New Capabilities, Old Relationships:  
Emergent ESDP and EU-Turkish Relations

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Abstract

This paper will consider the EU’s emerging security structure and its effect on the EU’s foreign relations, using the Turkish case as an example. First of all, this paper will evaluate the re-definition of EU’s security perspective after the Cold War and how the shift in the EU’s image from a civilian power to one with prospective military capabilities affects the wider European security. Secondly, taking into consideration that most of the potential crisis regions that the EU might get involved in are also neighbouring regions to Turkey, Turkey’s relations with the EU demonstrate the effect of the EU’s new capabilities on its long established relationships. This paper will put forward that the EU’s relations with Turkey contain a security aspect for both sides, not only due to the geostrategic position of Turkey but also due to the emerging security structure within the EU. Finally, this paper will analyse the prospects for the EU in the European security architecture and the commitment of the EU to European security, considering Turkey’s objection to any European military establishment that excludes itself. By taking Turkey as an example, this paper aims to analyse the effect of the EU’s emerging security dimension on its already established partnerships with the countries in its surrounding region.

Introduction

The efforts for the promotion of a European Security and Defence Policy in the European Union are a milestone toward the realisation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) provides the EU with an important tool for the pursuit of an efficient CFSP. The adoption of Petersberg tasks as the aim of the ESDP and the promotion of military and civilian capabilities enhance EU’s position as a benevolent civilian power with military capabilities. However, the international implications of this achievement are problematic: How do the non-EU actors perceive and react to these new capabilities of the EU and how can future
achievements affect the foreign relations of the EU? These questions are the main focus of this paper. This paper will focus on these questions, and analyze them by taking the EU-Turkish relations as an example. The mostly economic nature of relations between Turkey and the EU have changed to become political, not only due to further political integration in the EU and Turkey’s accession process, but also due to the emergence of ESDP.

In this respect the paper will present the EU’s prospects for success in promoting European security and how such a project can draw new lines of division on the Continent. Turkey perceives its formal exclusion from an emergent European Security and Defence Policy as a threat to its own security since it would lose the tools of influence it would have had had the ESDP developed as a result of the ESDI within NATO. Turkey’s exclusion from a militarily capable EU would also mean military exclusion from post-Cold War Europe.

Surely, Turkey is not the only country whose relations with the EU have been influenced by the emergence of ESDP and the prospect of an EU with military power. The United States made the ESDP and the prospect of NATO issues of discussion in the EU-US Summit in Goteborg in June 2001. EU’s relations with Russia and the prospect of the eastward enlargement of the EU can also be affected by the emergence of the ESDP, if Russia starts perceiving the EU as a European military alliance.

For the time being, the ESDP is a voluntary joint action of the EU member countries to realise the Petersberg tasks, which are crisis-management and humanitarian operations. However, humanitarian actions can find themselves in the middle of military crises. Besides, once integration in the military field begins, it may not be too long before the EU develops an independent army or an independent military policy. Thus, the perception of the EU as a prominent actor in European security can change EU’s relations with its partners. This will be analysed in the following two parts, focusing on the EU-Turkish relations in the second part.

In the first part, the paper will evaluate the impact of the emergence of ESDP on European security— the capacities it has promoted, the forms of cooperation it foresees with its Allies and partners, the debate in NATO and the views of the Allies on participation in the ESDP. In the second part, the paper will present the changing nature of EU-Turkish relations from economic to political and military, the reasons for Turkey’s objection to some aspects of ESDP, and suggestions for a solution to the disagreements.

The research done for this paper is based mainly on official documents of the EU and NATO, especially when presenting the development of ESDP, EU-US relations and the debates taking place in NATO. The Turkish view presented is based on the debates taking place in the Turkish media, Turkish foreign ministry declarations and articles written by Turkish diplomats, academicians and military staff.
What Does the ESDP Mean for European Security?

The end of the 1990s brought a new factor into European security: The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The roots of the ESDP lie within NATO’s concept of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) as well as in CFSP’s long-term goal of a security and defence policy, which might lead to common defence. Whether the ESDP will become an effective agent of European security is still unknown. The success of integration of security will depend on the future shape of the EU, which is currently under debate. Although the ESDP is still in its formational stage, it is causing both approbation and concern among Europe’s allies and partners. This part of the paper is going to focus on the ESDP as a new policy of the EU, describing what it comprises and what it excludes, while taking into consideration its repercussions on EU’s Allies and partners. The second part will focus on how it is already affecting foreign relations of the EU, using the EU’s relations with Turkey as an example.

As stated in the 1994 NATO Summit Declaration and reaffirmed in 1996 in Berlin, the NATO countries fully supported the development of ESDI within the Alliance by making assets and capabilities available for WEU led operations. The ESDI would enable all European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance. According to NATO’s Washington Declaration issued at the 50th Anniversary of the Alliance, the NATO allies welcomed the further strengthening of European defence capabilities, which would enable European allies to act more effectively together, thus reinforcing the transatlantic link. (NATO 1999a) As stated in the Strategic Concept agreed at the April 1999 Washington Summit, the EU has taken important decisions to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process would have implications for the entire Alliance and all European allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. (NATO 1999b)

As Gerry explains, for the proponents of an ESDP the changing political landscape in the post-Cold War period is driving the need for an independent European defence policy. The old parameters are no longer valid, and the future of US commitment and engagement in Europe is unknown. Europe is richer and stronger than before and has a population larger than the US. These facts, together with the potential for non-state and other threats to stability and security in Europe, mandate that the EU take responsibility for its own defence. As the Ambassador Marc Otte, Head of ESDP Task Force in Council Secretariat of the EU, put it, “the EU has become a political entity whose time has come to develop its own security needs and the means to defend itself.”(stated in Gerry 2001) The merging of the concept of an ESDI in NATO with the EU’s second pillar, the CFSP (and its aim for a common security and defence policy which could in time lead to a common defence), made up today’s ESDP. The divergence of Turkish and EU views on the participation of non-EU European NATO countries in ESDP has its roots in the development processes of these two concepts, ESDI and ESDP.
The ESDP has been established with reference to the second “CFSP” pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Its purpose is to promote integration in the security and defence fields. Although it proceeds in the form of intergovernmental integration, ESDP’s Headline Goal and the adoption of the Petersberg tasks by the EU present a commitment of the participating countries to do more for their security. The emergent ESDP foresees probable use of NATO capabilities and strategic planning and aims to take action in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions where NATO as a whole is not engaged, while at the same time supposedly promoting an ESDI within NATO. Under the current framework, ESDP is a benevolent undertaking of the EU member countries to enhance their security by the outlined Petersberg tasks and does not present a decoupling of its participating countries from NATO’s collective defence, although there are views that the ESDP should or could develop into an independent European defence. (Sanberk 2001a)

Development of ESDP is intended to strengthen the EU’s capacity for action in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian tasks. Where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU is determined to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. In Lord Robertson’s words “those who observe the European process know that there was an inevitability in the extension of the EU into security and defence policy. But ESDP is not about European strategic independence but about a more coherent European contribution to crisis management.”(Robertson 2001a)

**1.1 Latest Accomplishments for the Conduct of ESDP**

The EU is developing an autonomous capacity to make decisions. The political and Security Committee (PSC) will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including ESDP, help define policies by drawing up “opinions” for the Council, send guidelines to the Military Committee (EUMC), and receive the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee. The PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the EU’s military response to crises. The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU, and it directs all military activities within the EU framework. (CFSP 2001) The non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU have appointed interlocutors to the Political and Security Committee, as well as contacts to the EU Military Staff, to facilitate close interaction with these EU bodies. (Presidency Report 2001)

ESDP is not foreseen to promote the creation of a European army. The commitment of national resources by member states to such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions. For this aim a Capabilities Commitment Conference was convened in November 2000. A capability improvement conference is foreseen in November 2001. The EU finds it essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the ESDP that the Union’s military capabilities
for crisis management enable it to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets. On one hand, the promotion of the capabilities of the EU to enable it to take action without recourse to NATO assets would signal a whole new independent common foreign and security policy tool, thus promoting further political integration. On the other hand, it would create boundaries of exclusion and enhance suspicions about a future decouplement of EU countries from NATO. In addition to the institutional improvement of the ESDP by the earlier Presidencies, the Gothenburg European Council also endorsed the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, which will improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action. Accordingly, conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects including ESDP, development cooperation and trade. (European Council 2001) The EU is also developing an Exercise Policy. The EU Exercise Policy and the EU Exercise Programme have been approved by the Council. The Exercise policy identifies EU requirements for categories of exercises, including joint exercises with NATO. Arrangements for the involvement of non-EU European NATO members and other candidates for accession to the EU are provided for in the EU Exercise Policy. It has also been confirmed that in the relations between the EU and NATO, there will be no discrimination against any of the member states. The EU will invite NATO, on the basis of reciprocity regarding crisis-management exercises, to observe EU exercises, including those that are not executed jointly. Non-EU European NATO members, and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, will be invited to participate in the conduct of relevant exercises in line with the provisions for their participation in EU-led operations. Also, in line with the established dialogue, consultation and cooperation, these countries should be invited to observe in relevant exercises. Decisions on participation and observation in EU-NATO exercises will be taken after EU-NATO consultations. In this context, the EU will seek to ensure that all non-NATO EU candidate countries participate in or observe these exercises. (Presidency Report 2001) At the first meeting of NATO and EU Military Committees at NATO Headquarters, it was stressed that the autonomy of NATO and EU decision-making will be fully respected. (IMS Press Release 2001)

1.2 EU-NATO Relationship

The concerns in NATO about the emergence of ESDP are twofold: whether the ESDP will cause disengagement of Europe from its Atlantic link, and whether the ESDP will cause additional problems among the Allies. NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson has said that the 19-state NATO’s burden sharing should approximately be 50-50 between the Atlantic and Europe and that he supports the EU military force as long as it does not intend to become a European army and does not extend its operational scope beyond the Petersberg tasks. (European Voice 2001) While talking about ESDP, Lord Robertson often stresses that the NATO will retain its core collective defence
mission, and that the EU is focusing only on crisis-management. So instead of “NATO or Nothing” he says there will now be a European option for handling crises where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The US would be spared a situation where it is dragged into engagement simply for lack of alternatives. (Robertson 2001b) “Strengthening the EU does not mean that NATO will lose its central role in European security, nor will the transatlantic security link will be weakened. On the contrary, when the long-sought European security identity comes to fruit, Europe and North America will still be working together, only through more flexible arrangements and with more capability at hand.” (Robertson 2001c)

The NATO-EU relationship on European security is crucial in determining the shape of the 21st century European security architecture, especially due to the doubts about the future of NATO and US commitment in Europe. The EU-NATO relationship is also important since it could delineate new forms of inclusion or exclusion in Europe on security matters, which is Turkey’s main concern about the future role of ESDP. As seen by these comments, ESDI, which is a NATO aim, is attributed to the EU by itself, thus excluding from the start the non-EU European NATO members, although the EU and NATO are not destined to converge in their memberships. NATO is aiming to continue enlargement at the Prague Summit in 2002. The events of the September 11th have shown that NATO preserves its commitment to the defence of its members. Article V of the NATO Treaty, calling for a mutual defence guarantee, was invoked for the first time in the history of the Alliance. As Gordon comments, after September 11th “the benefits of having close allies with similar interests and values-and the tools to defend them- are all too clear.” He also mentions that the events of September 11th have important implications for the ESDP. Firstly, ESDP might be called into action earlier than envisaged due to withdrawal of American troops from the Balkans. Secondly, the European governments would be forced to give priority to defence expenditures while enhancing their capabilities for ESDP. (Gordon 2001-02) On the other hand, ESDP is mostly about crisis-management and does not include territorial or anti-terrorism defence (yet). Counter-terrorism is one of NATO’s tasks, but NATO’s capabilities are mostly retaliatory and not preventive, whereas the EU possesses the means of police (Europol), financial measures like sanctions, and judicial means. (Rutten 2001, 2002)

Thus, the relationship between the EU and NATO gains much more significance than before. The aim of relations between the EU and NATO is to ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in determining the appropriate military response to crises and to guarantee effective crisis-management. As the Presidency Report on ESDP to the Nice European Council strongly emphasises, EU and NATO are organisations of a different nature, which would be taken into account in the arrangements concerning their relations and in the assessment to be made by the EU of existing procedures governing WEU-NATO relations with a view to their possible adaptation to an
EU-NATO framework. (Presidency Report 2000) This may mean that the rights acquired by the non-EU European NATO members in the WEU may be diminished by the incorporation of WEU objectives into the EU framework. Although progress has been made in the development of permanent and effective relationship with NATO, rapid agreement is called for on arrangements permitting EU access to NATO assets and capabilities (European Council 2001). This leads to the second problem of the Turkish veto for the strategic use of NATO assets. The EU suggests that arrangements between the two organisations should be as follows: The EU should have guaranteed permanent access to NATO’s planning capabilities, when the EU is considering an operation involving NATO assets and capabilities. EU should presume the availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities, and a series of command options should be made available to the EU. (Presidency Report 2000)

1.3 Outsiders’ View on the ESDP

The United States

US opinion on ESDI ranges from the belief that “the EU force would undermine NATO” to a more positive understanding that “finally the Europeans would do more for their defence and that that could lead to a more equal burden-sharing in the Alliance”. (Gerry 2001) However, the EU members focus on crisis management should not lead to a two-tier Alliance in which the EU members engage only in low intensity situations whereas the rest engage in high-profile security issues. For this reason, it is suggested that NATO’s capabilities for crisis-management should also be enhanced, but that it should also give the European members the capacity to take the lead in operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged or where the US does not want to participate. (Vershbow 2000) At the Gotemborg Summit, the US welcomed the EU efforts to acquire a civilian and military crisis-management capability, and the US specifically called for an EU crisis management process that is transparent, fully coordinated with NATO and that would provide for “the fullest possible participation of non-EU European allies.” (Joint EU-US Statement 2001) The US hopes that the ESDP is managed in a way that adds capabilities to NATO and embeds defence planning in NATO. It also wants activities arranged so that NATO has the right of first refusal and so that ESDP applies only where NATO has chosen not to act collectively. (Washington File 2001) Put in this way, the US view can be partially taken to support Turkey’s position that European NATO members should not be ousted from ESDP decision-making, and that NATO should remain the main security provider in Europe. On the other hand, one can argue that since the ESDP is an EU project and an achievement of integration, it can only be comprised of and serve its own members. The US seems to be taking a middle-way position with an understanding of Turkish concerns.

Canada
Canada seems not to be involved in the debate among the Allies and cooperates with the EU on the promotion of crisis-management efforts. Canada, with its long experience in peacekeeping, is seen as a valuable partner to the EU in the area of ESDP. The EU welcomes the readiness of Canada to contribute to crisis management efforts undertaken by the Union. The EU also aims to work with Canada to take forward the modalities for Canadian participation in EU-led operations.

Russia

Currently, Russia does not view the EU and NATO as comparable organisations. NATO is a defence instrument and Russia will have to take necessary political and defensive measure for NATO enlargement, which by including the Baltic States were to extend to the borders of Russia. (Gerry 2001) The EU-Russian relations are regulated under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Also, the Nordic Dimension is important in EU’s relations with Russia. It aims to promote closer dialogue and cooperation in political and security matters in Europe, to elaborate the concept of a common European economic scape, to pursue dialogue on energy cooperation, and to open up EIB lending for selected environmental projects. The launching of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership by the International Financial Institutions and the Commission will help mobilise support for environmental and nuclear safety projects. (European Council 2001) The EU-Russia Summit also reaffirmed the commitment to promoting closer dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe. Possible participation by Russia in EU-led crisis management operations under agreed conditions is foreseen and dialogue with the Ukraine on ESDP is continuing. (Presidency Report 2001) The Ukraine can also be invited to participate in EU-led operations. (Presidency Report 2000)

The non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates to the EU

The position of non-EU European NATO countries is the closest to that of Turkey. They belong to the collective defence of NATO, but are not a part of the ESDP that their EU Allies are developing. All these countries are invited to contribute to EU’s Headline Goal. The non-EU European NATO members can take part, if they wish, in EU-led operations, making use of NATO assets. The other countries which are candidates to the EU may be invited to participate in such operations. In an EU operation without recourse to NATO assets, these countries can be invited to join in the operation. Permanent consultation arrangements with the non-EU European NATO members and other countries who are candidates to the EU have been agreed at the Nice European Council as well as arrangements for crisis periods with a particular attention to consultation of the six non-EU European NATO members if an operation using NATO assets and capabilities is under consideration. Non-EU European Allies and candidate
countries deploying significant military forces under an EU-led operation will have the same rights and obligations in day to day management of the operation as the EU states taking part in the operation. (Presidency Report 2000)

Among the non-EU European NATO countries, whose positions resemble that of Turkey, Norway is an Ally from Cold War times whose main security concerns are arms control and stability in the Nordic region. (Borch 2001) The three new members of NATO are closer geographically to Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Poland has adopted a position similar to that of Turkey, stating that ESDP should evolve according to security requirements and not according to institutional design, and insisting that the EU’s arrangements for participation of non-EU European Allies should be built on arrangements existing within the WEU, thus avoiding the establishment of a circle of insiders versus outsiders. (Geremek 1999) Poland has proposed a range a participation forms from the participation of foreign and defence ministers of the six non-EU European NATO members to the General Affairs Council with participation of defence ministers held before the European Council meetings to participation of liaison officers in day to day work of EU military staff. Poland argued that such a regulation for participation would be de facto participation of these countries in the decision-making process. It proposed a decision-making mechanism that includes the ability to participate fully in the decision-making process concerning political control and strategic direction of operation on PSC level (according to intra-Alliance Understanding of 14th April 1999). Also included is participation in the decision-making process concerning Operational Plan as well as other strategic decisions such as withdrawal and participation in day to day conduct of an operation in cooperation with the command structures and the military committee. (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999)

The Czech Republic also endorses the full use of positive elements of WEU’s cooperative and inclusive culture and emphasises that military contribution to the Headline Goal must be coupled with participation in the political decision-making and decision-shaping processes. (Kavan 2000) In the Joint Statement of their Budapest Meeting on the occasion of the first anniversary of their accession into NATO, the Foreign Ministers of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic stressed that the role of non-EU European NATO members must be taken fully into account. (Joint Statement 2000) Hungary also emphasises that ESDP must be formulated on the basis of mutual trust between NATO and the EU. (Martonyi 2001) Although the three new members of NATO find themselves in a similar position to that of Turkey, their advanced position in the accession process to the EU will soon make them members and solve the problem of inclusion in the ESDP.

The ESDP is rapidly developing institutional arrangements for its enhancement and for cooperation with its Allies and partners. It is the expectations about the future role of the EU in European security that make the development of an ESDP a matter of wide discussion in academic, diplomatic, and military circles. The ESDP has started to be quite an important issue in the
EU’s foreign relations. Until now it has mostly concerned Turkey and the US, but it can also be expected to arise in the EU’s relations with Russia in case the development of the ESDP proves to be successful. It is also coming up in NATO meetings as an issue that seems to cause problems between the EU and non-EU Allies. The following part of the paper will focus on the ESDP aspect of EU-Turkish relations.

ESDP and EU-Turkish Relations

II.1 Background of EU-Turkish Relations

Until the mid-1990s, EU-Turkish relations were mostly economic in content. The association agreement, the Matutes Package, followed much later with a customs union. Financial cooperation constituted the crux of relations between the EU and Turkey. However, by 1990 the declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty invited the EU members to become WEU members and non-EU NATO members to become associate WEU members. Thus, EU and WEU memberships seemed to converge although non-EU NATO members were provided an associate status in the organisation. Although this development in the field of European security was not taken to be too crucial at the time of its inception, it later gained in importance.

The Central and Eastern European transition countries’ demands for accession to the EU led to the subsequent announcement of Copenhagen criteria for joining the Union, which can be taken as the political definition of European Union as a system of values and which has brought a political dimension to EU’s relations with aspiring countries. By 1995, EU-Turkish relations started to gain a political and security content with the emergence of the Cyprus issue. During the negotiations for the establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EU, Greece announced that unless the other EU member accept the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the end of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, it would veto the customs union agreement. Although this was a debate among the EU members and not between EU and Turkey, an issue that Turkey considers vital for its security has become an issue of discussion in the EU. Later many issues would come up in this respect.

In 1995, Turkey was incorporated into the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, which furthers political dialogue economic development, and the strengthening of civil society between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. However, EU-Turkish relations were soon dominated with discussion of Turkey’s candidacy and not with the Mediterranean process. At the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, Turkey was declined the status of a candidate. Attempting to compensate for chilled relations, the European Strategy for Turkey which oversaw the enhancement of the customs union and the establishment of a European Conference, which brought together EU members, candidate countries, and Turkey on political and security issues. Relations focused on the problem of
Turkey’s candidacy to the EU until the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, which announced Turkey as a candidate country. Since that date, the relations between Turkey and the EU have two main foci. The first is political reform in Turkey according to the national programme and the accession partnership document, which includes issues that Turkey considers important for its security. These are the solution of border problems, i.e. problems in the Aegean with Greece, and support for the UN Secretary General’s efforts for the solution of the Cyprus problem. (European Commission 2000) The second focus of EU-Turkey relations is the ESDP.

II.2 ESDP in EU-Turkish Relations

Turkey is not satisfied with the position it would have as a contributing country to the EU led operations (Hürriyet 2000), for the reasons stated below. As an Allied country and a member of the WEU, Turkey was given full and equal rights in the preparation, planning and conduct of WEU-led operations. Turkey’s declared contribution to the EU’s Headline Goal stands as the sixth largest contribution in total, surpassing those of ten EU members. The aim of enhancing the EU capabilities so as to be able to lead an operation without recourse to NATO assets raised fears in Turkey about being excluded from an emerging new security framework. In order to voice its concerns, Turkey chose to veto the EU’s use of strategic NATO assets. Turkey’s feeling of exclusion has been magnified by the ignoring of Turkey in the new weights of decision-making determined by the Nice Treaty. Steps towards further political integration in the EU enhance Turkey’s fears of being left out of “Europe.”

According to Onur Öyemen, Turkey’s Permanent Representative to NATO, Turkey’s concerns about the ESDP can be classified into four categories: 1. Institutional concerns, with respect to preserving the integrity of NATO; 2. concerns on how best to strengthen European security; 3. a matter of principle to respect agreements reached at the level of Heads of State and Government; and 4. national concerns with respect to protecting national interests. (Öyemen 2001) For the purposes of this paper these concerns will be classified as political and military.

Political concerns

As stated above, since the beginning of the new enlargement process Turkey has feared political exclusion from the EU. The EU’s decision to not declare Turkey a candidate country in December 1997 (Eralp 2000), coupled with the starting of accession negotiations with Cyprus (which will present a second veto to Turkey’s accession once it is in), is perceived in Turkey as a sign of a political will to alienate Turkey from the EU. Also, the mentioning of Cyprus and Aegean problems in the Accession Partnership document are equated with the final promotion of ESDP in the EU instead of the already agreed ESDI in NATO. A distinguished Turkish diplomat Özdem Sanberk, Turkey’s previous

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Ambassador to London, wrote early in 2001 that “it is no secret there are circles in Northern Europe who would be delighted to see Turkey withdraw its application for EU membership. They would probably even be more pleased if Turkey went into a phase of isolation.” However, he wants good working relations and would like the Turkish accession process to resume. He reminds the policy-makers in Ankara that “if the Helsinki momentum can be maintained, Turkey will be key player on the European stage, but if the accession process breaks down, Turkey would revert to being a buffer zone on the edge of Europe.” (Sanberk 2001b) This quotation shows how Turkey perceives its candidacy to the EU as a matter of belonging to Europe and also, more importantly, as a matter of security.

**Military concerns**

Turkey has a feeling of defence solidarity with NATO members, having constituted the southeastern flank of NATO during the Cold War. NATO gave Turkey a sign of belonging to the “West” during the Cold War years. The inception of an ESDP in the EU, of which Turkey is not a member, was perceived at first as a threat to NATO solidarity. This was the first concern mentioned by Ambassador Onur Öymen. Özdem Sanberk argues in an article on the Internet site of TESEV, a Turkish think tank, that the development of military capabilities by the EU is a rival to NATO and is the first step to a military integration that would diminish NATO’s influence. (Sanberk 2001a) For Turkey, NATO is the primary organisation for collective defence and security. NATO also has priority in crisis-management as laid out at NATO’s Washington Summit in April 1999. Accordingly, the formation of ESDP should develop in conformity with the principles of “indivisibility of security” and “preservation of the Atlantic link”. It is of paramount importance not to create inequality and division within the Alliance. (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000a)

Turkey’s main concern about the ESDP is that since it is not an EU member, it does not have a place among the formal decision-makers. The cooperation foreseen between the EU and the six non-EU European NATO members in Feira Summit and reiterated in the Presidency Report to the Nice European Council can be summarised as, “Permanent and regular consultation at peace time.” Non-EU countries can also propose meetings, on issues of security, defence and crisis management. Liaison officers can be appointed by the six to the EU military staff. Other specific liaison arrangements can be organised, especially for the exercises. In times of crises, there will be pre-operational consultations to allay the fears of the non-EU allies. They will be kept abreast of EU thinking on strategic military options, operations and operational plans. During the operational phase, European members of NATO will have automatic right to participate in EU operations where NATO assets are used. They can be invited to participate if the operation is made without recourse to NATO assets. If these countries contribute to an EU led operation they will have equal rights
and obligations in the daily conduct of operations. (Robertson 2001a) However, most of the regions that the EU crisis-management forces are expected to serve are neighbouring regions to Turkey and thus are of vital importance to Turkey’s security. Under this procedure, the points of Turkey’s objection are as follows: If the EU is conducting an operation without recourse to NATO assets in a neighbouring region to Turkey, Turkey’s participation is dependent on an invitation by the EU. Secondly, even if Turkey is invited or participates in an operation making use of NATO assets, it is going to participate only in the daily conduct of operations, which are mainly military decisions made by professional military staff and not strategic or political reflections on the aim of the operation. Especially if the EU makes use of NATO planning, Turkey feelsousted in the conduct of the operation, which it has helped plan in the first place. (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001a) Evaluating these objections by Turkey to EU’s mechanism of participation, we can say that Turkey sees in the EU not only a civilian power, but one that can lead operations in its neighbouring regions without Turkey having an influence on it.

Lord George Robertson accepts that EU’s taking over of many of WEU’s functions may be perceived as calling into question the benefits of Turkey’s far-reaching associate status in the WEU and that the recent developments may suggest that Turkey is suffering a setback in its security status and a net loss of its influence on the evolution of European security. He stresses that Turkey’s proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean put Turkey at the centre of a vital strategic area. As a secular democracy and a firm NATO ally, Turkey has a great opportunity to play a role as an agent of positive change. Any attempt to deprive Turkey of this role would be self-defeating and contrary to the West’s own vital strategic interests. (Robertson 2001a) The policy that Turkey has adopted is to make its voice heard in NATO decisions on granting assets to the EU. Turkey is striving to preserve the influence it has in NATO over EU policies. (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000a) However, this policy cannot be taken for granted for long since political change will surely continue and might result in an American disengagement from Europe in the coming years of the 21st Century. (Sanberk 2001a)

II.3 Solution of the disagreement

As expressed by the Turkish foreign ministry in early 2000, Turkey would like to

- participate on a regular basis in day to day planning and consultations on matters related to European security, as was the case with the WEU.
- participate fully and equally in the process leading to decision-making on all EU-led operations drawing on the collective assets and capabilities of NATO and their implementation,
- participate in the decision-shaping and subsequent preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations not drawing on NATO assets and capabilities.
In addition to these worries, the Turkish policy was based on the fear that the EU’s new capabilities could be used against herself in a dispute with Greece over the Aegean or Cyprus. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, it would be helpful to ease the relations between the EU and Turkey on this subject if the EU and NATO would have a structural relationship, preferably based on a framework agreement to be reached between the two organisations. These relations should be guided by principles of transparency and reciprocity. Such an agreement would facilitate Turkey to be informed of efforts related to the development of ESDP within the EU and to be able to express her views in a timely manner. (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000b) Before the Laeken European Council, the UK, US and Turkey succeeded in agreeing to a formula, which ensured that ESDP would not be used against a NATO ally and in areas that harmed Turkish national interests, and Turkey would lift its veto on the use of NATO capabilities by the EU and give up its wish to be included automatically in any operation that took place in Turkey’s vicinity but did not involve NATO assets. The EU confirmed that Turkey would be invited to take part in an EU led operation without recourse to NATO assets by an invitation agreed by the Council of Ministers. (Financial Times 2001) This agreement, the details of which are not yet officially published, was rejected by Greece in the Laeken Summit. The issue still awaits Greek approval.

The United States sees the tension between the EU and Turkey as detrimental to solidarity in the Alliance. A fact brought forward by the US on this disagreement is that the development of an effective ESDP is possible only if the six non-EU European NATO allies are comfortable with their role in shaping EU decisions on crisis management and participation in EU-led operations. It is essential that non-EU European Allies such as Turkey enjoy a special status in their security relations with the EU because of their NATO Article V commitment to the 11 EU Allies. If a crisis being handled by the EU were to escalate, Article V could come into play. Thus regular dialogue and an atmosphere of inclusion and transparency are needed to develop a decision-shaping role for non-EU Allies. (Vershbow 2000)

The determining question here, as explained by Vershbow, seems to be about the nature of ESDP for the time being, i.e. whether the ESDP is about institution building or about problem solving, whether the ESDP is primarily a political exercise (as the latest stage in the European integration), or whether ESDP’s main goal is to solve real world security problems in Europe. If the ESDP is mostly about European construction then it will mostly focus on institution building and there will be a tendency to oppose interference of NATO and to minimise the participation of non-EU Allies. Then, with the autonomy as an end in itself ESDP will be an ineffective tool for managing crises and a source of tension in NATO. If on the other hand the EU’s primary aim is to solve European security problems with ESDP as a means to that end, then the EU will welcome cooperation with NATO and the contribution of non-EU NATO allies. NATO will have a stronger European presence in the process. For the time
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being, ESDP seems to be serving the major aim of providing the EU with autonomous capabilities and strengthening itself as a new dimension of CFSP. However, as it matures ESDP can be expected to develop practical solutions to real world problems. As suggested by Vershbow, the key is to get the balance right. NATO-EU relations on ESDP-ESDI should not be a zero-sum game in which it is considered a concession for one organisation to sit in the same room with the members of the other. (Vershbow 2000)

Despite the initial emphasis on crisis-management and conflict prevention operations, the results of the recent Summits indicate that the EU’s long-term objective is to acquire a larger domain in the security field, possibly leading to defence. The Turkish position is that, without denying the EU’s and NATO’s decision-making autonomy as institutions, a sui generis solution can be found, as was found in WEU by the invention of an associate membership status. (Orhun 2000).

Since mid-1990s, the EU has started to involve itself in matters Turkey considers related to its security. The prospective membership of Cyprus and the EU’s involvement in the Cyprus problem presented the first sign that EU-Turkish relations were acquiring a security dimension. The second step has been the promotion of ESDP. Turkey is probably the first country to perceive the EU's military capabilities as worthy of serious consideration in European security. Turkey’s concerns about the development of the EU’s military capabilities is the first example of the EU’s prospective image. In an enlarging Europe, institutions such as NATO and the EU are becoming tools of inclusion and exclusion. They are promoting identities and providing frameworks of security. Their relations with outsiders should not lead to new divisions in the European continent.

Conclusions

The international concerns about the emergence of ESDP and the development of military capabilities by the EU can be summarised with reference to Madeleine Albright’s warning about the “3 D’s”: ESDP should not decouple the US from Europe, must not duplicate NATO’s structures and capabilities, and must not discriminate against non-EU European NATO members. (Quoted in Carpenter 2000) Turkey is the country whose security seems for now to be most affected by the emergence of ESDP. Similar is the position of non-EU European NATO allies in times of a particular crisis. The US concerns about the promotion of an ESDP are based on the effect of ESDP on NATO’s future, on relations between allies, but also on its own engagement to Europe. If the ESDP proves to be successful, Russia could perceive the EU as an organisation with military capabilities. Such a possibility must be taken into consideration when the EU is approaching the Russian borders by enlargement. EU should continue being a civilian power, with the Petersberg tasks promoting its image as a peacekeeping power. At the beginning of the 21st Century, institutions become tools of identity building, inclusion and exclusion. Turkey’s
concerns about being included into the new, emergent military architecture in Europe are about belonging to Europe. In order for the EU to promote European security it must send its partners, allies and neighbours the message that it favours cooperation and inclusion for security in Europe.
Notes

1 Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking.

2 The European Union has decided to establish a 50-60,000 men force deployable within 60 days sustainable for at least a year to carry out the Petersberg tasks by 2003, according to the Feira European Council Conclusions.

References


