria supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s in order to thwart Saddam Hussein’s plan for regional dominance. Syria’s support for various resistance groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, shows that sect never featured strongly in the regime’s consideration. That said, Scheller also examines changing regional dynamics with the recent Sunni-Shiite schism, and how that has altered Syria’s relations with its former nemesis, Iraq. One of the book’s strengths is that by describing Syria’s foreign policy and relations with various international actors, the reader is allowed to form his or her own conclusions about what has enabled the Assads to remain in power. While the author does offer her own insights and explana-
tions, she does not present them as the only possible rationalization.

Scheller is also careful not to paint the Assad regime solely as a brutal dictatorship, which is important to gain an accurate picture and understand today's conflicting views regarding the Assads. While not exceptionally detailed, she discusses the Syrian government's open door policy for Arab refugees, particularly those from Palestine and Iraq. Palestinian refugees were largely integrated and given rights on par with Syrian nationals, bar citizenship, while Iraqi refugees were allowed to flee the destruction following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This strengthened the Assad regime's image as the protector of Arab rights.

At times, Scheller seems to go against her central theme that the Assad regime's main approach in foreign policy was waiting, and that Hafez al-Assad has shown to act “more on pragmatic than ideological grounds” (p. 18). Based on her own analysis, it would seem that Hafez al-Assad waited strategically when that seemed to be the best tactic, and acted when that it was in their favor, such as their support for the U.S. during the Gulf War. While waiting definitely features into Hafez al-Assad's strategy, it does not seem to explain why his regime lasted so long or why his son's regime has not compromised with the protesters, particularly as many of the Assads' international decisions were seen as provocative – such as allowing Palestinian resistance groups, such as Hamas, to have a base in Syria despite being branded as “terrorists” by the U.S., and Bashar al-Assad's outspokenness with regards to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Can what ostensibly seems to be ‘waiting’ be characterized as more than just ensuring the longevity of the regime? It would appear that cooperating with more powerful international actors could ensure the durability of the regime more than provocative international dealings. Waiting has only been successful because the international community had other more pressing considerations in the Middle East, namely Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Israel-Palestine conflict. It seems that the Assads were able to merge ideology and pragmatism in their foreign policy and ensure their prolonged existence without making large ideological compromises.

The chapter on Syrian-Israeli relations is slightly problematic. Scheller argues that it would seem that the Syrian-Israeli issue should be the easiest to solve as it is purely territorial, referring to Israel's occupation and illegal annexation of the Golan Heights. However, she states that the reason there has never been an agreement is both sides' unwillingness to compromise, as well as mutual suspicion. This assessment decontextualizes Israel's role in the Middle East and overlooks the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Syria is currently home to over 500,000 Palestinian refugees, the majority of which are stateless. Any agreement with Israel would have to take into account the refugees, which is something that Israel is not willing to compromise on. Moreover, Syria's mistrust of Israel is based on fact; after Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, Israel (illegally) annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan. Israel also moved more than 500,000 Israeli settlers to the Occupied West Bank in contravention of international law. Thus, to characterize Syria's actions simply as 'stubbornness' misses the point of principle and fact.

Bente Scheller's book is a timely analysis of Syria's foreign policy, and offers an interesting view regarding the agenda and reasoning behind the Assads' foreign policy. She posits that Syria's strategy has always been to wait out international criticism of its policies, as it
eventually changes without the Syrian regime having to change its stance. This is important as it helps to explain Bashar al-Assad’s current strategy in the face of international condemnation of his treatment of the uprising. That said, as Scheller herself shows, there was more to Hafez al-Assad’s strategy than waiting. Moreover, some chapters, particularly on Syrian-Israeli relations, are overly simplistic and ignore the history and law surrounding the conflict.

Turkey and the Arab Spring
Leadership in the Middle East

By Graham E. Fuller

Reviewed by Andrew A. Szarejko

Some 15 to 20 years from today, it will be illuminating to examine how academic and policy circles read the period from early 2013 to late 2014 in Turkey. There are many competing narratives about the future of the country. One pessimistic reading that is currently popular with many American observers of Turkey goes as follows: the so-called “Turkish model” was all the rage just a couple years ago. Turkey was prospering and democratizing under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which was hailed for its successful fusion of Islamic values and democratic governance. Its leaders were widely respected abroad and were even named on Foreign Policy’s list of the “Top 100 Global Thinkers” three years in a row.1 With the Turkish Republic’s centennial anniversary approaching, the AK Party had grand plans to make Turkey a major player on the international stage. Then a small protest by environmentalists turned into something more. From Taksim to Tunceli, Turkey convulsed for weeks as the Gezi Park protests unfolded. The Turkish model was finished—if the wave of protests was not enough, surely the corruption scandal that erupted in December 2013 put an end to it.2

Fuller’s Turkey and the Arab Spring adds an optimistic postscript to that narrative. The Turkish model may have fallen out of favor for the time being, the former CIA official concedes, but it ultimately represents the best model of governance for predominantly Muslim states in the Middle East. In a region “hungry for leaders of genuine vision” and models of “competent governance,” Turkey is the state best equipped to offer both (pp. 372-374). The AK Party has proven that a democratic government can reflect the piety of its citizenry, while also providing economic growth and playing a constructive role abroad. Recent protests and scandals have called the durability of the model into question. Fuller is pessimistic about the AK Party’s near-term electoral prospects, but in his opinion the party does not have to continue winning elections for the Turkish model to survive.

After using Part One and Part Two to briefly examine the current state of global politics and the meaning of leadership in the Middle
East, Fuller examines the strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish model. This forms the lengthiest section of the book, Part Three. He concludes that there are a number of reasons to remain optimistic about the Turkish model, chief among them its economic success, its establishment of civilian control of the military, its growing ability to accommodate religious and ethnic diversity, and its clear success at the ballot box. Ultimately, however, the key for Fuller is the lack of any other attractive options in the Middle East—other possible claimants like Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are surveyed in Part Four and Part Five and are found wanting. Compared to the competitors, “Turkey represents the only forward-looking, advanced and democratic model that has successfully integrated a form of moderate Islam” (p. 263). Turkey may provide an imperfect model, but it provides a much more attractive option than any other state in the region.

Of course, Turkey may not remain such an attractive option for long. Fuller completed his manuscript in early 2014, and he acknowledges from the start that rapid political developments may overtake his argument. Indeed, he finished writing this book before the June 2014 local elections bolstered the AK Party, before Erdoğan declared his run for president, and before Erdoğan announced that the Gülen Movement (or Hizmet) would be added to a classified list of domestic and external threats. For Fuller and many skeptics, “He is in danger of dismantling his own remarkable legacy and engineering his own political defeat” (p. 347). If he continues down that path, the Turkish model may well lose its reputation for good. The Muslim populations of the Middle East have seen enough of authoritarianism and will not be inclined to take up a Turkish variant—the revolts of the Arab Spring would suggest as much. Nonetheless, Fuller offers a hopeful view of Turkish politics and seems to believe that any missteps now will be only fleeting bumps in the road.

Surely, change in Turkish politics will continue unabated as this review awaits publication. It will be easier to evaluate Fuller’s claims several years from now. Nonetheless, the book is insightful, though it sometimes makes too much effort to find those insights. Fuller brings many factors to bear, and the transitions from one to another are often jarring. For example, Part Six (the final portion of the book) leaps from discussions on Israel to the Kurds and then to the Gülen Movement before finally returning to the broader question of Turkey’s role in an evolving Middle East. For those familiar with Fuller’s previous books, this will come as a surprise as his writing has always been parsimonious. Perhaps his most impactful work is a tight, 196-page appraisal of Turkey’s role in the Muslim world that culminated in a powerful argument for “letting Turkey be Turkey.”

The hallmark of Fuller’s books, Turkey and the Arab Spring included, is a long-term view that eschews the standard U.S.-centric analyses of Turkish politics and foreign policy. That quality is displayed again and shines through an occasionally uneven text. Fuller makes a compelling case that rumors of the Turkish model’s death are greatly exaggerated. The skeptics, however, will want to have an obituary drafted.

Endnotes

1. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was seventh on the 2010 list. Davutoğlu and Erdoğan appeared together at
number 16 in 2011, then again at 28 in 2012. Neither has appeared in the list since then.


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**The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbors: Orientation, Ownership and Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey**

*By Ann-Kristin Jonasson*  

*Reviewed by Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Öner*

The EU has been involved in democracy promotion in the Mediterranean for many years. However, it is facing criticism from its members and partners for prioritizing security and stability over democracy. Particularly following the Arab uprisings, the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts have increasingly been called into question and demands for a new approach towards democratization in the Mediterranean are growing. Ann-Kristin Jonasson’s book, *The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbors: Orientation, Ownership and Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey*, systematically evaluates the EU’s democratization efforts by focusing on democracy promotion in two Mediterranean countries, Jordan and Turkey, and effectively addresses the major pitfalls in the EU’s strategy. Therefore, it is a timely contribution as the Arab revolutions have forced us to reconsider the prospects for democratization in the region.

The book consists of four chapters. The first chapter, which comprises an introduction to the study and a conceptual and theoretical framework, discusses the essential elements of democracy promotion. The chapter starts with a rich conceptual discussion and a thorough review of the literature on democratization based on an extensive bibliography. The theoretical framework seeks to identify the prerequisites for democracy promotion and compare them to the EU’s policies. Three distinct but interrelated concepts stand out in the conceptual and theoretical discussions: orientation, ownership and dialogue – stated in the title of the book. These constitute the three most important pillars in the analytical framework on democracy promotion. The book primarily argues that democracy promotion is likely to be successful if there is a genuine local orientation towards democracy in the partner country.
Moreover, the ownership and dialogue need to be broad and encompass a wide array of actors in order to be democratic. Local actors should take the lead in the formulation and implementation of policies for democratization to take root.

Critical of the focus on the democracy promoters at the expense of partner countries in democratization studies, the author seeks to shed light on the local context, conditions and actors and emphasizes the need to develop country-specific models for democracy promotion to work. Hence, Chapter 2 and 3 present the reader with two elaborate case studies on the EU’s democracy promotion in Jordan and Turkey. Since the EU establishes relations with its southern neighbors through two programs – enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – launched in 2004, the author selected one country from each framework in order to analyze the extent to which the policies differ. As a political scientist, the author’s research interest in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and her previous research experience and contacts in both Jordan and Turkey impacted the case selection.

By using the analytical framework set out in the first chapter, Chapter 2 and 3 competently assess the partner countries’ perceptions of the EU’s democracy promotion and the EU’s view of its relations with the partner country in question. These chapters critically examine the local orientation in EU policy, ownership of the project from the perspective of both the partner countries and the EU, and the level and scope of the dialogue between the EU and local actors based on in-depth and semi-structured interviews conducted between 2006 and 2011 with a variety of actors in Jordan, Turkey and the EU. In order to reveal the differences of opinion among the EU institutions, the author interview representatives from the three EU institutions – the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament – at the country’s desk in Brussels and its Delegation in the respective country. On the partner side, the author questioned government representatives who were directly involved in the negotiations with the EU, representatives from the main opposition party – the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the Republican People’s Party in Turkey – and representatives from different NGOs, as well as independent analysts and experts in both countries. Other sources of data for the book include various documents, surveys, reports and academic research from both countries and the EU. The author is successful in analyzing and presenting a large amount of data, as the clarity of her writing style makes it easy to follow the argument, even if the theoretical premises of the study are reiterated perhaps a little too often.

Jordan and Turkey may appear as odd choices for comparison. Jordan is an authoritarian state, while Turkey is a democracy with serious problems. While Turkey aspires to become a member of the EU, Jordan does not have such a prospect. The history and terms of their relationship with the EU also differ. However, despite these differences, the problems encountered in democracy promotion in both countries are very much alike and reveal the shortcomings in the EU’s approach. In the case of Jordan, a genuine orientation towards democracy is lacking, even if the Jordanian government claims otherwise. As for Turkey, despite a foundational inclination towards democracy promotion in both countries are very much alike and reveal the shortcomings in the EU’s approach. In the case of Jordan, a genuine orientation towards democracy is lacking, even if the Jordanian government claims otherwise. As for Turkey, despite a foundational inclination towards democracy promotion is reactive and very much dependent on the EU’s attitude. As one of the core elements of the EU’s democratization efforts in both cases, conditionality
takes the form of respect for the common values defined within the ENP framework and the Copenhagen criteria. Thus, in both frameworks, it is the EU that sets the criteria, while the partner governments are expected to implement the reforms, which does not augur well for local ownership. Rather than a process that involves different actors and segments of society, the EU’s democracy promotion is intergovernmental in character. Furthermore, as the research findings indicate, the limited number of NGOs that the EU works with and its funding scheme do not bode well for NGO capacity building or the NGOs’ contributions to democratization in partner countries.

After a brief assessment of the EU’s new approaches, the last chapter discusses the extent to which these approaches – the New Response for the ENP following the Arab uprisings and the Positive Agenda towards Turkey – differ from previous policies or programs. Based on a comparison of the research in both contexts, the chapter critically evaluates the deficiencies in the EU’s democracy promotion and offers a number of recommendations to correct policies.

While the negative impact of the pitfalls in democracy promotion on the local context is discussed in detail in the book, its impact on the EU and its image is not accounted for. The foundational treaties of the EU, various decisions and conclusions of the Council of Ministers, and Commission communications, reports and financial instruments – namely pre-accession assistance and development cooperation that reiterates the EU’s commitment to human rights and democracy – form the basis of the civilian power image that the EU wishes to project. Thus, problems in democracy promotion weaken the soft power that the EU wields on a regional and global scale. Furthermore, even if a full-fledged comparison is beyond the scope of the book, a more explicit comparison with the democracy promotion strategies of the U.S., as the other major promoter in the region, could have better highlighted the EU’s capabilities, potential and limitations in reaching out to pro-democracy forces. Still, the book demonstrates that democracy cannot be exported or imposed by an external power; domestic dynamics play a decisive role. External forces, considered to be authoritative and legitimate by the recipient society, could play an important role that is conducive to democratization by collaborating with local actors, supporting pro-democracy forces against authoritarian tendencies and listening to local conceptualizations of democracy.

The book will primarily appeal to students of European integration, EU Neighborhood Policy and enlargement studies. It will also be of interest to those involved in democracy studies, comparative politics and regional studies as well as student of political science and IR, even those not well-versed with the European integration studies. The book might be particularly appealing for readers interested in Turkish-EU relations, especially at a time when the EU’s impact on the reform process in Turkey is growing weaker and the prospects for membership look bleak at best.
Christine M. Philliou’s meticulous study, rooted in a harmony of multiple theoretical and methodological perspectives, elaborates on the experience of Ottoman governance between the 1770s and the 1850s. Since the Ottoman Empire governed a multi-confessional, multilingual and multinational territory, Philliou emphasizes the necessity of synthesizing sources scattered across the archives of successor states and the Great Powers in order to grasp the Ottoman Empire’s complexities. Her hybrid vantage point, based on egodocuments and archival sources written in Ottoman Turkish, Greek, French and English, reveals the diffusion of Ottoman governance into many official and unofficial spheres of influence. Thus, Philliou’s revisionist approach challenges the binary of state and society by exploring “how institutions, networks, and individual personalities that functioned within the state were influx and being shaped by forces and ideas outside the formal state apparatus” (p.18). Philliou supports this argument through the elaborate account of Phanariots, who operated within and between the Ottoman institutions despite their lack of official askeri, or tax-exempt status.

Phanariots, the Greek Orthodox dominated Christian elite of the Ottoman Empire, established ascendancy over the interlinked offices of the grand dragoman, the dragoman of the fleet, and two voyvodas of the Danubian Principalities (Moldovia and Wallachia) by the second decade of the 18th century. Although they lost most of their influence after the outbreak of the Greek-hetairist movement in 1821, some neo-Phanariots managed to attach themselves to offices and semi-official missions in the expanding political sphere of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 19th century. Philliou frames her narrative around the biography and writings of a Phanariot individual, Stephanos Vogorides (1770s-1859). Vogorides/Istefanaki Bey was born into a Bulgarian-speaking family as Stoiko Stoikov and entered into the Phanariot system through his father’s attachment to the voyvoda of Moldavia. In the process of Hellenization, he shifted his name to the Greek language and received a Greek education in the Princely Academy of Bucharest. In the 1790s, Vogorides made his way to Istanbul where he served the Porte in various ways, ranging from diplomatic missions to the coordination of relations with the voyvoda of Moldovia. Glimpses into Vogorides’ life throughout the six chapters of the book sheds light on the political, cultural, and social transformations occurring in Ottoman politics.

Chapter one, “The Houses of Phanar,” elaborates how Phanariots established extensive power relations through their ability to transform commercial, cultural, social, and linguistic capitals into political power. After the Carlowitz Treaty, the ongoing territorial con-
flicts with the bordering Russian and Austrian Empires necessitated the appointment of individuals who had a good understanding of the trade of diplomatic information, like polyglot Phanariot physicians, and translators in the service of the grand vizier to the governance of the Danubian Principalities. Philliou associates the distinctive transregional character of the Phanariot system with multiple administrative functions attached to the offices of dragomans and voyvodas, such as grain provision in Istanbul and the collection of diplomatic information. To gain a picture of how Phanariots connected themselves to the Ottoman imperial house, Janissaries, merchant guilds, the Orthodox Church, trading diaspora, and local magnates of the Balkans while fulfilling their administrative obligations, Philliou examines the investiture ceremony of voyvodas.

Chapter two, “Volatile Synthesis,” focuses on the crisis in the Ottoman Empire between the 1780s and 1821 through the intertwined biographies of Nicholas Mavroyeni (voyvoda of Wallachia in the 1780s), Osman Pasvanoğlu (janissary-cum-notable of the Vidin district), and Halet Efendi (one of the prominent Ottoman bureaucrats in the 1810s), all of whom played a decisive role in maintaining “the volatile synthesis” between the Porte, Phanariots, magnates of Balkans, and Janissary patronage networks until the outbreak of the Greek Revolt. Philliou’s examination of this period through the lens of the Phanariots addresses many neglected issues, like the association between Mavroyeni’s army of Christians, the Nizam-ı Cedit reforms and the significance of Hanedan-ı Erba’a (Dynasty of Four) Edict of 1819 in the Ottoman political culture.

Chapter three to five – “Demolitions,” “Phanariot Remodeling and Struggle for Continuity,” and “Diplomacy and the Restoration of a New Order” – are dedicated to three changes in the post-1821 Ottoman governance: 1) day-to-day violence in Istanbul in the 1820s, resulting in the demise of the Phanariot and Janissary networks; 2) structural changes in governance, especially in diplomacy and military; and 3) expansion of the political landscape in relation with the Mehmed Ali Paşa crisis. In these chapters, Philliou elaborates how some Phanariots, like Vogorides, his son-in-law Constantine Musurus, and Nicholas Aris-tarchi – archrival of Vogorides – restored their positions through their ties to the emergent court factions, representatives of the Great Powers, and the Patriarchate.

Chapter six, “In the Eye of the Storm,” describes how the debate over custodianship of the Christian Holy Places in the Ottoman Palestine created political, diplomatic, and discursive challenges for the Ottomans in the...
early 1850s. Philiou puts Vogorides’ apologia of 1852 at the center of this chapter to grasp diverse responses and predicaments of Ottomans at the disjuncture of international, imperial, and confessional politics.

Philiou’s well-written book deserves special praise for its success in combining linguistic and archival skills with theory of governance and biographic genre. Nevertheless, in such an extensive research, some translation and writing errors are inevitable. Philiou, for instance, translates arz-ı mahzar as “national petition” (p.165) and reads mugâlatät as mül-gatlar (p.193). In a worse example, Philiou misreads “ancak al-küfrî milletîn vahidetîn mâ-sadakınca Rum tâifesi…” as “ancak al-küfrî millâ-I vahide[-i] ma sadûncà rum tâ‘ifesî” and mistranslates it as “now our number one infidel millet in terms of loyalty” (p.19). She did not recognize the Arabic hadith within the Ottoman text, and tried to read it in Turkish. Nevertheless, these errors, which only indicate her lack of proficiency in the Arabic and Ottoman languages, do not harm the pleasure of reading this valuable study. Lastly, one may question whether the life of Vogorides reflects the biography of the Ottoman Empire as the title of the book suggests. Considering the existence of various factions within the Phanariots themselves, the life of Vogorides would remain inadequate even as a representation of the Phanariot system. Despite these issues, Philiou’s study provides the reader with an impressive model of analysis for the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq
Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East

By Ebubekir Ceylan

Reviewed by M. Talha Çiçek

Studies on the Ottoman modernization of Arab provinces have received an increasing amount of attention by historians. Concordantly, scholars are using Ottoman sources to a growing extent. In this sense, Ebubekir Ceylan’s book, which is recycled from his PhD dissertation, is an important contribution to the existing literature. He uses new materials from the Ottoman and the British archives as well as Arabic and English periodicals. The book analyses provincial capitals, and key concepts such as Tanzimat reforms, centralization, modernization and Ottomanism. It has six chapters analyzing the different aspects of the Ottoman modernization of Baghdad. The book starts with the fall of the Mamluks in Baghdad in 1831 and beginning of the Ottoman centralization of the city. However, the chapters are organized according to topic rather than chronology.

In the first chapter, “Geography, People and History of Ottoman Iraq and Baghdad,” the author deals with the geographical distance between Baghdad and the Ottoman center and how this prevented the Ottomans from establishing proper control over the city. He also
emphasizes how this “question” was resolved by the introduction of modern transportation means such as the Baghdad railway. Ceylan then sheds light on the ethnic, religious and urban/nomad structure of the population in Baghdad and its historical transformation in the modern period. Finally, he describes the rise and fall of the Mamluks in Baghdad.

Chapter 2 focuses on “bringing the state back in” with the reassertion of direct Ottoman rule in Iraq. The author argues that the reasons for Ottoman centralization were the Persian threat to recapture Baghdad and tribal disorder in the region. He describes the fall of the Jalilis in Mosul, collapse of the Kurdish emirates in northern Iraq and the disintegration of the semi-independent dynasties in Baghdad through the use of Ottoman and British documents. The threat of the nomadic tribes to the order in the province was reduced by the expansion of the Ottoman administration. Ceylan then analyzes the conscription of Iraqis for the reinforcement of the provincial army.

Chapter 3 analyzes Ottoman provincial administration in Baghdad. Since Baghdad was one of the most important provinces in the empire, its governors were selected among high-ranking officials and, as demonstrated in detail by Ceylan, played a significant role in the reassertion of Ottoman authority between 1831 and 1872 as the agents of the centralization policies. He reserves a special place for Midhat Pasha’s reforms in the history of Iraq. However, he notes that it is misleading to treat the provincial governors preceding Midhat, such as Reşid and Namık Pashas, as if they were non-existent. Apart from the governors, the chapter also includes valuable information on the provincial bureaucracy in Baghdad, i.e., low-ranking officials. The creation and dissemination of the Ottoman bureaucracy in Baghdad is described in detail in the book.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 seek to consider the extent to which the centralization reforms, i.e., Tanzimat, were carried out in Baghdad and Iraq. In Chapter 4, Ceylan gives special attention to the establishment of provincial administrative councils and the implementation of two significant laws, namely the Provincial Law of 1864 and Ottoman Land Code of 1858. He argues that the introduction of these laws had a lasting influence on the history of Baghdad and Iraq. In Chapter 5, the author discusses the influence of the implementation of centralization reforms on tribal structures in the region and concludes that the application of these laws led to the dissolution of tribal structures. He also sheds light on the disagreements between the central and provincial government during the implementation of these reforms.

The final chapter examines the development of public works in the Tanzimat period. In total compliance with the title of the book, the author indicates that the governors of Baghdad, especially Midhat Pasha, built all the instruments of a modern state in Baghdad – namely schools, public buildings, prisons, barracks, transportation infrastructure, hospitals and communications infrastructure (telegraph lines and postal services) – which enabled them to control the provinces and its citizens.

Ebubekir Ceylan’s book skillfully presents the political and social modernization of late Ottoman Iraq and Baghdad in an eminently readable narrative. His well-produced book contains useful charts and maps. Ceylan contributed a truly valuable piece of work using a considerable amount of sources, providing new perspectives on the history of a comparatively neglected district of the late Ottoman Empire.
The Kurdish question has been one of the most highly debated issues in Turkey for the last few decades, if not earlier. Although researchers and observers have analyzed nearly every aspect of the issue, new publications about the Kurdish question continue to appear. Among these is an edited volume offering a general overview of the issue since its genesis.

The volume is made up of four parts. The first part, which consists of three articles, focuses on the historical evolution of Kurdish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. In the first essay, Djene R. Bajalan examines several texts that were penned by Kurds during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as early examples of Kurdish nationalist discourse. He argues that this period corresponds to the initial phase of Hroch’s model of small-nation nationalism, which is characterized by an increase in literary interest and activity, as well as a lack of political organization. In the second article, Oral Çalışlar provides a very general summary of the history of the Kurdish question during the Republican period with a larger emphasis on the past few years. Without engaging with any academic study, Çalışlar, who is an experienced journalist in Turkey, presents his understanding of how the Kurdish question emerged and developed over time as well as his observations and suggestions on the democratic opening launched by the AK Party in 2009. The third article, written by E. Fuat Keyman and Umut Özkirimli discusses how the Kurdish question is conceived and approached in Turkey. Underlining the continuing dominance of nationalist views and communitarian concerns among both ethnic Turks and Kurds, the authors claim that the permanent settlement of the Kurdish question can only be reached through its “de-ethnicization,” whereby both parties prioritize universal values such as equality, diversity and human rights.

The second part of the book consists of six articles and examines various aspects of the Kurdish question in Turkey. In the first article, Cengiz Çandar presents a general evaluation of the roots, present state and prospects of the Kurdish issue. He defines the Kurdish question as the struggle of the Kurds – “the only stateless people of the Middle East” – to establish their own nation-state and asserts that the question will be resolved either when the Kurds achieve this aspiration or when they are fully recognized, with appropriate power-sharing arrangements, by the societies that they live in. In the following chapter, Michael M. Günter briefly introduces a number of groups and organizations that have taken part in the Kurdish movement spearheaded by the PKK. He argues that although the PKK started off as a small and isolated party with a Marxist outlook, it has developed a violent insurgency into a broad, complex and multifaceted nationalist movement by forming ancillary organizations with various political and social functions.
Ali Sarıhan compares the situation before and after the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire that took place in 1999-2004. He argues that the marked decrease in the intensity of conflict in the latter period was due to: 1) changes in the PKK’s strategies; 2) the government’s increased use of soft power alongside security measures; 3) a decrease in the support of neighboring governments for the PKK as a result of improved relations with Turkey; and 4) the more compromising attitude adopted by Öcalan to get out of prison. Kılıç Buğra Kanat attempts to untangle the lack of consistency that the PKK has shown in respecting its unilateral ceasefires and peaceful declarations. He claims that the organization has used “diversionary attacks” on military and civilian targets as a tactical tool for its survival; by provoking retaliation by the state, the PKK was then able to (re-)mobilize Kurds under its leadership “by victimization.”

In the following chapter, Hugh Pope evaluates the AK Party’s democratic opening for the Kurds. According to him, while this eventually led to the Turkish state’s recognition that the Kurdish question was not solely a security problem and necessitated a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach, mutual confidence between state authorities and “Turkish Kurds” is still limited. In the final article of this part, Gökhan Bacık and Bezen Balamir Coşkun seek to explain why the Kurdish question has not yet been solved. The authors argue that the responsibility falls mainly on the Turkish state, which adhered to military means in tackling the question for a long time and refused to compromise the Kemalist understanding of nationalism. This, in turn, created a spiral of conflict, mutual alienation and distrust, making a peaceful understanding increasingly difficult.

The third part of the book pertains to the civil society aspect of the Kurdish question and consists of two monographs on two Islamic civil society groups that have operated in the East and Southeast of Turkey. In the first one, Mustafa Gürbüz examines the Kurdish Hezbollah, first as a revolutionary Islamist organization that fought the PKK, and then as a rather peaceful movement of Islamic revivalism. In the following article, Doğan Koç discusses the sociopolitical impacts of the Hizmet (Gülen) Movement on the Kurds in Turkey. He argues that with its pacifist and non-political outlook that integrates traditional and modern values, the movement’s educational and fellowship activities, albeit not purposely, drove many Kurds away from not only participating in but also supporting the political violence of the PKK.

The final part of the book examines the international dimensions of Turkey’s Kurdish question. H. Akin Ünver examines the place of the Kurdish question in Turkey’s relations with Europe and the United States until the late 1990s. He argues that while the grievances of the Kurds did not make a significant impact on how the U.S. and Europe approached Turkey for decades, the increasing role of social forces in politics gradually strengthened the position of the U.S. Congress and European Parliament in foreign policy and caused complications in Turkey’s relations with the West. Joshua W. Walker discusses recent developments (until 2012) in Turkey’s domestic politics and Middle East policy that are related to the Kurdish question. Claiming that the settlement of this question is essential for the security of the whole region, the author concludes that the optimism heralded by the conciliatory discourses and deeds of the AK Party government was damaged by a number of developments after 2009.

There are a few editorial shortcomings in the book. First, there were apparently no clear
standards set for contributions, resulting in a large variety of writing styles from theory-based discussions (Keyman & Özkırımlı) to opinion pieces with a few or no references (Çalışlar, Çandar & Pope). Second, apart from the 15-page introduction, which provides short synopses for each chapter, there is no attempt on the side of the editors for a broader evaluation or synthesis of the arguments presented by the contributors. To correct a couple of errors, the name of the chief of general staff in 1998 was Hüseyin (not Hayri) Kıvrıkoğlu (p. 106), and instead of “international conjecture,” which is frequently stated in pp. 157-62, it must be the “international conjuncture” that has helped the AK Party government in its struggle against the PKK.

It is also a pity for the contributors that the Kurdish question entered into a new phase when a “solution process” was launched in late 2012 through proxy talks among the government, the PKK leadership and Öcalan in prison. Even though one of the editors points this out in the introduction, the articles were evidently written before this process began. Therefore, no serious commentary or assessment regarding the present state and the future of this process is found in the book, and some remarks, such as the pessimism regarding the slowdown of the 2009 Kurdish opening (p. 235), were already irrelevant when the book entered the market.

All that said, this volume, which consists of essays by renowned scholars and journalists, provides valuable information and commentary about the past and present of various aspects of the Kurdish question, and any student who would like to have an understanding of not only the earlier phases of the Kurdish issue but also the on-going solution process will benefit from it. In addition, with all its shortcomings, the book can bridge the need for an updated basic reading, if not a textbook, for Turkey’s Kurdish question.

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**No Establishment of Religion**

**America’s Original Contribution to Religious Liberty**

*Edited By T. Jeremy Gunn and John Witte, Jr.*


*Reviewed by Brett G. Scharffs*

John Witte, Jr., the Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University, and Jeremy Gunn, a professor at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco and a Senior Fellow at the Emory Center, have edited a valuable new book, *No Establishment of Religion: America’s Original Contribution to Religious Liberty.*

True to its title, the book is a survey of the history of the non-establishment principle in the United States, and an assessment of how the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment contributes to the protection of religious liberty. As Professor Witte explains, “This volume aims to deepen our understanding of the establishment clause in..."
American History and our appreciation for its signature contribution to the modern understanding of religious liberty” (p. 1). The book is also relevant to current debates taking place in Turkey about what it means to be a secular state, including visions based on a strong ideological secularism that resonates with the non-establishment idea of muscular separation of church and state and those views based on a more pluralistic secularism, which relates more closely to more accommodating interpretations of the establishment clause.

As Thomas Jefferson described it, the U.S.'s constitutional guarantees of disestablishment and free exercise of religion were a “novel experiment” when they were implemented in the late 18th century. It defied the thousand-year European presumption that political stability and social solidarity rested on the establishment of one form of Christianity that was supported by the state against all other forms of faith. The basic assumption was that a shared religious identity was the glue that held a society together. As James Madison memorably explained it, this Western “career of intolerance” was founded on the legal establishment of one religion and “very little toleration of others.” Madison depicted the convention wisdom as follows: “[I]t was taken for granted that an exclusive and intolerant establishment was essential,” and that “religion could not be preserved without the support of Government, nor Government be supported without an established Religion” (p. 3).

The American experiment turned this conventional wisdom on its head, positing instead that social cohesion could be fostered by guaranteeing religious freedom for everyone and by not having the government support any particular religion. With nearly two hundred and fifty years of experience, the experiment is no longer an untested hypothesis, but rather a tested proposition.

The journey to non-establishment, however, was more circuitous than we often remember. When the First Amendment was drafted in 1789, seven of the original 13 states had some form of religious establishment, and it wasn’t until 1833 that Massachusetts became the last state to abandon its religious preference. This book provides a valuable survey of the historical development and implementation of the idea of non-establishment in U.S. law, which helps us understand the continuing controversies about how the principle should be interpreted and applied.

The meaning of non-establishment was contested from the beginning, and remains controversial even today. As Professor Witte describes it in his introduction, there were three related goals. The first was to “protect the principle of liberty of conscience by foreclosing government for coercively prescribing mandatory forms of religious belief, doctrine, and practice” (p. 7). The second was to “protect the principle of equality of all faiths before the law by preventing the government from singling out certain religious beliefs and bodies for preferential treatment.” (p. 7). Here views differed, with some arguing for a strong “no aid” principle, and others favoring the allowance of non-preferential support of religion by the state. The third animating idea was to “protect the basic principle of separation of the offices and operations of church and state.” (p. 7). This meant that the government was prohibited from, in Jefferson’s words, “intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises,” but was also designed to be protected from interference by religious bodies.
Over time, the interpretation of the principle of non-establishment in U.S. law was divided between two views: one advocating a strong separation of church and state, and the other advocating accommodations of religion that are non-discriminatory and that do not involve direct state funding of religion or involvement of the government in religious affairs. The book traces the development of these views, with an emphasis on the early history.

The book contains 13 chapters, written by an impressive assortment of legal scholars with a range of views. Jeremy Gunn’s chapter develops the dialectic between “separationist” and “cooperationist” accounts of the idea of non-establishment. Michael McConnell focuses on what an establishment of religion entailed during the founding era, and identifies six elements: (1) control over doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church; (2) compulsory church attendance; (3) financial support; (4) prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches; (5) use of church institutions for public functions; and (6) restrictions on political participation for members of the established church” (p. 49). McConnell notes that it is a mistake to view the debate about non-establishment as a debate about the influence of religion in society. Non-establishment was not so much about curtailng religion, as it was about government control over public opinion. He stated, “[D]isestablishment was not an attempt to curtail the influence or prominence of religion in public life. It was to make religious practice free and independent, and therefore strong.”

Mark McGarvie traces the history of state disestablishment between 1776 and 1833. David Little explains the influence of Roger Williams and the puritan concept of rights, including ideas about non-establishment. Paul Finkelman describes the story of disestablishment in New York. Ralph Ketcham explores Madison’s and Jefferson’s views about non-establishment and the political struggle for religious freedom in Virginia. Derek Davis examines the ideas concerning the separation of church and state that emerged from the Continental Congress and Carl Esbeck focuses on the formation of the establishment clause during the First Federal Congress. Daniel Dreisbach concentrates on the prohibition of religious tests. Steven Green addresses the evolution of 19th century understandings of church and state, and Thomas Berg explores the proposed adoption of the Blaine Amendment, which would have prohibited federal funding of religious schools. Kent Greenawalt discusses the difficulty of sorting out the original understanding of the establishment clause. Finally, Martin Marty concludes the book by arguing that the establishment clause was not a rejection of religion, but rather a testimony to the ability of religion to stand on its own two feet and thrive when granted freedom and equal treatment.

The book is a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, lawyers and judges who seek to understand how the principle of non-establishment of religion can be used not as a tool for marginalizing or privatizing religion, but as a means of fulfilling the promise of religious freedom and equality.
Return of a King
The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42

By William Dalrymple

Reviewed by Sabeen Ahmed

William Dalrymple, famed British historian and writer, is widely considered as the leading modern scholar on South Asia and, especially, the British East India Company. His scholarly journey takes him north in his latest work, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42, in which he narrates the events surrounding the first Anglo-Afghan War and details one of the largest strategic and diplomatic disasters in the East India Company’s history.

At its core, the novel is a sweeping epic that narrates the lives of Shah Shuja and Dost Mohammad Khan, intricately and inadvertently caught in the middle of the Great Game: the imperial rivalry between the Russian and British Empires as each vies for control of Central Asia. Dalrymple manages to deliver a humanizing account of the Afghan rulers, outlining their struggles and failures, the disintegration of the great Durrani Empire, and the subsequent emergence of the Sadozai-Barakzai rivalry (a poignant parallel to the larger Russo-Anglo rivalry) that stands as the central power struggle of the War. This period in history, in which the Afghans were no more than “mere pawns on the chessboard of western diplomacy, to be engaged or sacrificed at will,” is a brilliant echo of a modern Afghanistan, riddled with internal discord amid efforts to establish a stable unity against external intervention (p. 10). The book often reads more as a story than a historic narrative – colored by firsthand accounts from British and Russian intelligence officers and generals, and letters and journal entries penned by Afghan political figures and Western travelers – that paints vivid images of the beauty and humility of the Afghan people and countryside against the horrors of British occupation.

The book’s opening chapters examine the social and political climate of Afghanistan leading up to the 1839 War, from Shah Shuja Durrani’s fall and exile to the subsequent rise of Dost Mohammad Khan and the Barakzais. Alongside the emergence of Ranjit Singh’s Sikh Empire in Peshawar, Afghanistan quickly devolves into a land of tribal conflict and regional discord, ripe for interference from British and Russian forces, or the “Battle for Afghanistan.”

Much of the Anglo-Russo competition for Afghanistan emerges as a product of paranoia, through competing intelligence reports gathered by dashing Scotsman Alexander Burnes and Polish-turned-Russian-spy Ivan Vitkevitch, two of the Great Game’s earliest players. Burnes and his brilliantly invaluable Indian secretary and counselor, Mohan Lal Kashmiri, advise London on the political and social climate of Central Asia and urge the British to support Dost Mohammad as Amir. Their counsel is ignored, however, against Major Claude Wade’s appeal to restore the Sadozais to the throne. The central chapters follow Britain’s efforts to ally with and re-
instate the exiled Shah Shuja – headed by Sir William Macnaghten, Major-General William Elphinstone, and Lord Auckland – in the hopes of using him to unify and exert British influence over the region. The British army of 20,000 traverse across the Indus and through the Khyber Pass to Kabul, where they easily remove the Amir and proceed to occupy the region for the next two years. It becomes quickly apparent, however, that overconfidence, lack of regard for Afghan culture and society, and sheer tactical ignorance doom the British to a series of gross strategic errors. As such, it is the Shuja-led British revolt against Dost Mohammad that comprises the heart of the book, not for its political significance, but for its transformative and deeply profound effect on Afghan politics, society, and stability.

"‘I have seen this country, sacred to the harmony of hallowed solitude, desecrated by the rude intrusion of senseless stranger boors, vile in habits, infamous in vulgar tastes, callous leaders in the sanguinary march of heedless conquests, who crushed the feeble heart and hushed the merry voice of mirth, hilarity and joy… To subdue and crush the masses of a nation by military force, when all are unanimous in the determination to be free, is to attempt the imprisonment of a whole people: all such projects must be temporary and transient, and terminate in a catastrophe…’" (p. 194).

The Afghans – who for decades had witnessed power transfers and general political unrest – perceive their returned king as nothing more than a puppet ruler on behalf of British self-interest, and do not hesitate in declaring jihad against British presence in their country. The final chapter of the book details the blossoming distrust, resentment, and hate taking root in the heart of the Afghan people, and the gory massacre of the British garrisons at the hands of Afghan rebels led by Dost Mohammad’s ruthless son, Akbar Khan. While the British generals flounder in a remarkable inability to salvage their position, Dalrymple’s Shah Shuja perseveres as a capable leader of a failing regime, dedicated and determined to the very end.

“Shuja’s reign was brought down not by his own faults but by the catastrophic mishandling of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as managed by Auckland and Macnaghten, and as lost by General Elphinstone” (p. 378).

Dalrymple’s treatise gives the reader a glimpse into a historical event of great significance; one that, though almost 200 years past, sheds light on the political crises and social turmoil that have since plagued South and Central Asia. The author’s passion for the subject matter and dedication to his craft shine through in the accessibility of his prose and use of material researched from British, Russian, and Persian sources, as well as his own visits to the country in 2009 and 2010. The result is a richly comprehensive picture of a fragmented Afghanistan caught in the midst of Western imperialism. It is a sobering reminder of the importance of cultural identity, societal history, and political traditions in shaping the motivations and complexities of a region and its people. Above all, it is a tragic and humbling retelling of modern Afghanistan’s early history, a catalog of the wasted expenses and lives on an “unnecessary war of dubious legality,” and a testament to the perseverance of its flawed but ambitious rulers (p. 419). Shah Shuja’s vision for Afghanistan, as Dalrymple writes, was not “an isolated and mountainous backwater but instead as tied by alliances to a wider world,” and although it is “sadly not a vision that shows much sign, even today, of being realized,” it “has never completely died” (p. 378).
Healing the Nation
Prisoners of War, Medicine and Nationalism in Turkey, 1914-1939

By Yücel Yanıkdağ

Reviewed by Sanem Güvenç Salgırlı

Over the past decade, the social and political history of Ottoman/Turkish medicine has been growing as a new and potent field of study; Yücel Yanıkdağ’s recently published book, Healing the Nation, is one of the latest contributions to that area of study. A result of fastidious research in Turkish, British and American state and military archives, as well as the diaries and memoirs of World War I Ottoman prisoners, the book tells the story of Russian and British war camps, both as subjects who made that life possible, and as objects of a nationally imbued medical discourse formed within and continued after the war. Yanıkdağ focuses on how nationalism slowly grew from within the camps and reached the emergent nation-state via medical discourse.

The first chapter narrates everyday practices in Russian and British prisoner of war (POW) camps, illustrating how each camp became a source of nationalism. The author’s his comparative approach, which contextually distinguishes the different camps, increases the book’s appeal. For instance, while the type of food that was consumed became a matter of religious (and national) pride in Russian camps (p. 27), the prisoners complained about the monotony of their diet in Egypt. While learning foreign languages from prisoners of other nationalities created strife among the ‘Ottomans’ in Russian camps, the monotone structure of camps in Egypt ensured that it never became a controversial issue. Just as these everyday elements inhabited specters of nationalism, so did social relationships within the camps.

In the second chapter, the author describes how nationalism grew out of relations with the other(s) – either a different ethnic groups, such as the Arabs, or the captors, Russians or British. Yet, equally significant was Ottomans’ practice of policing each other. Mostly a matter of intergenerational conflict, when the seniors believed that tradition was under threat, nationalist chastising of the younger generation began; wearing pajamas during the day, bathing naked, learning a foreign language, walking bare-headed and naked-legged, shaving moustaches, and so forth were all condemned by the older generation under the guise of protecting national honor. Moreover, observing each other’s behavior not only constituted the ground for self-policing, but also paved the way for larger societal and political concerns to surface.

Yanıkdağ’s third chapter is dedicated to the accounts of educated prisoners, who, after observing peasants-turned-soldiers, decided that the lack of education was the paramount problem facing the nation come the war’s end. The remaining three chapters, where the prisoners of war have shifted from being the subject of nationalism to its object, concern
itself with the links between medicine and nationalism.

The fourth chapter traces the pervasive occurrences of pellagra and trachoma among the Ottoman POWs, especially in Egypt. Both diseases prove to be curious histories to the extent that the British, imbued with nationalism of their own, continually externalized the responsibility of the diseases to the Ottoman army and culture. These POWs, who were blamed for their lack of proper hygiene, became the responsible party once more upon repatriation. Chapter five is a rather comprehensive account of the Ottoman/Turkish neuro-psychiatrist’s medical discourse that classified traumatized ex-soldiers as carriers of dormant degenerate genes. The fear that the genes of repatriated soldiers would contaminate the national gene pool laid the basis for policies of eugenics, both positive and negative, to be implemented on national scale. Yanıkdağ’s book closes with the sixth chapter, where eugenic policies are discussed to the extent that they stood at the intersection of the neuro-psychiatrist’s nationalist and professional concerns.

Though not one of his overtly pronounced aims, one of Yanıkdağ’s major contributions is his conceptual reworking of the Republic’s spatial and chronological borders. In his narrative, the WWI POW camps emerge as places where the founding problem of the Turkish Republic – how to construct a healthy, civilized, and modern nation – was developed. Reading about officials who were candidly concerned with educating the nation and devising solutions that resembled those of the Republic (in some cases by the very same people), it would not be an exaggeration to infer from Yanıkdağ’s book that the Turkish state was not founded in the parliament nor in the single party headquarters, but rather in the war camps. The nation that needed healing was not the local populations of Anatolia, but rather the sick and indifferent soldiers who were repatriated at the end of the war. As a cautious and meticulous historian, Yanıkdağ refrains from forming hasty links between Republican institutions and the war camps; yet, he suggests probable connections, such as those between the Village Institutes and the camp schools constructed by learned officers (p. 96).

Bringing the Great War into Ottoman/Turkish history and shifting the temporal and spatial boundaries of the Republic are significant contributions. Yet, Yanıkdağ does not stop there. By giving voice to the POWs via camp newspapers, memoirs, and diaries, and then using these to counter the official medical discourse of the neuro-psychiatrists of the Republican era (pp. 191-194), the author valuably contributes to the history from below genre. His emphasis on the Turkish medical community as a part of the international community and rejection of the adoption model could be seen as a silent yet powerful rejection of an Orientalist tendency still abound in historiography, both ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western.’ All of the above, weaved together in a comprehensive work with inquisitive reasoning and clever writing style, deserves a warm welcome to historiography.
Sean McMeekin’s book is a critical reading of the history of German involvement in the Middle East during World War I. It is specifically a political history of an internationally significant enterprise, namely the Berlin–Baghdad railway project. The book presents a chronological account of events, following a thematic course and mainly episodic in character. Methodologically, states, rulers and certain individuals are taken as prime agents in the narrative. Throughout the book, McMeekin underlines the strategic importance and potential power of jihad (Islamic holy war) not as a peripheral, as many scholars would argue, but as a central element of German war strategy. McMeekin argues that the German government wanted to utilize jihad as a weapon against Britain and Russia, as these governments ruled over Muslim populations in their imperial territories that outnumbered the Muslim population living in the Ottoman Empire, the largest Muslim Empire at the time.

The book covers a wide range of topics from the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway to the preparations for WWI, from the proceedings and experience of the war in the Middle East to Zionism and the Palestinian issue, and from anti-Semitism in Germany to 9/11 in the U.S. McMeekin initially narrates the history of the railway project, then the story disappears as WWI starts. Subsequently, the author focuses on the question of “Jihadism,” which is a recently generated concept used mostly in current political debates and political science to explain the motivation behind certain globally operating militants. From the epilogue on, the author emphasizes that the call for jihad as a German war strategy was an overestimation or a myth in almost every chapter. It was a failure in political and strategic terms but achieved one thing that is sowing the seeds of current “global jihadism.” McMeekin looks back on the competing German-Ottoman and British-Wahhabi alliances in a retrospective manner. As a result, he concludes that what we know as Jihadism today is the ultimate product of this competition from WWI. The last sentence of the book clearly indicates the presentism that dominates his argument: “it was a breathtaking error in judgment, and we are all living with the consequences today” (p. 366).

A great merit of this book is the abundant use of archival material. The rich list of abbreviations indicates that Russian, French, German, American, Austrian, British and Ottoman archival sources are utilized. In addition, the author weaves this material together nicely and composes an articulate, colorful and readable – though sometimes too informal and sarcastic – story. The book presents a kind of narration that many historians either

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**The Berlin-Baghdad Express**  
The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power  
*By* Sean McMeekin  
*Reviewed by* Faruk Yaslıçimen
overlook or can barely achieve. Moreover, he skillfully incorporates biographic information into the main text. Indeed, it is a painstaking work but not necessarily meticulous. Government documents without critical reading might explain less than what they tell. This academic-ethical concern aside, McMeekin feels no need to distance himself from the colonial language of the documents. For example, he describes how Boutros Ghali, the Coptic Christian Minister-President of Egypt who was appointed by the British colonial rule, was assassinated “by a young Muslim fanatic” (p. 27). Likewise, McMeekin does not hesitate to label the local forces fighting against the British imperial army in Egypt as “jihad-terror comitaji” (p. 92).

This brings us to the question of the author’s uncritical perspective. McMeekin not only reads the primary sources as “fact books” but also writes as if he was a part of the events. The book looks like a personal account of a scholar who was engaged and entangled in the events politically and sentimentally. He openly expresses his biased feelings about the Ottoman and German rulers of the time. For instance, he refers to Abdulhamid II as “tyrant” and “Bloody Sultan” many times and criticizes Max von Oppenheim and his “foolish” emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II for promoting jihad. Furthermore, it is easy to notice the author’s sympathy toward the British and the pro-British members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). An approach like this poses a serious question about the academic reliability of the book.

As mentioned above, The Berlin-Baghdad Express is mainly about Germany’s war effort in the East, written from an Anglo-American or general Western perspective. Why is the Ottoman approach missing in this book? Well, there is a section reserved for the Ottoman archives in the “list of abbreviations” but the book is really poor on that matter. In the whole book, there are only five references to the Ottoman archival documents, only four references to secondary literature on Ottoman history written in Turkish, and no reference to Ottoman-Turkish newspapers at all. The reader would expect more from a scholar who lived and taught in Turkey for more than a decade.

In his review of The Berlin-Baghdad Express, Robert Zens draws attention to McMeekin’s neglect of the rich scholarship on the period of Abdulhamid II, such as Kemal Karpat’s The Politicization of Islam (2001), Selim Deringil’s The Well-Protected Domains (1999), and Francois Georgeon’s Abdulhamid II (2003). To the list of neglected books, one should add İlber Ortaylı’s Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Alman Nüfuzu [German Influence in the Ottoman Empire], a well-known book written specifically on this subject. Unsatisfactory use of secondary literature is not only a scholarly shortcoming, but also leads McMeekin to some factual mistakes. For example, he writes, “There was Persia and southern Mesopotamia, where Shia Muslims had never accepted the Ottoman Sultan as their Caliph” (p. 14). Contrarily, as Meir Litvak shows in his article published in 2000, many leading Iraqi Shiite mujtahids followed the Ottoman Sultan’s call for jihad and fought against the British army during WWI.2

Essentialism and anachronism, embedded in the author’s sarcastic and informal writing style, are two other major shortcomings of the book. There are problematic remarks such as the Baghdad railway “born in sin” (p. 43), “Hamidian Islamists” (p. 75), “German Jihadists” (p. 89), “brunt of the Muslim rage” (p. 125), “Islam has always been a fighting creed” (p. 234), Germany ridding “the tiger of Islamic
rage and resentment” (p. 258), “the murderous rage of Muslims” (p. 365), “unleashing the murderous rage of Muslims” (p. 365) and others. The book occasionally gives the impression that the author sometimes goes too far as to transgress the tolerable limits of scholarship. So, it is not surprising to come across orientalist stereotypes such as “the iron law of the Orient” (p. 21); or “In the Orient, what one said mattered less than how one said it” (p. 207). McMeekin describes the Caliphate as a “troublesome Islamic institution.” While talking about Mustafa Kemal’s choices and asking why he did not declare himself a caliph, he said, “Instead he chose to kill off this troublesome Islamic institution which had brought his country nothing but devastation in the modern era” (p. 338). The author uses concepts such as “Islamic jihadism” for the early 20th century without consideration. Therefore, sentences such as “Berlin … had been cynically turned into the world capital of Islamic jihadism and inevitably corollary, anti-Semitism” is not an exception (p. 339).

An interesting approach by McMeekin is that he introduces Britain and Germany as essentially “Christian” powers. He emphasizes several times the “christianness” of European states and talks about “Christian Europe” (p. 71), “Christian West” (p. 71), “Christian Bulgaria” (p. 80), and “Balkan Christian armies” (p. 80) without ever discussing the extent to which the local and international policies of these states can be considered “Christian.” One can call this approach historical baptizing and it certainly drives the author to bizarre conclusions. For example, McMeekin naively astonishes how his “Christian” powers built such alignments that Germany cooperated with the Ottoman Empire (a Muslim state), whereas Britain fought against it. However, he seems less surprised when the emirs of Arab “Muslim” tribes in Hejaz established close relationships with Western “Christian” powers.

In sum, readers ready to tolerate anachronistic connections between past and present for the sake of “some” explanation of today’s political concerns might welcome this book as a novel contribution, but many scholars will certainly raise lots of questions about its perspective, method, sources, and content. The book begins with a reference to John Buchan, who comments that “someday, when the full history is written – sober history with ample documents – the poor romancer will give up business and fall to reading Miss Austen in a hermitage” (p. vii). Overall, this reference to Buchan seems to be the greatest irony of McMeekin’s The Berlin-Baghdad Express.

Endnotes
The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity
The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire

By Taner Akçam

Reviewed by Hazal Duran

What happened in 1915 is a much debated issue by scholars and researchers as well as politicians. Turkey’s official position labeling other claims on the topic as “so-called” has been increasingly questioned by Turkish academics and prominent thinkers. Taner Akçam, Professor of history at the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University, rejects Turkey’s proposition and claims that even if Turkey’s official history tries to reject the Armenian Genocide, the reality can be demonstrated by investigating the Ottoman archival sources, especially those belonging to the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of the General Directorate of Security, the Cipher Office, and Post-War Court-Martial Trials. Akçam supports his main thesis also by using German, British, Austrian, and U.S. archives, which he believes “tell the same story but from different points of view” (p. xxiii).

The book is an edited translation of its Turkish version, “Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur”: Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere Yönelik Politikalar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008). It consists of 12 detailed chapters containing stories of the different steps taken to homogenize Anatolia by deportating non-Muslim communities, which started to be a national security problem for the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) during World War I. In the preface, Akçam claims that the demographic policy implemented by the CUP shows a genocidal intention, especially towards the Greeks and Armenians, because it became an existential issue for the Committee. The whole aim of the book aims to prove this by using official documents from the Ottoman archives together with foreign archives. Principally, the “dual-track mechanism” takes center stage in almost every chapter of the book. While members of the CUP and other Ottoman authorities used official cables and cipher telegrams titled “extremely urgent and top secret” to transmit their orders to the provinces, they also created a “secret network” (şebeke-yi hafiye) to carry out their main commands. Chapters Three and Four concentrate on how the unofficial Secret Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) and other individuals were used during the deportation process of the Greeks based on memoirs and records of the trials. Other chapters describe how the aim of homogenizing Anatolia was implemented in the Armenian case and show details of how the settlement policy – or “social engineering project” in Akçam’s words – was conceived by CUP members and produced a genocidal process.

Although Akçam uses different evidence to support his main thesis, he misses some points that are very important to confirm the accuracy of his argument. In Chapter Five, “Anti-Armenian Policy,” the author examines
different theories on the 1915 events. Even if there is a common argument among some scholars that “the CUP had decided on a policy of annihilation and was awaiting an opportune moment to put it into practice,” Akçam finds this argument to be speculative (p. 139). Additionally, he believes that annihilation was not a necessity the way it occurred during war time (p. 125). At this point, he fails to form a strong theoretical framework for the process of annihilation. If it is neither a preplanned nor suddenly taken decision, how could it be clarified in a well-defined context? He underestimates the question when the idea of annihilation is addressed, but the lack of an answer to these questions creates a gap in his thesis.

In addition to these questions, Akçam’s use of different terms to describe the 1915 events, such as genocide, annihilation, crime against humanity, deportation, annihilation and massacre – one of his books is titled “a shameful act” – which may lead to confusion in trying to understand the theoretical position taken in the book. Using these words without definition or reason can cause confusion for the reader, especially one who is not familiar with the topic. The function of these words should be clarified by giving the purpose for their use and underlining their similarities and differences. Starting from Chapter Four, the author claims that the annihilation policy implemented towards the Greeks is different than that of the Armenians because the Greeks were politically powerful. However, he uses the same terms and concepts for both. Thus, using these assertive words without giving their meanings and functions causes confusion. Moreover, some of these terms do not make any sense in such an academic work, as they are related to ethical and moral issues. It harms Akçam’s objective approach, which is necessary for academic research. Even if he clarifies in the conclusion that he discusses this issue as a moral rather than legal concern and that he chose these words on purpose, it decreases the academic quality of the work.

As mentioned before, the main argument of the book depends primarily on the archival sources of the Empire. Besides memoirs belonging to Talat Pasha, Halil Menteşe, Kuşçubaşı Eşref, and other prominent figures of the era, several secondary sources were also used. While using a large number of sources strengthens the validity of hypothesis, it also transforms the work into a narrative rather than remaining analytical. Outside of the first and last two chapters, the book contains a great deal of information, but lacks analyses. Due to the analytical deficiency in these chapters, the hypothesis of the book cannot efficiently be associated with the data.

Overall, Taner Akçam’s work is valuable in providing references for the relationship between the settlement policies of the CUP during WWI and the deportation policy against the non-Muslim population. It contains a great number of sources belonging to both Ottoman and foreign sources. Academics who are particularly interested in a comparative study in this field may find this book useful if its deficiencies are also kept in mind. Reading Akçam’s book together with Fuat Dündar’s İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918) and Soner Çağaptay’s Türk Kimdir?: Türkiye’de İslam, Laiklik ve Milliyetçilik may be helpful in understanding the background of the CUP’s settlement policy to homogenizing Anatolia.
Ali Balcı’s book, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar (Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles, Actors, Practices), contains important information for those interested in international affairs and Turkish foreign policy. Contextualized by Balcı’s international relations background, the text offers a critical overview of Turkish foreign policy during the last 90 years. It consists of 11 chapters, each on a different Turkish foreign policy era, ranging from the time of Atatürk to the present day’s AK Party. To encourage further inquiry, each chapter ends with additional literature related to its topic.

Most evaluations of Turkish foreign policy offer a realist perspective by grounding analysis in global historical trends and interstate relations, rather than intrastate actors. This book’s originality, then, lies in its sophisticated ability to recognize the effects of decision-makers and internal processes on Turkish foreign policy throughout history. As Balcı stresses, “the basic assumption of this study is foreign policy as an extension of internal power relationships, clashes, and identity conflicts” (p. 20). Balcı remains faithful to this outlook throughout the text, evaluating each era’s leaders and their decisions through the lens of Turkey’s internal policy-making process.

Balcı’s assumption that internal actors and government institutions determine foreign policy comes to fore in the first chapter, which examines Turkish foreign policy under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The chapter highlights how the newly-formed Turkish Republic’s Kemalist paradigm—which sought to purge Turkish society of Islamic and Kurdish domestic influence in favor of Western institutions and practices—ushered in a Western-oriented foreign policy mindset. Balcı shows how the Takrir-i Süksen (Law on the Maintenance of Order), which aimed to quash any domestic opposition, ensured that foreign policy-making was left to the complete discretion of Mustafa Kemal and his close circle.

As Turkey sought to continue its Western mindset and nation-building process, while stay out of World War II, the foreign policy concept of “active non-alignment” (p. 55) emerged. Balcı stresses that under İsmet İnönü, Turkey continued its Western orientation on domestic and foreign policy fronts. Given Turkey’s flawed judicial and political system, policy-making power lied almost exclusively with İnönü. Balcı astutely suggests that Atatürk and İnönü were, in a way, sanctified, and therefore works of the period rarely criticized their policies. This situation changed after 1945, when leftist journalists began suggesting that Turkey had become an American outpost in the Near-East (p. 60). Indeed, this “Turkey as a U.S. satellite” critique remains salient today.
Balci’s third chapter argues that Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’s government solidified Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy by prioritizing constant and continuous economic development through external support sources (p. 80). During the Cold War period, Ankara aligned its Middle East policies with the U.S. to act against the USSR threat. Thus, in the middle of Ankara’s efforts to reach out to its neighbors, Balci shows why Turkey appeared to Middle Eastern countries as a tool of the West within a Cold War context (p. 95).

The military influenced Turkish foreign policy for a long time after Turkey’s 1960 military coup. In chapter four Balci shows how this influence came about using two outcomes from the Constitution of 1961: first, the foundation of the National Security Council and The Senate of the Republic; and second, the vox populi (voice of the people) stepping in as a result of a more liberal environment (p. 111). In this era, which Balci consistently characterizes as one of military domination, Turkey’s U.S.-centric policies received further criticism, and Turkey began considering self-interest in its relations with the USSR and Middle Eastern countries. Like today, discourse of a “shift” in Turkish foreign policy existed during this era. Nevertheless, Balci stresses that Turkey’s new, more versatile policy did not necessitate disengagement from the U.S. or NATO.

By exhibiting how internal dynamics and struggles for power have affected Turkish foreign policy, Balci reveals how Turkey has been limited by its own polarity. His examination suggests that major actors in Turkish domestic policy have also determined Turkey’s foreign engagements and partners. Readers can better understand, then, the context in which Turkey cited “anti-secularism” as its reason for opting out during the foundation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)—despite the fact that the OIC’s current president is a Turkish diplomat (p. 129).

Balci’s historical investigation provides clarity for the current political debates in Turkey. Readers see how the question “Is Turkey shifting away from the West?” has in fact been raised in almost every Turkish foreign policy period. The fifth chapter shows the prevalence of this question especially under Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the National Front-era foreign policy. Despite perceptions, foreign policy-makers at the time recognized that pursuing close relations with countries in the Middle East must come at the expense of ties with the West.

According to Balci, the 1980s (Chapter 6) marked the beginning of neo-liberalism in Turkey. Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s economic liberalism shaped Turkey’s relations with the Middle East as part of a multidimensional foreign policy. At the same time, the military, with its security-based perspective, also retained its foreign policy influence. Balci exposes how this economy-security divergence manifested itself in Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus. While the military viewed Cyprus as a “national issue,” Özal perceived Cyprus as a potential hindrance in relationships with the EU and the U.S (p.162).

The Cyprus issue once again highlights one of Balci’s tactful main points: that Turkish foreign policy is tied largely to internal political struggles and different groups vying for power. Under Özal, Turkey abandoned the simplistic yet highly influential Kemalist ideology that saw complete engagement with the West as the only path forward. Özal’s foreign policy preferences were shaped by his understanding of neo-Ottomanism, which favors civilizational boundaries over the nation-state paradigm. While Kemalism called for the purging of Islamism and conservatism
in Turkey, Özal’s neo-Ottoman understanding recognized that the legacy of the Ottoman Empire could exist in tandem with Western influences in Turkish foreign policy (p. 185).

In the 1990s, Özal’s liberal views lost deference, and security concerns instead of cooperation efforts dictated foreign policy decisions. Balci asserts that internal threats from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) led policy-makers to focus on securing Kemalism’s two highest priorities: territorial integrity and secularism. While Turkey’s unstable political situation caused Özal’s neo-Ottomanism to wane in influence, the military showed its renewed influence through the National Security Council, and shaped Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors solely around security concerns (p. 212).

Chapter 9 discusses Turkey’s reform process on the road to EU membership during the 2000s. Balci illustrates this process as a return to Westernization in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. Civilian politics and civil society organizations gained influence, the military lost its hold, and Turkey normalized relations with its neighbors. Turkey subsequently regained its economy-driven foreign policy (p. 234). According to Balci’s analysis, Turkey’s EU membership process served to drastically liberalize Turkey’s internal and foreign policy.

The 10th and final chapter of the book focuses on the AK Party period and outlines Turkish foreign policy between 2000 and 2011. The chapter suggests that under Davutoğlu’s philosophy and holistic view of foreign policy, Özal era preferences were realized and Turkey once again pursued economic liberalism. Balci identifies the AK Party period as a new one, in which decisions based on economy and interdependence impacted long-held political ties. Turkey’s pre-Arab Spring relationship with Syria highlights such a strategy.

Before the Arab Spring, the AK Party government, following a pluralist mindset, sought good relations with its neighbors regardless of the government’s level of democracy. The military’s loss of influence made room for NGOs, think tanks, and universities to have more say in their country’s foreign policy, leading to new and innovative ideas in the policy-making process. Yet after 2010, Turkey began qualifying its foreign ties with the belief that, in Balci’s words, “only politically-legitimate governments which respect freedom can provide peace and stability” (p. 286).

Overall, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles, Actors, Practices* is just as informative as a textbook and represents a unique contribution to Turkish political literature. It provides a sophisticated perspective of Turkish foreign policy throughout history, beginning with the military and Kemalism’s monopoly over the policy-making process. Balci shows how as this approach has lost influence in the last decade—allowing for Turkey’s Islamist and conservative elements to gain power—the country has become more influential in the global arena. Through his analysis of Turkey’s internal power struggles, Balci demonstrates how Turkey’s capacities and limits have led it to become a strategic middle power.

While the book highlights foreign policy criticisms from various internal power groups, it does not delve into the reasons for these criticisms. For example, Turkey’s worsened reputation in the Middle East stemmed from foreign policy-makers’ failure to act quickly and decisively to the Arab Spring. Still, Balci’s insights display how actor-based analysis can enhance the new field of foreign policy studies. The book is an ideal place to start for comparing Turkey’s foreign policy periods. It judiciously presents an array of perspectives for those who wish to conduct deeper academic research surrounding foreign policy.
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change and adaptation in Turkish foreign policy

Edited by; Kiлич Buğra Kanat, Kadır Üstün, Ahmet Selim Tekelioğlu

This volume is the product of the SETA Foundation at Washington DC’s second Young Scholars on Turkey (YSOT) Conference held in Washington, D.C. on February 5, 2013. The YSOT program organizes several events throughout the year, the highlight of which is the annual conference. Bringing together young scholars from the academic and policy worlds to the nation’s capital, the program aims to foster meaningful and up-to-date research and ideas on Turkish politics, history and foreign policy, and seeks to engage both academics and policy makers working on Turkey.
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